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INTRODUCTION
The law of summary judgment as applied in California state courts
has degenerated into a state of confusion. This confusion stems from a
poorly drafted summary judgment statute compounded by a flawed
1995 decision of the Second Appellate District California Court of Ap-
peal in Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court.' In Union
Bank, the court held that the California Legislature intended a substan-
tial expansion of summary judgment 2 The court based the holding on
its interpretation of a concededly ambiguous statute and upon contra-
dictory legislative history.3
To clarify the problematic summary judgment statute, the state's
Republican governor,4 with support from Republican legislators, the de-
fense bar, and business interests, proposed yet another poorly drafted
amendment-Assembly Bill 3113. However, the bill died in the Demo-
crat-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee on August 7, 1996.8 Apart
from the bi's merits, this flawed proposal never had a chance for pas-
sage by the Senate because of opposition by the powerful trial lawyers'
lobby.7 As a result of this political stalemate on a point of civil proce-
dure, the confusion regarding the state of summary judgment in. Califor-
nia is likely to continue at least as long as control of the legislature is
split between opposing political forces.8
1. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995).
2. Id. at 663.
3. Prior to Union Bank, the statute's own sponsor vigorously denied the intent
that subsequently was attributed to the statute by Union Bank. See CALIFORNIA LEGIS-
LATURE, ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1993-94, at 4190
(1993).
4. There are numerous references throughout this Article to Republicans and
Democrats. This Article does not intend by these references to single out for judg-
ment any political party. This Article's examination of the recent politicization of civil
procedure will explore the role of political parties in shaping procedural rules, espe-
cially summary judgment. Summary judgment is a partisan issue in California, and the
political story cannot be told without referring to the players.
5. A.B. 3113, 1995-1996 Reg. Seas. (Cal. 1996). Assembly Member Goldsmith intro-
duced Assembly Bill 3113 on February 23, 1996; it passed the Republican Assembly
on May 28 of that year. A.B. 3113, Votes-Roll Call on Assembly Floor (on file with
author).
6. A.B. 3113, Votes--Roll Call in. Senate Committee on Judiciary (on file with
author).
7. See JAN GOLDSMrrH & PETE WILSON, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIA-
RY, A.B. 3113, Reg. Sess. 5-6 (1996) (noting opposition by Consumer Attorneys of
California).
8. The Democrats regained control of the Assembly by a "paper thin" majority in
The confusion over summary judgment primarily involves the
movant's burden standard. Summary judgment law requires the moving
party to show that no triable issue exists as to any material fact, there-
by making a trial unnecessary.' When a defendant moves for summary
judgment seeking dismissal of a claim, it must show that there is no
genuine issue as to at least one of the essential elements of the
claim."0 Under current California summary judgment law, however, it
is unclear whether the moving defendant must conclusively negate that
element with its own affirmative proof, which is the traditional rule,"
or whether the defendant need only demonstrate insufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence, which is the current federal standard. 2 California
courts appearing to apply the latter standard have yet to establish
whether the moving defendant need only "point out" to the court the
gaps in the plaintiffs evidence, or whether the defendant must affirma-
tively demonstrate, through discovery, that the plaintiff has no case.13
This Article argues that California's troubled summary judgment
experience is but a symptom of a larger problem-the very process by
which California promulgates rules of civil procedure. Fundamentally,
the California Constitution gives the rulemaking initiative to the legisla-
ture and the people, leaving the state's Judicial Council with residual, or
secondary, authority to adopt rules "when and where the higher author-
ity of the Legislature and the people has not been exercised."4 This
Article demonstrates how this rulemaking process, referred to herein as
"legislative primacy," does not work because it produces ineffective
summary judgment law.
Seventy years after its creation, the Judicial Council has largely ful-
filled its early promise among judicial reformers except in one crucial
area, the rulemaking power. Today, the Judicial Council has fully devel-
the November 1996 elections. Mark Gladstone & Carl Ingrain, Democrats Recapture
Control of Assembly, LA. Tds, Nov. 7. 1996, at Al.
9. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1996). All statutory references in this
Article are to the California Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
10. § 437c(f(1).
11. See Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1969).
12.. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (holding that
moving party only needs to show "absence of evidence").
13. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 207 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that defendant must make an "affirmative showing"). But see Hunter v. Pacific Me-
chanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 338 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that defendant
could point to an "absence of evidence").
14. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial
Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 7 n.36
(1958) (quoting Lane v. Superior Court, 285 P. 860, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930); see CAL
CONST. of 1879, art. VI, § 6 (1966). In fact, California procedure remains almost en-
tirely governed by code. See INSTITUTE OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE-MAKING POW-'
ER OF THE CouRTS 4 (1955).
[VoL 24: 455, 1997] Saga of Summary Judgment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
oped its rulemaking expertise and has the staff support structure to
give it necessary rulemaking capability. 5 Nevertheless, while the legis-
lature has delegated pieces of rulemaking authority to the Judicial
Council, it has yet to transfer complete rulemaking power. 6 California
is one of the few remaining American jurisdictions where the legislature
continues to write the rules of court procedure. 7 The current
politicization of procedure makes it even more timely for California to
rethink the wisdom that placed rulemaking power in legislative hands,
and to reconsider a long-standing proposition that the Judicial Council
be given complete procedural rulemaking authority.
This critique of California's legislative rulemaking process divides
into four parts. Part I briefly describes the constitutional and historical
bases for legislative primacy in California's procedural rulemaking.8
This Part attributes California's continued adherence to the legislative
primacy model to historical accident stemming from California's en-
trenched "code" tradition. It also examines the quasi-successful State
Bar and Judicial Council efforts to transfer the complete rulemaking
15. See CA. R. CT. 1000-1040.
16. CAL CONST. art. VI, § 6; California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council,
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 48-49 (Ct. App. 1995).
17. DAViD B. RoTrMAN ET AL, STATE CouRT ORGANIZATION 1993, 117 (1995). This
book lists California as the only remaining state whose legislature formulates proce-
dural rules. Id. However, Article 6, section 30 of the New York State Constitution
allows the legislature to delegate to the courts, "in whole or in part," the power to
promulgate procedural rules. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. 6, § 30 (1961, amended 1977).
New York State's Civil Practice Law and Rues is partly procedural statute enacted
by the New York State Legislature and partly judicially promulgated rules of court
As in California, the New York State Legislature has delegated rulemaking power to
the judiciary in specific areas only. Id.
A 1982 survey of the 50 states in categories of state court reform ranks Califor-
nia a distant 47th in the category of "Judicial Rulemaking." The honor of last place is
reserved for New York, the home of the Field Code. See Henry R. Glick, Supreme
Courts in State Judicial Administration, in STATE SUPREME COURTS-POLICYMLAKES IN
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 109, 122-23 (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982)
(Table 5.1: The Fifty States Ranked in Categories of State Court Reform); see also
Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 163
(1991) (stating that "[mlost states have not only copied many or all of the [Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure], but have adopted judicial rulemaking if they had not previ-
ously done so").
18. See intfra notes 27-79 and accompanying text.
power from the legislature to the Judicial Council.'9 As a result of
these efforts, the Council is now capable of overhauling California's
Code of Civil Procedure.'
Part II examines the politicization of the rulemaking procedure
over the last twenty years and reveals how this phenomenon has
plagued the federal rulemaldng process as powerful interest groups
have successfully lobbied Congress to alter the federal rules for strate-
gic advantage.2' This part also argues that continued legislative
rulemaking in the current politically charged procedural environment
threatens to continue to adversely affect California civil procedure rules
in the same manner.'
Part III analyzes the deteriorating state of summary judgment law
in California and lays blame at the doorstep of the legislative primacy
model of rulemaking.'
Part IV considers the wide implications of the legislature's failure
to develop sound summary judgment law for California's legislative
primacy model.' 4 This section determines that the existing process
fails both because legislators lack sufficient understanding of procedur-
al issues and because they are directly pressured by organized interest
groups who seek to tilt what should be the level playing field of proce-
dural rules to their advantage.'
The Article concludes that it is time for the California Legislature
to release its rulemaking power to the Judicial Council, and to retain
only a veto power.2"
I. CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATIVE PRimAcY RULEMAKING PROCESS
A. A Description of California's Legislative Primacy Rulemaking
Process
In California, the legislature and the people have the primary au-
thority to prescribe the civil procedural rules for state courts. There-
fore, the Judicial Council's rulemaking authority is secondary to that of
the legislature.27 As a result of this unique allocation of rulemaking
authority, the legislature enacted the California Code of Civil Proce-
19. See infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 166-85 and accompanying text.
23. See irfra notes 186-506 and accompanying text.
24. See ifra notes 507-59 and accompanying text.
25. See infraz notes 511-16 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 560-61 and accompanying text.
27. Throughout this Article, this allocation of rulemaling authority will be referred
to as the legislative primacy model of rulemaking process.
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dure.2 In stark contrast, the judiciary promulgates the procedural
rules of most other state courts and all federal district courts; in fact,
among the state judicial systems, California is one of the few remaining
states where the grant of procedural rulemaking authority rests with
the legislature.'
California case law confirms the dominance of the legislature and
the people in the rulemaking process. Based upon its interpretation of
article VI, section 6, and article II, section 8 of the California Constitu-
tion (relating to the "initiative" power of the people), the California
Supreme Court has held that the legislature and the people are the
primary initiators and promulgators of civil procedural rules in state
courts.' Most recently, in the 1985 decision In re Lance W., the
court held:
The Legislature and, a fortiori, the people acting through either the reserved pow-
er of statutory initiative or the power to initiate and adopt constitutional amend-
ments (art. H, § 8) may prescribe rules of procedure and of evidence to be fol-
lowed in the courts of this state.... That the authority of the judicial branch of
government is subject to legislative enactment of rules of procedure is implicit in
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution which empowers the Judicial
Council to "adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not in-
consistent with statute."'
Under California's constitution, the Judicial Council has only a supple-
mental rulemaking authority.' In the hierarchy of procedural rules, the
28. See CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 1, 2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
29. See supra note 17.
30. See, e.g., Solberg v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Cal. 1977) (citing Sac-
ramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court, 238 P. 687, 694 (Cal. 1925)).
31. 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985).
32. 1&. at 755-56 (quoting CAL CONST. art. VI, § 6); see also Levin & Amsterdam,
supra note 14, at 7 n.36 ("[In California. . . the full and absolute authority over
procedure remains in the legislature; and what is constitutionally granted to the
courts proves merely a patchwork power which .. . is in the final analysis no power
at all").
33. See CAL CONST. art. VI, § 6. Article VI, section 6 also confers upon the Judi-
cial Council the role of managing the business of the courts. In order "to expedite
judicial business and to equalize the work of judges," the constitution empowers the
Chief Justice to assign judges to assist courts other than their own which suffer from
congested dockets, and to direct judges to report to the Judicial Council "concerning
the condition of judicial business in their courts." Id.
The Council has been a very effective agent of judicial reform in its administra-
tive role. See Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of
Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 1960-1990, 66 S. CAL L REV. 2949, 2081
(1993) ("[Chief Justice Gibson] gave new impetus to the development of the Judicial
Council as an effective administrative instrument . . All of the chief justices since
legislature's statutory rules supersede the Judicial Council's supplemental
rules of court.' In essence, it is this hierarchy that makes the
legislature's rulemaking power dominant over that of the Judicial Coun-
cil.3' By contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by
the United States Supreme Court supersede inconsistent congressional
statutes.
36
B. California's Legislative Primacy Process is an Historical Accident:
A Case of Imprinting at Birth
The longevity of California's legislative primacy model of rulemaking is
largely the result of an accident of history.37 Essentially, California has
never known any other rulemaking regime.' Unlike the judiciaries in
1940 have given a high priority to their duties as administrative leader of the
courts."). The same 1982 survey that ranks California as 47th among the 60 states in
the "Judicial Rulemaking" category ranks California third in "Judicial Education and
Qualifications," eighth in "Court Consolidation and Simplification," and 26th in "Cen-
tralized Judicial Management" See Glick, supra note 17, at 122-23.
34. Preble Stolz & Kathleen Gunn, The California Judicial CounciL The Begin-
nings of an Institutional History, 11 PAC. LJ. 877, 881-82 (1980).
In 1995, the California Court Reporters Association succeeded in persuading the
First District Court of Appeal to invalidate a Judicial Council rule of court as "incon-
sistent with statute." California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 44, 46 (Ct App. 1995). The rule of court would have authorized the elec-
tronic recording of superior court proceedings as the official record of those proceed-
ings. Id. at 45. The court reporters had previously succeeded in using their political
clout in the legislature to block the enactment of the same rule. Id. In a resounding
affirmation of the legislature's dominant rulemaking authority, the court rejected the
Judicial Council's argument that, "as it and the Legislature both derive their powers
from the state Constitution, the two institutions are coequals." Id. at 49. The court
held that "[t]he Constitution reserves to the Legislature and the people of this state
the higher right to provide rules of procedure." Id. The court emphasized that "[tihe
Judicial Council's right is secondary--a right to adopt rules only when the higher
authority of the Legislature and the people has not been exercised." Id. at 47.
35. Stolz & Gunn, supra note 34, at 881-82. In specific areas, the legislature has
delegated to the council the power to promulgate procedural rules that supersede
inconsistent statutes, and thereby have the binding force of procedural statutes. Id. at
882. These areas are "appellate practice, pretrial conferences, family law procedure,
and juvenile court practice." Id.
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994); Stolz & Gunn, supra note 34, at 882.
37. Another factor that explains the legislature's refusal to release its rulemaldng
power to the judiciary is the politically charged environment that has surrounded
procedural rules since the 1980s. As discussed in Part H, special interest groups have
been using their influence in the legislature to alter procedural rules to advance sub-
stantive goals. See infra notes 80-185 and accompanying text These interest groups
may well perceive that they would stand to lose their influence over procedure if the
legislature, the forum most directly responsive to lobbying, were to surrender com-
pletely the ndemaking power. See infra notes 80-185 and accompanying text
38. See infra notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
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many other states, California courts never possessed the complete
rulemaldng power.' Thus, California has no previous tradition of judi-
cial rulemaking to which it can return.'
Part of the explanation for the tight grip that legislative primacy has
on the rulemaidng process in California is that California was imprinted
at birth with the Field Code and remains today one of the quintessential
code states." California's code tradition, which has been deeply en-
trenched in this state since California joined the Union in 1850, firmly
roots legislative supremacy in procedural rulemadng. 2
The code movement to reform the labyrinth of antiquated common law
procedural rules began in New York with the enactment of the Field
Code by New York's legislature in 1848.' The common law procedure,
drawn from English case law, had become a scandal.' Because the
39. See inftra notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
40. See Ralph N. Kieps, Efforts to Govern Court Procedure by Rule Make Progress
in California, 17 CAL ST. B.J. 18, 20 (1942) (providing an overview of civil proce-
dure in California courts).
41. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L REv. 1367, 1383
(1986). "California adopted code pleading in 1851. The Practice Act of that year was
based on the code which David Dudley Field had prepared for New York three years
before; Field's brother, Stephen J. Field later a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, came to California in 1850 and was the author and prime mover of the Cali-
fornia legislation. The 1851 Practice Act was succeeded, in 1872, by a Code of Civil
Procedure which, much amended remains in effect today." Charles Alan Wright, Pro-
cedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 91 (1959).
42. Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1383.
43. FLEKMNG JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PRocEDuRE § 1.6, at 18 (3d
ed. 1985). The Field Code "sought to effectuate [the] merger [of law and equity] and
to abolish the distinctions among the [common law] forms of action." Id § 1.7, at 19.
In place of the obsolescent forms of common law action, it "created the civil action
in which the parties were to plead the facts constituting the cause of action or de-
fense." Id, The Code "was intended to make available all appropriate remedies in
[the single civil] action . . . and also sought to liberalize the provisions for joinder of
causes and parties." Id.
44. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 137 U. PA. L REV. 2067, 2082 (1989) ("Elaborate procedure rigorously enforced
was the tradition of the Hilary Rules that gave us Baron Parke, who boasted that he
had decided many volumes of cases without considering their merits."); Richard L
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK.
L REV. 761, 781 (1993) ("In England . .. the strictures of the writ system and its at-
tendant intricacies and delays created a 'crisis' that was supposedly 'viewed by the
public with serious concern.'") (quoting Edson Sunderland, The English Struggle for
courts failed to reform these rules, the legislature took the initiative.'
Legislative rulemaking became an integral part of the code tradition.'
Therefore, a defining feature of a classic code state is legislative
rulemaking. New York, the home of the Field Code, still follows this
model.47 The code movement eventually spread to California, which
"pioneered code pleading in the western states.'
The early promise of the code movement began to sour as successive
legislatures, in response to the importunings of special interest groups,
added layer upon layer of amendments to the code. Legislatures sought
to regulate every detail of court activity and to remedy procedural prob-
lems on a piecemeal and patchwork basis."9 In New York, the Field
Code turned into the Throop Code,' and grew "from 88 sections to over
1000, making it a legal text of truly Byzantine complexity, a stellar trap
for the unwary, and a source of mischief to hapless litigants.""
California's code has suffered a similar fate.2
Yet, despite the defects in California's civil procedure code caused by
generations of legislative rulemaking, California has remained strongly
attached to its code tradition. California's civil procedure code currently
contains more code features than that of most code states.' Conse-
quently, while most states eventually abandoned legislative rulemaking,"
choosing to emulate the federal reform model of judicial rulemaking em-
Procedural Reform, 39 HARv. L REv. 725, 728-29 (1926)).
45. Marcus, supra note 44, at 781.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 17.
48. Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1383.
49. See supra note 17 and infra notes 50-52.
50. Marcus, supra note 44, at 781.
51. Carrington, supra note 17, at 163. "[W]hat followed in New York after 1848
made vivid the deficiency of legislative making of procedural rules. Every time the
legislature sat, it would adopt another hat-full of special-interest amendments to the
Field Code, marring its clean, simple text finally beyond recognition." Id.
52. See Kleps, supra note 40, at 23 ("A constantly expanding Code of Civil Proce-
dure has been subjected to piece-meal amendment by successive legislatures.").
53. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 41, at 1383. "[A]lthough it has imported many
features of the Federal Rules, California remains committed to code pleading. Califor-
nia practice follows its own terminology even when the devices and procedures...
are not merely semantic." Id.
54. See supra note 17.
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bodied in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 (REA),' California's legisla-
ture has tightly guarded its dominant rulemaking authority.'
C. Complete Rulemaking Authority was Almost Granted to
California's Judicial Council by Constitutional
Amendment in 1926
Notwithstanding California's adherence to code pleading and legislative
primacy in rulemaking, the judicial reform movement of the early twenti-
eth century, culminating in the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act of
1934, significantly affected judicial administration in California. In 1926,
the Judicial Council 7 was created by constitutional amendment.' That
amendment almost included a provision conferring on the Council full
rulemaking power.' As originally submitted, the amendment would have
55. Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress delegated the power to promulgate
rules of procedure for the federal courts to the Supreme Court, while retaining only
a veto power. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The actual work of drafting amendments is
done by Advisory Committee members whom the Chief Justice appoints. Jeffrey W.
Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adju-
dicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BRooK. L REV. 659, 710-11 (1993).
Most of the members of the Advisory Committee are judges, but membership also in-
cludes law professors and practitioners. Id. at 710 n.183. The Civil Rules Advisory
Committee considers all proposed amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, circu-
lates them to members of the bench and bar for comment, revises them, and then
forwards the revised proposals to the standing Committee on Practice and Procedure,
which, in turn, transmits them to the Judicial Conference. IdL at 710-11. If approved,
the Judicial Council forwards the proposed rule to the Supreme Court. Id. at 711. If
approved by the Supreme Court, the rule is promulgated and then transmitted to
Congress. Id. If Congress fails to modify or reject the proposal within a prescribed
time period, the rule takes effect. Id. at 711-12; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994).
Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under the REA supersede any inconsistent
statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). Professor Stempel characterizes this model of
rulemaldng process as "judge/legal profession-centered at the top, with a preference
for deliberation, uniformity, and neutrality" and calls it the "professional dominance"
paradigm. Stempel, supra, at 708-10, 730. This model was the unchallenged
rulemaking paradigm for the federal courts until 1990 when Congress began to inter-
vene directly in rulemaking. See iqfra notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
56. See RorrmAN, supra note 17, at 117 (listing California as the only remaining
state whose legislature formulates procedural rules).
57. The "Judicial Council and Unified Control of the Courts" and the "Restoration
of the Rule-making Power" were two of six concrete remedial measures of the judi-
cial reform program adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) around 1910
and promoted by the ABA through the late 1930s. See Hugh H. Brown, Judicial
Councils at Work, 1 CAL. ST. B.J. 52, 63 (1926).
58. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (amended 1926).
59. Phil S. Gibson, Chief Justice Urges Effective Plan to Give Courts Rule-Making
provided the Council with complete rulemaking authority.' At the last
minute the legislature deleted this provision.6' It appears from contem-
poraneous accounts that a majority of the legislature favored granting
the Council unrestricted rulemaking power, but that "aggressive oppo-
sition" by a single legislator caused the legislature to water down the
Council's rulemaking power.'
D. The State Bar and the Judicial Council Supported Vesting the
Judicial Council with Complete Rulemaking Power from
1940 to 1960
Prompted by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Committee of the State Bar recommended in 1940 that the legislature
confer full rulemaking authority on the Judicial Council.' The Council
was "favorably inclined toward such a move. "' Chief Justice Gibson,
Chair of the Judicial Council, opposed the proposal because he believed
the Council lacked a permanent research staff to support the task of
overhauling the procedure code,' and that "[w]ithout this staff, the pro-
posal to vest the rule-making power in the Judicial Council skirts the
edge of disaster." ' Chief Justice Gibson recommended that the legisla-
ture grant the Council additional rulemaking authority limited to appel-
late practice as a calculated first step toward achieving full rulemaking
power.67 A bill was subsequently proposed in the 1941 session of the
legislature that would have given the Council complete rulemaking pow-
er, but the legislature bowed to Gibson's suggestion and delegated to the
Power, 15 CAL ST. B.J. 331, 333 (1940).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Harry A. Holizer, The Rule-Making Power, 3 CAL ST. B.J. 238, 240 (1929);
Brown, supra note 57, at 63.
63. Edward Winterer, Lawyer Group Advocates Giving Rule Making Power to Ju-
dicial Council, 15 CAL ST. B.J. 250 (1940). "It is about time, in this twentieth centu-
ry, that California... shall advance the methods of the administration of justice
from the obsolete and forgotten past to the front line of progress and efficiency." Id.
at 251.
64. Gibson, supra note 59, at 332.
65. Id. at 335. Chief Justice Gibson envisioned a team of litigation experts "with a
sufficient staff and enough money to do the actual job of drafting the revised rules."
Id. These experts would "consist of men of varied experience, including judges, law
professors, and practicing lawyers." Id. at 336. Gibson considered the creation of this
staff of experts to be "the heart of the entire reform." Id.
66. Id. at 336.
67. See Stolz & Gunn, supra note 34, at 886. "Acquisition of complete rule-maling
authority became one of Gibson's primary goals for the Council, and power over the
procedure in appeals was a calculated and limited step toward reaching that goal."
Id.
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Council the authority to promulgate rules governing only appellate proce-
dure, with such rules to supersede all conflicting statutes.6
The appellate rules that the Council promulgated proved to be "very
successful in standardizing and streamlining procedure in the appellate
courts and have required only modest changes."6 This limited delega-
tion of appellate rulemaking power gave Chief Justice Gibson the oppor-
tunity to assemble a permanent staff of experts to support the Council's
limited rlemaking authority-a "braintrust of lawyers concerned with
the drafting of legislation and rules for the centralized reformation of the
court system."70
In 1957, the State Bar and the Judicial Council once again recommend-
ed to the legislature that it amend article VI of the constitution to give
the Council complete rulemaking power over all practice and proce-
dure. This time, Chief Justice Gibson endorsed the proposal, believing
the Council had developed "considerable rule-maling experience and
[was now] equipped to give continuous attention to the study and devel-
opment of effective rules of procedure."' The last reference to this pro-
posal was made by Justice Roger Traynor, who expressed the hope that
the legislature would place on the November 1960 ballot a proposition
68. Id. at 885-86.
69. Id. at 886.
70. Id. at 886 n.63. In 1955 the legislature delegated to the Judicial Council author-
ity to prescribe rules governing pretrial conference procedure. Phil S. Gibson, For
Modern Courts, 32 CAL ST. B.J. 727, 729 (1957).
71. Gibson, supra note 70, at 729.
72. Id. at 731. Chief Justice Gibson believed that legislatures were institutionally
incapable of formulating effective procedural rules for courts. Specifically, the Chief
Justice believed that (1) legislatures, in session for brief periods, cannot devote "con-
tinuous attention to the study and development of effective rules of procedure;" (2)
most legislators "do not have the legal training necessary to an understanding of
judicial practice and procedure;" and (3) "legislators have other and, in a sense, more
important tasks of statecraft than the formulation of statutes in this specialized field."
Id. at 730-31.
giving the Council full rulemaking authority.73 The legislature never act-
ed on this proposal and it has faded into history.
E. Since 1960, the Legislature has Shut the Door on Surrendering
its Rulemaking Power, and the Judicial Council and State Bar
Have Stopped Knocking
There have been many ironic turns in the history of the rulemaking
power in California First, every California Chief Justice from Gibson
through Lucas has advocated the "reformist" position on judicial
rulemaking.74 Second, "the Judicial Council and various professional or-
ganizations and coalitions, including judges' groups and the organized
bars, have consistently espoused" giving the Council complete
rulemaking power.7" The third ironic twist was that Chief Justice Gib-
son, a staunch supporter of judicial rulemaking, blocked legislative action
in 1941 to give full rulemaking power to the Council until an adequate
support staff had been developed." Fourth, although an adequate sup-
port staff has been developed, the proposition has never been implement-
ed.7" Fifth, the Judicial Council and the State Bar appear to have retreat-
ed from this issue during the past thirty years,8 and the great reformist
73. Roger J. Traynor, A Time to Build Up, 35 CAL ST. B.J. 219, 225 (1960) ("Our
state is out of character in lagging behind 30 other states and the federal govern-
ment, which have already returned the rulemaking power to the judicial
branch . . . ."). The last public reference to the concept .of full judicial rulemaking
power was made in 1962 by Ralph N. Kleps, the first Director of the Administrative
Office of the California Courts:
Since about 1916 the great majority of judges and lawyers in California have
been convinced that a court procedure governed by flexible rules of court is
much to be preferred over the complicated patch-work of statutory procedure
found in our 1872 practice codes. Great strides have been made in judicial
rule-making during the last 20 years in California, and many people believe
that the solution to our problems of congestion and delay is to be found in
the use of an effective rule-making authority.
Ralph N. Kleps, Calornia Courts, 37 CAL ST. B.J. 329, 337 (1962).
74. Scheiber, supra note 33, at 2086; see irfta notes 101-06 and accompanying text
(discussing the reformist positions).
75. Scheiber, supra note 33, at 2086.
76. See supra notes 59, 70 and accompanying text.
77. In 1960, Chief Justice Gibson's dream of an institutionalized support staff for
the Judicial Council was realized when the voters approved the establishment of the
Administrative Office of the Courts. Scheiber, supra note 33, at 2081-82.
78. The Council has generally retreated from high profile reform issues, focusing
its efforts on its administrative role. See Stolz & Gunn, supra note 34, at 904. In
1960, the Council made a conscious decision to avoid tangling with the legislature to
achieve enactment of the Council's own initiatives for procedural change. Instead, the
Council decided "to work within its own sphere of authority over the courts." Id.
Stolz and Gunn attribute one reason for this retreat from legislative engagement to
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goal of judicial primacy in rulemaking has apparently been forgotten.
However, the current political environment that surrounds civil proce-
dure should cause California to reconsider the forgotten concept of full
judicial responsibility for rulemaldng.'
H. THE POLITICIZATION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING
. EXPERIENCE SINCE 1980
Since the 1980s, civil procedure has become increasingly politicized as
special interest groups have turned to procedure to advance their inter-
ests.' This use of procedure to advance substantive goals is not only a
national phenomenon, but as Part III will illustrate, a California phenom-
enon as well.8" This phenomenon has caused Congress to adopt a more
assertive role in the federal rulemaking process. In the 1980s, Congress
directly intervened several times in the rulemaking process, culminating
in the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.' What is so
startling about this direct congressional participation in federal
rulemaking is that forty years of deference to the rules drafted by the
Advisory Committee under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 preceded this
frustration with the political nature of the legislative rulemaking process. Id. "[I]t had
become too difficult to accomplish what the Council wanted through legislation; the
process was too complex and political to permit full consideration of the judicial
system's needs and the most efficient methods of reform." Id. This statement by Stolz
and Gunn confirms this Article's view that increased politicization of procedure has
caused the legislature to be more assertive in its rulemaking role and less inclined to
give it up. See infra notes 112-33 (explaining reluctance of the legislature to release
rulemaking power because of the political nature of the environment).
79. See infr notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 90-193 and accompanying text (describing instances of congres-
sional intervention into procedure to advance interests of members connected with
the system).
81. See infra Part Ill.
82. Lauren K Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROoK. L REv. 879, 880 (1993); Laurens Walker, A
Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 456
(1993).
-Traditionally, the rulemaking process of the Advisory Committees has been
largely the work of a small group of judges, lawyers, and academicians." Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 799 (1991) (footnotes omitted). "The work of the
Advisory Committee has been subject to virtually no public or professional interest,
inducing widespread ennuL" Id. (footnote omitted); see also Carrington, supra note
17, at 163.
abrupt change." Congressional activism in rulemaking represents a ma-
jor challenge to the professional dominance paradigm of the rulemaking
process.'
The impact of the politicization of procedure on expanding Congress's
rulemaking role has adverse implications for California's legislative pri-
macy model. The jolting episodes of congressional intervention in the
rulemaking process are dramatic evidence of the responsiveness of the
legislative branch to procedural politicking by special interest groups.
This increased congressional rulemaking activity has also stirred consid-
erable concern among procedural scholars about the adverse effect such
intervention can have on the integrity of the federal rulemaking process
and on the federal rules themselves.' These concerns are equally ap-
plicable to California's rulemaking process and procedural rules.
The political influences that have buffeted procedure on the federal
level have also impacted California procedure. As discussed in Part I,
summary judgment in California has become a political football, and the
law of summary judgment has suffered as a result.' This Article illus-
trates the inability of the legislature to fashion a coherent, workable
body of procedural rules.
California's legislative primacy rulemaking process cannot be viewed
as a quaint but harmless vestige of the code pleading era whose day has
passed. The politicization of procedure has made Chief Justice Gibson's
83. Robel, supra note 82, at 880.
84. Stempel, supra note 55, at 708. Stempel states that Congress's deference to the
judiciary in rulemaldng matters
[lasted only] so long as Congress (or the relevant congresspersons influential
in judicial policy) are not besieged by interest group pressures at odds with
the judiciary's objective, and so long as Congress respects the judiciary
enough to defer to it and the Enabling Act process. For the most part, it ap-
pears that this set of circumstances prevailed during the 1934-1974 period,
enabling civil rules revision to be revised largely by the bench.
Id. at 712. Stempel also noted the harmful effects of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 and "other trends which erode the litigation reform model, such as proliferating
local rules and standing orders." Id. at 731.
85. For example, Professor Carrington, former Reporter for the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules, expressed his concern that:
Unconstrained review by Congress of rule promulgations, with the substitu-
tion of congressional judgment for that of the [United States Supreme] Court,
would re-politicize the rules, defeat the neutrality goals of the reform move-
ment, fragment the rules, increase complexity, elevate cost, diminish the stat-
ure of the judiciary, and decrease the effectiveness of law enforcement, all
without material compensating benefits.
Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DuKE LJ. 281, 323 (1989).
86. See infra notes 186-506 and accompanying text.
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lifelong goal of vesting complete rulemaking authority with the Judicial
Council not only timely, but urgent.
Sub-part A of this section describes the national phenomenon of the
rise of special interest groups in shaping procedure.87 Sub-part B consid-
ers a few episodes of congressional response to interest group lobbying
and the concerns which these episodes have generated among commen-
tators.'a Finally, sub-part C discusses the implications of increased con-
gressional intervention in federal rulemaking for California's legislative
primacy model.'
A. Politicization of Procedure: The Rise of Factionalism
The story of the politicization of procedure over the last decade is
essentially about the awakening of special interest groups to the poten-
tial for shaping procedural rules to advance their particular agendas.
These groups have become sophisticated in working the rulemaking
process, both in Congress and with the Advisory Committee.' Professor
Stempel, in his chronicling of the "politicization of litigation issues," ob-
served:
Across the spectrum of interests ranging from the American Tort Reform Associa-
tion (a manufacturers group seeling more favorable product liability laws) to the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (a liberal group seeking to protect or ex-
pand civil rights laws), America's political actors have increasingly become in-
volved in matters of litigation procedure.9 '
Furthermore, Professor Stempel contends that "law reform has ceased to
be a drawing-room pastime of the intelligentsia and has become part of
the milieu of down-and-dirty politics."'
Different groups have demonstrated a wide range of interests in civil
procedure in the past decade. These interests can be categorized as (1)
ideological or philosophical-those concerned with the fundamental
87. See infra notes 90-133 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 134-65 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 166-85 and accompanying text.
90. "There has been a quiet but subtle change in rule reform efforts. The experi-
ence of the last ten years suggests that actors in the judicial arena have become
increasingly sophisticated concerning the opportunities for accomplishing advantageous
rule reform through traditional lobbying efforts." Mullenix, supra note 82, at 855.
91. Stempel, supra note 56, at 669. For a critique of the lobbying activities of
"public interest" advocates (or "partisans"), "falsely imbuing proposed rules with polit-
ical content," see Mullenix, supra note 82, at 822-30.
92. Stempel, supra note 55, at 669.
goals, underlying assumptions, and basic direction of the adjudicatory
system;' (2) "political" in the electoral sense of the term;' and (3) pe-
cuniary, referring to perceived gain or loss by a business or profession in
terms of income or workload. 95
1. Ideological Interests
There are two ideological interest groups whose members advocate
conflicting visions of adjudicatory procedure. One group, the
preservationists,6 seeks to preserve the traditional, liberal open courts
paradigm of adjudicatory procedure embodied in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure since their promulgation in 1938.' The primary goals of
the open courts paradigm are fair and accurate outcomes achieved
through a full and fair hearing on the merits, replete with due process
procedural formality.9 This litigation model is adversarial and lawyer-
driven, assigning to each party responsibility for developing and present-
ing its own case. The judge's role is primarily that of adjudicator. As
manifested in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this paradigm stress-
es "simplicity, liberal pleading, broad discovery, and a preference for
substance over form; the primary mission was the just resolution of dis-
putes."
|°°
The opposing ideological group, the reformers, believes that the open
courts model is a luxury society can no longer afford. The reformers'
vision of adjudicatory procedure, the "restrictive procedural para-
digm," 01 emphasizes judicial economy over accurate outcomes,'0 2 and
quantity of outcomes over quality."° The key to judicial economy is to
promote aggressive case management, by diverting dispute resolution
from formal, full-blown adjudication to alternative, less formal settings
like mediation, arbitration, and settlement, and by more aggressive use of
summary judgment.'° This litigation model accelerates the shift of the
93. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
95. See infr notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
96. Stempel, supra note 55, at 689.




101. Professor Stempel also created the term "restrictive procedural paradigm." Id.
at 718.
102. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. C. L.
REV. 494, 534 (1986).
103. Id. at 540.
104. Id. at 534.
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adjudicatory system away from the adversarial litigation model. °5 The
restrictive access paradigm views the judge less as an adjudicator and
more as a case manager, whose primary role is to move a lawsuit from
filing to disposition.'"
2. Partisan Interests: The Political Parties
The two political parties have taken sides in this conflict of the proce-
dural paradigms. Republicans, urged on by business interests, generally
support the reformers and the restrictive adjudicatory procedure para-
digm, while Democrats, backed by groups such as trial lawyers and pub-
lic interest lawyers, support the traditional open courts paradigm."7 Ac-
cording to Stempel, the "Republican ascendancy and dominance of presi-
dential politics during the 1968-1992 period" largely accounts for the shift
in thinking about litigation procedure."° Presidential appointments of
conservative judges throughout the federal judiciary, from the Chief Jus-
tice to district court judges, provided a powerful boost for the restrictive
procedure paradigm."°
A watershed event that accelerated the melding of electoral politics
and procedure during this period was the Reagan Administration's estab-
lishment of the President's Council on Competitiveness."0 The Council
advanced the Reagan Administration's agenda for civil justice reform."'
Vice President Dan Quayle unveiled its fifty-point "Agenda for Civil Jus-
tice Reform in America" in a speech delivered at the American Bar
Association's 1991 summer meeting."2 The proposals were typical of
105. Stempel, supra note 55, at 718.
106. Resnik, supra note 102, at 534.
107. See infra notes 124-33 and accompanying text (discussing pecuniary interests).
108. Stempel, supra note 55, at 719.
109. Id. at 719-20. Professor Stempel suggested that:
[T]he appointments of Chief Justices Burger in 1969 and Rehnquist in 1986
meant that conservative jurists frequently critical of the oPen procedural para-
digm could spend more than two decades placing kindred spirits in positions
of influence. Despite the growing pressure upon and dissatisfaction with the
open courts model, it might well have survived if instead Justice Brennan
had become Chief Justice in 1969, to be replaced by, for example, Judge A.
Leon Higgenbotham of the Third Circuit or Judge Abner Mikva of the District
of Columbia Circuit.
Id.
110. Id. at 720.
111. Id
112. Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council
most civil justice reform, or tort reform, proposals, and are consistent
with the restrictive adjudicatory procedure paradigm."' The Council's
program included "encourag[ing] the use of ADR; expand[ing] the use of
settlement conferences; limit[ing] the amount of discovery and
penaliz[ing] discovery abuse; set[ing] early and firm trial dates;
encourag[ing] greater use of sunnmary judgement; and limit[ing] diversity
jurisdiction.""'
In explaining the Council's agenda, Vice President Quayle emphasized
that the high costs which the legal system imposes on American busi-
nesses place them at a competitive disadvantage in the global market-
place."' He placed the blame on the so-called litigation explosion"6
and a surfeit of U.S. lawyers."' Reformers commonly use these themes
to justify civil justice reform. Vice President Quayle claimed that the
on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244 (1992). But see
Gregory B. Butler & Brian D. Miller, Fiddling While Rome Burns: A Response to Dr.
Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251 (1992) (rebutting Dr. Hensler's critique of the Quayle
Report). Stempel called the August 1991 publication of the Agenda for Civil Justice
Reform in America, commonly referred to as the "Quayle Report," "another important
upheaval on the court reform landscape." Stempel, supra note 55, at 687.
113. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, SOURCEBOOK OF AMERICAN
STATE LEGISLATION, PART H1: "CIVIL JUSTICE" ch. 3 (1995) (The chapter is entitled "Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution Act, Pre-Complaint Notice Act, Offer of Settlement Act,
Summary Judgment Procedure Act, Litigation Accountability Act, Civil Procedure Rule
Equity Resolution, and Accuracy in Pleading Act.").
114. Hensler, supra note 112, at 245.
115. Id. at.244.
116. Stempel notes that Quayle's "thesis that America was in the midst of a litiga-
tion crisis requiring dramatic action" is regarded by the "consensus of scholarly
opinion (as] inadequate[] and erroneous[]." Stempel, supra note 55, at 687 (citing
Hensler, supra note 112, and Milo Geyelin, Quayle's Data in Proposed Reform of
Legal System Called Misleading, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at B7 (summarizing crit-
icisms of Professor Marc Galanter and others)). Stempel adds that "as a document
the Report and its most drastic recommendations have enjoyed little or no support
among the aggregate organized bar or the legal academy." Stempel, supra note 55, at
687 n.109.
Judge Weinstein notes: "The truth about the 'litigation explosion' is that it is a
weapon of perception, not substance. If the public can be persuaded that there is a
litigation crisis, it may support efforts to cut back on litigation access." Jack B.
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers
to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1909 (1989). Weinstein quotes
Professor Rotunda's comment that the "increased talk of the litigation crisis may tell
us more about the public relations expertise of insurance companies than anything
else." Id. at 1909 (quoting Ronald D. Rotunda, ABA Offers Trite Reforms to Defuse
Fictional Litigation Crisis, MANHATTAN LAw., Aug. 16-22, 1988, at 12); see also Marc
S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983); Marcus, supra note 44, at 763.
117. Hensler, supra note 112, at 244.
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Council's proposals would "'improve the delivery of justice to American
citizens,' 'empower people with disputes,' and 'make it easier for citizens
to vindicate their legal rights, '""'
Deborah Hensler, a senior social scientist at Rand's Institute for Civil
Justice, questions the candidness of these populist claims. She sees many
of the Council's "procedural" proposals as masking, in essence, a sub-
stantive political agenda aimed at "chang[ing] the current balance be-
tween individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants, in favor of the lat-
ter."119
The use of procedurally neutral camouflage to pitch what could be
viewed as an unpopular substantive agenda is a common political tactic.
Judge Weinstein, Chief Judge of the Eastern District of New York and a
vocal critic of this tactic, writes that "[tihe issue [of the desirability of
free entry to our courts] is raised in a variety of somewhat disingenuous
guises, camouflaged under values like 'administrative efficiency. °'"
This conservative reform agenda was carried into the congressional
arena when the Republicans won control of both houses of Congress
from the Democrats in 1995.2' The historic shift of congressional con-
trol from left to right finds its parallel in the California legislature where,
in 1995, the conservative leadership of the Republican Party assumed
118. Id. at 244-45 (quoting the Vice President's speech to the ABA).
119. Id. at 250.
120. Weinstein, supra note 116, at 1907; see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Refor-
mation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L REv. 375, 439 (1992). Mullenix commented
on the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 which embodied many of the proposals con-
tained in the "Quayle Report":
Ultimately, what is so disturbing about the Civil Justice Reform Act is the
blatant as well as disguised political agendas behind the legislation. The bla-
tant agenda is to improve American business competitiveness domestically
and abroad; the disguised political agenda is to remove disagreeable cases
and disagreeable litigants from the federal courts.
Id.; see also Judith Resnik, The Domain of the Courts, 137 U. PA. L REv. 2219, 2226
(1989).
121. Tony Mauro, Contract with America/7he Common Sense Legal Reform Act,
USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 1994, at 10A
control of the Assembly." The state Senate has been targeted for a Re-
publican takeover in the future."
3. Pecuniary Interests
Businesses, particularly repeat-player defendants in personal injury
lawsuits (e.g., drug manufacturers) and securities litigation (e.g., the
computer industry), have been particularly active lobbyists for the re-
strictive access paradigm. Certain professions directly involved in the
judicial system, including court reporters'24 and process servers,"
have actively lobbied, somewhat effectively, to blunt proposed procedur-
al reform, which they perceived would affect their livelihood." Judges
also stand to gain from the current round of procedural reform because
the advancement of the goals of the restrictive access paradigm would
reduce their workload as well.'
Other members of the legal profession whose pecuniary fortunes are
affected by procedural reform are lawyers." The trial lawyers' associa-
tions wield considerable influence among Democrats in the halls of Con-
gress and the halls of the state legislature in Sacramento." The trial
lawyers' political game, in contradistinction to that of conservatives, is to
preserve the procedural status quo and to oppose conservative efforts at
litigation reform."n The proverbial bread of the trial lawyers is buttered
on the side of preserving the open courts paradigm. Trial lawyers have a
vested interest in the traditional paradigm because their clients are usual-
ly plaintiffs3 ' who are "disproportionately comprised of society's 'have
122. See Eric Bailey et al., Republican Reign-Orange County Conservatives and
the Pursuit of Power O.C. GOP Setting Sights on the State, LA. TIMES (Orange
County Edition), July 7, 1996, at Al. The Democrats regained control of the Assembly
in the November 1996 election, but only by a "paper thin" majority. See supra note
8.
123. Bailey, supra note 122, at Al.
124. See infta note 170 and accompanying text (discussing court reporters).
125. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing process servers).
126. Stempel, supra note 55, at 719.
127. Judges who support the goals of the restrictive access paradigm can be moti-
vated by ideology as well as self-interest.
128. Within the legal profession in California, tort reform divides the plaintiffs' and
defendants' bars. Scheiber, supra note 33, at 2116 (discussing factionalism in tort
reform issues).
129. Douglas Frantz, Tral Launyers, Their Money and Their Influence Become Is-
sues in the Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1996, at A18.
130. Id.
131. "[T]he American Trial Lawyers Association, comprised largely of plaintiffs' per-
sonal injury lawyers, is reputed to have considerable lobbying clout with Congress,
due in substantial part to the grassroots contacts of its membership." Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary
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nots': individuals, business sole proprietorships, and smaller entities,"
whereas "[dlefendants are disproportionately comprised of society's
'haves': banks, insurance companies, railroads, business organizations,
governments, and government agencies" who have an economic interest
in raising the barriers to litigation."r Similarly motivated by economic
self-interest, defense lawyers, representing society's "haves," support civil
justice reform proposals.
A particular group can complicate this simplified picture of interests
affected by procedural change by grinding more than one ax, or pretend-
ing to grind one ax (usually involving ideology or philosophy) when they
are actually grinding another. Many interest groups are disingenuous
about their true aims, camouflaging a substantive agenda behind the
cloak of neutral procedural reform."
B. Politicization of the Rulemaking Process: Direct Congressional
Intervention in Federal Rulemaking
As mentioned earlier, Congress, under the REA, delegated to the judi-
cial branch the power to formulate and promulgate the rules of proce-
dure for the federal courts."3 The REA prescribes the process by which
the Advisory Committee formulates rule changes and ultimately transmits
the changes to the Supreme Court for formal adoption. " Under the
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHio ST. UJ. 95, 162
n.345 (1988).
132. Id. at 161; see also Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead- Specula-
tions on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974); Stanton Wheeler
et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 21 L & Soc'y REV. 403 (1987).
133. See Jack Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law
-Revision, 59 BROOK. L REV. 827, 829 (1993). "As guardians and keepers of the rules,
proceduralists have a duty to flush out these substantive arguments from behind their
procedural camouflage, exposing them to open and honest debate." Id.; see also
Mullenix, supra note 82, at 856 ("There is a good deal of disingenuousness in the
air .... [It would do a great deal to clear the air if all involved in the rule reform
process were more forthright about whose oxen are being gored or protected.");
Marcus, supra note 44, at 773 ("[Wlhether the innovation in question is advanced by
representatives of the insurance industry or by the American Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion . . . the real objective of the one proposing the change may be to become a
winner, not to achieve whatever loftier goals are invoked to justify the change.").
134. See supra note 55.
135. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2077 (1994) (discussing the Advisory
Committee and the method by which they develop and approve rules); see also supra
note 55.
REA, Congress retains only a veto power over rule changes."3 The judi-
ciary, whose rules supersede any inconsistent statutes, has the initiative
for rulemaking.'"
In 1990, Congress made a major thrust into the rulemaking process
when it enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act, effectively circumventing
the procedures prescribed by the REA." This intervention caused a
major upheaval in the hitherto settled process. Intermittent rumblings,
however, were heard several years before this major tremor struck.
These earlier interventions demonstrate the problems of polit-
icization."
1. "Partisan Pork Barrel" Procedure"
Partisan pork barrel procedure refers to congressional intervention in
procedure to advance the narrow, pecuniary interests of the members of
professions connected with the judicial system."" Two episodes of such
intervention illustrate the responsiveness of the legislative branch to such
efforts.
In 1982, the National Association of Process Servers (N.A.P.S.) object-
ed to an amendment to Rule 4, proposed by the Advisory Committee,
which authorized the use of registered or certified mail for service of
process.Y Congress responded to the Association's lobbying efforts by
postponing the effective date of the proposed amendment.Y The pro-
posed amendment was the product of four years of Advisory Committee
deliberation.'" In four months, Congress hastily drafted and enacted its
136. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994); see also supra note 55.
137. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
138. See Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994). For a general dis-
cussion of the Civil Justice Reform Act, see Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Can Systematic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts be Remedied by Local Rules?,
67 ST. JOHN'S L REv. 721 (1993).
139. The earliest significant episode of congressional rulemaldng is the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1974. Congress spent two years maldng substantial
revisions in the evidence rules developed by the Advisory Committee under the REA
and then decided to pass its own evidence statute. Carrington, supra note 17, at 163-
64.
140. This Article purloins the term "partisan pork barrel" from Professor Mullenix.
Mullenix, supra note 82, at 848.
141. Id.
142. For an excellent discussion of the legislative process, see Kent Sinclair, Service
of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal
Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L REv. 1183, 1197-1212 (1987).
143. Id. at 1207-08.
144. Mullenix, supra note 82, at 848.
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own Rule 4 revision without hearings or debate." One writer com-
mented:
[The interests of the N.A.P.S.] prevailed over those of rulemaking, leaving us to
imagine what the American Association of Retired Persons or the National Rifle
Association might be able to do to the rules if motivated It deserves note that the
effort of Congress in drafting a revision of Rule 4 did not receive high marks. Kent
Sinclair has described the rule as enacted to be "pregnant with difficulties."'4
The second instance of pork barrel procedural legislation occurred in
1988 when Congress amended Rule 35 to allow a court to order mental
examinations conducted by licensed clinical psychologists, in addition to
psychiatrists or psychologists who are also physicians.147 Professor
Carrington recounts that Senator Daniel Inouye, whose daughter-in-law is
a clinical psychologist in Hawaii, proposed the amendment as a rider to
an omnibus drug bill." Senator Inouye's amendment had been previ-
ously proposed in 1987, but Congress did not act upon it "out of defer-
ence to the Rules Enabling Act.""4 The Congressional Record notes
that "[iut would be appropriate for the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules to address whether Rule 35(a) should be
amended to include licensed or certified psychologists."'" By the fol-
lowing year, the Civil Rules Committee had considered and approved the
proposed amendment, but Senator Inouye "was unwilling to await the
lengthy rulemaking process and so his amendment became effective
without any public notice whatsoever, in seeming defiance of the pro-
visions of the Rules Enabling Act adopted only 14 days earlier."5 '
Carrington commented that this kind of legislative tinkering with proce-
dure "is an excellent example of the kind of legislation that turned the
New York Field Code of 1848 into a monstrosity.""s
The foregoing episodes of special interest groups advancing their pecu-
niary interests at the expense of procedural integrity raise the concern
that, once Congress starts down the slippery slope of directly drafting
145. Id.
146. Carrington, supra note 17, at 164; see also Mullenix, supra note 82, at 845-46
(commenting that this "[Rjule 4 legislative saga" demonstrates that "[tlime pressure
often induces Congress to act quickly, affecting the deliberative process negatively").
147. Carrington, supra note 17, at 165.
148. Id.
149. Walker, supra note 82, at 461.
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. Carrington, supra note 17, at 165. The "provisions of the Rules Enabling Act
adopted only 14 days earlier" refers to the 1988 amendments to the REA. Id.
152. Id.
procedural rules in response to special interests, a momentum develops
in this direction and the rulemaking process begins to unravel as the
procedural system gets picked apart by factional interests."5
2. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
The growing momentum of direct, congressional intervention in the
rulemaldng process culminated in the enactment of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA)." The CJRA created ninety-four communi-
ty advisory groups, one for each federal judicial district."5 The member-
ship of each group was drawn from local lawyers and consumers of legal
services, but not the bench." Under the CJRA, each advisory group
had to formulate and recommend to the local federal district court a
"civil justice and expense and delay reduction plan.""57 The CJRA re-
quired each federal district court to promulgate such a plan."
The CJRA has drawn fire from many commentators. In enacting this
statute, Congress has been criticized for (1) taking rulemaking power
away from the judiciary and giving it to local, lay, advisory groups;
(2) yielding to the pressure of powerful interest groups seeking to shape
procedure to benefit their self-interest;"6 (3) camouflaging as procedur-
al reform what is essentially a substantive agenda that benefits "repeat
players" in litigation;"1 (4) acting in haste to create a "bad piece of leg-
153. Id. at 165-66. Referring to the lobbying successes of the N.A.P.S. and of the
clinical psychologists of Hawaii, Carrington expressed the following concern about
congressional rulemaking: "If Congress is responsive, as is its wont, to every faction
in the United States that detects a possible stake in a proposed amendment to the
rules, the rulemaking tradition is doomed to disintegrate." Id.
154. Stempel, supra note 55, at 684. "In 1990 .... with [the] passage of the CJRA,
Congress thrust itself into the field of litigation policy and procedure in a manner
regarded as unprecedented by many and as unconstitutional by at least one promi-
nent commentator." Id.
155. Mullenix, supra note 120, at 376.
156. Stempel, supra note 55, at 684.
157. Mullenix, supra note 120, at 376.
158. Stempel, supra note 55, at 684. See generaly Mullenix, supra note 120, at 376-
77 (discussing the impending nationwide revolution in this area).
159. See Mullenix, supra note 120, at 377 ("The Act mandates local, grassroots
rulemaking by civilian advisory groups, a novel process that essentially circumvents
the usual judicial advisory committee system for civil procedure reform that has been
in place since 1938.").
160. See id. at 439 ("Procedural rules will be shaped to favor those groups with the
most effective lobbyists in Congress or the local advisory groups."); see also Marcus,
supra note 44, at 805 ("Whatever the reality of a hidden agenda underlying the
[CJRA], it is undeniable that moneyed interests have a more direct, even sanctioned,
avenue of access to the traditional political process.").
161. Mulenix, supra note 120, at 439. "[TIhe disguised political agenda is to remove
disagreeable cases and disagreeable litigants from the federal courts." Id.
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islation";' (5) assuming, without verifying through empirical studies,
the existence of serious delays in civil litigation;I (6) mandating from
each district court a "patchwork of local innovation without concern for
the process of [centralized] federal rulemaking [by the Advisory Commit-
tee in Washington]"; 6 and (7) seeking to regulate "the minutiae of judi-
cial activity.
165
3. Implications for California's Legislative Primacy Model
These episodes of congressional intervention in federal court
rulemaking, in direct response to rising interest group pressure, have
aroused the concern of federal judges"6 and procedural scholars."
The prospect of frequent congressional intervention has ominous implica-
162. Id, at 400.
163. See Marcus, supra note 44, at 801-02 ("[Diespite Congressional findings of seri-
ous delay problems, there was limited evidence, empirical or other, to support this
conclusion. To the contrary, Congress had available, but disregarded, a Rand Corpora-
tion study showing no significant increase in delay in civil litigation in the federal
system since 1971.").
164. Id. at 803.
165. Id,
166. Testifying before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on behalf of the Judi-
cial Conference, in opposition to the CJRA, Judge Robert F. Peckham stated
"We fear that enactment of this statute could result in real harm to the rule-
making process that has served both Congress and the court so well for so
long ... As we who have sat on the bench for some time have discov-
ered ... procedural matters are extraordinarily complex. They can not only
influence, but fix, the outcome of litigation. New rules can have a great
many unforeseen consequences. And it takes the most considered deliberation
to be sure that the dynamic between new programs and established practices
is constructive."
Mullenix, supra note 120, at 416 n.167 (quoting The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 91-184, 333-44 (1990) (statement of Robert F. Peckham,
Judge)). Testifying before the House subcommittee, Judge Peckham also stated: "Judg-
es feel very strongly about judicial involvement in the [rulemaking] process, particu-
larly when the subject relates to procedural matters that go to the core of the per-
fonnance of the judicial function." Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation
Act and Civil Justice Reform Ack Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, InteUec-
tual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong. 105-06 (1990) (statement of Robert F. Peckham, Judge).
167. For a summary of the widespread misgivings over congressional assertiveness
in procedural rulemaking, see Marcus, supra note 44, at 765-66; see also Walker,
supra note 82, at 455-64, 469-75.
tions for the federal rulemaking process and the federal rules
themselves." These concerns and implications are especially applicable
to California's rulemaking process, given the legislature's dominant role
in that process.
The national phenomenon of the politicization of procedure has been
mirrored in California as well. Special interest groups have not restricted
their lobbying activities to Congress; they have also lobbied the Califor-
nia Legislature, and the electorate directly through the initiative process,
for procedural advantage."M In 1993, the California Court Reporters As-
sociation defeated legislation that would have authorized the electronic
recording of proceedings in California courts.7 '
It is no secret that legislators are directly dependent upon interest
groups for campaign contributions and other electoral support. Legisla-
tures are peculiarly vulnerable, and therefore, responsive to lobbying. 7'
One of the adverse consequences of legislative rulemaking for procedure,
168. In a Memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Professor
Carrington, serving as the Committee Reporter, warned that the Civil Rules will soon
be "decorated with special interest" legislation if Congress intervenes frequently in the
rulemaling process. Carrington, supra note 17, at 163. Carrington then drew a paral-
lel between recent congressional intervention and the New York State Legislature's re-
peated legislative tinkering with the Field Code in response to special interests, which
caused that former model of reform to deteriorate into the Byzantine complexity of
the Throop Code. See supra note 17. "This is a fate that befell the Field Code in
New York in the 19th century, and it is an accident waiting to happen to federal
reform now." Reporter, MEMORANDUM TO CIVIL RULES COMMrrrEE RE QUESTIONS ABOUT
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 13 (October 18, 1989); see also Stempel, supra note 55, at
730 ("Although a new [rulemaking] structure may emerge or the previous consensus
may reassert itself, litigation reform may also devolve into a fragmented regime of
controlled chaos rather than the emergence of a new paradigm.").
169. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (referring to successful lobbying
efforts of California court reporters) and infru note 467 and accompanying text (not-
ing Assembly Bill 3113 supporters); Proposition 201, Shareholder Litigation Reform
Act (defeated in general election Mar. 26, 1996), reprinted in 2 CAL. LEGIS. SERVICE
A-22 to A-27 (1996) (regarding fee shifting); Proposition 202, Lawyer Contingent Fee
Limitation Act (defeated in general election Mar. 26, 1996), reprinted in 2 CAL LEGiS.
SERVICE A-28 to A-30 (1996) (regarding contingent fees).
170. Professor Marcus cited this episode in his treatment of the political influences
in the federal rulemaking process. Marcus, supra note 44, at 771-72 n.45.
171. It is, of course, true that lobbyists have also been actively at work in the
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee became more exposed to lobbying
activity after the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act opened up the
Committee's hearings to greater public participation. See generally Mulienix, supra
note 82, at 843-55 (discussing the lobbying efforts rulemakers have encountered). The
Advisory Committee is not directly dependent upon interest groups, financially or
otherwise, and has usually maintained a neutral perspective in rulemaking. See
Marcus, supra note 44, at 816 ("Even without a new or riveting paradigm, reformers
can be moved by more than the self-interest of the loudest or best-financed suppli-
cant, and this is the orientation the Advisory Committee has assumed.").
(Vol. 24: 455, 19971 Saga of Summary Judgment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
in the current politically charged procedural environment, is the loss of a
neutral approach to ruemaking.'"
Many writers have argued that the neutralist perspective to rulemaking
that underlies the advisory committee system of the REA should be pre-
served in some form and that procedural rulemakers should be motivat-
ed by the public interest rather than narrow special interests."3 Most
believe that procedural neutrality cannot be achieved by returning
rulemaking authority to the legislative branch.174 The recent episodes of
congressional rulemaking have raised pointed concerns about the capaci-
ty of legislative rulemakers to be neutral. First, legislatures will enact
laws favoring powerful interest groups at the expense of the disenfran-
chised, sometimes masking substantive changes as civil justice re-
form.'75 Second, the body of procedural rules will proliferate into a
complexity of special interest "pork barrel" legislation. 76 Third, interest
groups who perceive that a proposed rule change could adversely impact
their pecuniary interests will block passage of amendments that benefit
172. Professor Carrington, an advocate of procedural neutrality, wrote:
Procedure rules that are, or are even seen to be, designed to favor one
set of litigants produce outcomes that are less acceptable to their adversar-
ies.... Equal Protection of the Law requires a "level playing field" in legal
dispute resolution.
Moreover, if the procedure rules were the result of a test of strength
among political organizations, it is obvious... that rules would generally
favor those litigants with the greater resources, especially those identifiable
.repeat players" who have the larger stakes in procedure rules and hence the
greater political energy.
Carrington, supra note 44, at 2074-75 (footnotes omitted).
173. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 55, at 752. "[Clivil rulemaking should not be
transformed into a completely political or partisan enterprise. Instead, the reform
process should.., work toward nonpartisan attitudes in rulemaking . . . ." Id.;
Marcus, supra note 44, at 762 ("I argue that we . . . should continue to endorse the
pursuit of a neutralist rulemaking process."); Carrington, supra note 44, at 2074-85
(discussing the principles of generalism and flexibility in support of political neutral-
ity).
174. See infra note 181.
175. An example of this type of legislation is the CJRA. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (concerning the special interest
amendment to Rule 35 to benefit clinical psychologists). Judicial reformers who advo-
cated judicial, over legislative, rulemaking had a "clear desire to avoid the politics of
legislative log-rolling with procedural doctrine as one of the logs." A. Leo Levin, Be-
yond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 67 ST. JoHN's L REV. 877, 895 (1993).
the public interest"9 Other concerns raised by congressional interven-
tion in the rulemaking process include the enactment of hastily and slop-
pily drafted procedural statutes," the failure to identify sufficient em-
pirical studies that support the existence of a perceived procedural prob-
lem (e.g., the "litigation explosion") and justify the proposed solu-
tions," and the drafting of overly particularized and cumbersome stat-
utes.
80
While academics offer a variety of proposals for saving the federal
rulemaking process from disintegrating into chaos, it is significant to
note that most do not favor a return to legislative rulemaking.'8 ' The
swing of the procedural pendulum toward legislative rulemaking is re-
awakening memories of the legislative abuses of the old code era."
The upheaval in federal rulemaking is challenging procedural scholars to
reassess the settled assumptions about the rulemaking process which
underlie the professional dominance litigation reform model."0 The
177. See supra notes 142-46 (describing the efforts of the National Association of
Process Servers to block an amendment to Rule 4 permitting service by certified
mal) and supra note 170 (referring to the successful efforts of the California Court
Reporters Association to block legislation allowing court reporting by electronic
means).
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also analysis of the California
summary judgment statute irta Part III.D.-F.
179. Marcus, supra note 44, at 801-02.
180. One cause of over-particularized procedural legislation is the penchant of legis-
latures for regulating the "minutiae of judicial activity." Id. at 803; Carrington, supra
note 44, at 2082-83. Professor Carrington identifies a specific problem with over-par-
ticularized statutes: "Elaborate procedural principles carefully designed to prevent
judges from falling into error become themselves centers of costly dispute tending to
distract decision-making away from substantive merits to alleged procedural miscues."
Id at 2082.
181. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 44, at 817. "Even while lambasting the existing
rules process in 1976, Professor Lesnick acknowledged that '[it would be difficult to
find a supporter of a return to the days of legislative rule-making.' [sic] Developments
since then do not call for a change of view." Id. (quoting Howard Lesnick, The Fed-
eral Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 579 (1975));
see Mullenix, supra note 120, at 439; Walker, supra note 82, at 460.
The chief alternative [to judicial rulemaking] is legislative rulemaldng, an
alternative that diminishes the pertinent knowledge of the rulemaker. At best,
the initial work might be done by legislators who are also attorneys, but
enactment would almost certainly be left to a majority of legislators with no
expertise at all.
Id.
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying texL
183. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BRoor. L REV. 841, 854-55 (1993).
It is time for a breather, for a group that includes rulemakers, members of
Congress and members of the bar carefully to review where we have been,
[Vol. 24: 455, 19971 Saga of Summary Judgment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
.dangers inherent in placing politically charged procedural issues in the
hands of politicians who are directly beholden to organized interest
groups, apparent to judicial reformers at the beginning of the twentieth
century, are becoming apparent once again. The following rhetorical
question raised in 1929 by a member of the Los Angeles Bar and then-
President of the American Bar Association (ABA) to the ABA's Memphis
convention is as timely today as it was then:
Who is best qualified to determine what is essential and vital in order that issues
may be properly framed-a legislator, whose vote is often given as a matter of
trade or courtesy, or a body of judges and practicing lawyers, working in harmony
of purpose, well versed in the substantive law and learned by long years of prac-
tice in procedure?'"
The current upheaval in federal rulemaking should motivate California to
rethink its legislative primacy rulemaking model. This Article proposes
that the current politicization of procedure, which is at play in California
as it is in the rest of the nation, makes Chief Justice Gibson's campaign
for judicial primacy in rulemaking'" timely once again.
The following history of summary judgment in California is intended to
provide a contemporary illustration of the deficiencies of the legislative
rulemaking process by focusing on a rule that most would consider pro-
cedural, yet politically charged, and which falls within the constitutional
competence of the legislature to amend.
where we are going and where we should be going. It is time for a morato-
rium on ignorance and procedural law reform.
See also Lesnick, supra note 181, at 579 (-The recent experience with the Federal
Rules of Evidence makes it clear that there should be a re-examination of the federal
rule-making process. We should not return to the days of congressional rule maling
for the courts, but it needs to be recognized that the present system has serious
shortcomings, and new directions should be explored."); Marcus, supra note 44, at
822 (opposing the call among some scholars for a "more political rules process").
Professor Walker argues "that further politicization of the process should be avoided
by sharply limiting the discretion of the Advisory Committee, thus clearly differentiat-
ing the role of the Committee from the role of elected officials." Mullenix, supra
note 82, at 799-800 (Professor Mullenix, referring to a provision in the 1988 Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act "permitting greater public access to the civil
rulemalng processes of the Advisory Committees," frames'the "ultimate issue raised
by the recent rulemaldng reform ... who should make the rules?"); Walker, supra
note 82, at 463 (opposing Paul Carrington's suggestion "that an appropriate response
to the politicization of civil rulemaling would be formation of a group to lobby Con-
gress on behalf of the product of the current process").
184. Gurney E. Newlin, The Rule-Making Power, 4 CAL. ST. B.J. 162, 163 (1930).
185. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text
Ill. THE SAGA OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CALIFORNIA
AN EXAMPLE OF "BAD" PROCEDURE
A. Introduction
The survey in Part II discussing the rise of interest group politics as a
major force in shaping federal procedure, both in the Advisory Commit-
tee and especially in Congress, provides evidence of the inadequacy of
rulemaking through the political process." Recent instances of the
amendment (or attempted amendment) of the federal rules by political
"logrolling"" have generated concern by commentators that the federal
procedural system could be picked apart by special interests." Addi-
tionally, the increasing tempo of congressional intervention in federal
rulemaking could impair public respect for the integrity of the federal
rulemaking process. Unlike substantive law, procedural rules are the
"rules of the game," and their legitimacy depends on "a 'level playing
field.'"" The public perception that procedural rulemaking is "a test of
strength among political organizations""g risks reducing the legitimacy
of both the process and the procedural system produced by the process.
The critique of California's summary judgment experience, which this
Article presents in this section, provides more evidence of the inadequa-
cy of California's legislative primacy process, and confirms the concerns
of procedural scholars about the negative implications of congressional
rulemaldng for federal procedure. The underlying premise of this critique
is that "bad" procedural rulemaking process produces "bad" proce-dure.'19'
186. See supra notes 80-185 and accompanying text.
187. Logrolling is defined as "the trading of votes by legislators to secure favorable
action on projects of interest to each one." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
1895 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1986). One of the goals of federal rulemaking reform was
.a clear desire to avoid the politics of legislative log-rolling with procedural doctrine
as one of the logs." Levin, supra note 176, at 895; see also Levin & Amsterdam, su-
pra note 14, at 10 ("[L]egislatures are subject to the influence of other pressures
than those which seek the efficient administration of justice and may often push
through some particular and ill-advised pet project of an influential legislator while
the comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a bar association molders in commit-
tee .... ").
188. Carrington, supra note 17, at 165-66.
189. Carrington, supra note 44, at 2074. But note contrary views of those who view
the "substance"/"procedure" distinction as illusory: advocates of non-trans-substantive
rules. Id.
190. Id. at 2074-75.
191. Part 1I of this Article contends that the cause of the current confusion in Cal-
ifornia -sumuary judgment law is the legislative primacy model as it functions in
today's highly politicized procedural environment. See iqfra notes 192-506 and accom-
panying text.
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B. Standards for Determining 'ood" and 'Bad" Procedure
In the abstract, there is a consensus that the goals of a procedural
system, and of individual procedural rules, are fairness and justice
achieved with efficiency and economy."9 Procedural rules that are fair
and just should facilitate accurate outcomes based upon the law and the
evidence. These concepts imply giving each party a reasonable opportu-
nity to assemble its case and to present it at a hearing, where it will
receive careful and unbiased, or party-neutral, deliberation." Addition-
ally, the procedural rules should give parties the satisfaction of feeling
that they have been dealt with fairly.'" Commentators have expressed
concern that the increased politicization of the rulemaking process will
unfairly skew the rules in favor of those litigants, usually "repeat play-
ers," who have greater resources and motivation to influence the political
process.19
On the other side of the coin, outcomes can hardly be deemed fair if
they are so time-consuming and expensive that only well-off individuals
and corporations can afford to litigate. Therefore, most would agree that
procedural rules should provide just results efficiently and economical-
ly."m Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodies these
goals: "[These rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."'"
The current controversy among politicians and scholars arises over
what these abstract terms mean in the context of the detailed operation
of a procedural system. The source of this controversy revolves around
192. "We can expect near universal support for the goals of justice, dispatch, and
economy in litigation." Carrington, supra note 44, at 2077 (discussing the impact of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
193. FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 2 (1965) ("It is this objective
which the 'due process' clauses in our national and state constitutions seek to safe-
guard."); see also Weinstein, supra note 116, at 1906.
The [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] drafters' commitment was to a civil
practice in which all parties would have ready access to the courts and to
relevant information, a practice in which the merits would be reached
promptly and decided fairly. Every claimant would get a meaningful day in
court.
Id.
194. Weinstein, supra note 116, at 1906.
195. Carrington, supra note 44, at 2074-75.
196. Id. at 2077.
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
the inherent tension between fairness and economy: the more meaningful
a litigant's day in court, the more that day costs in time and money."
This tension fuels the debate between the preservationists, who stress
the goals of open access to the courts and accurate outcomes, and the
reformers, who seek to rein in what they perceive to be a litigation ex-
plosion by restricting access to the formal litigation system and speeding
up the disposition of cases." This section will demonstrate that an un-
articulated difference of opinion over what goals the civil justice system
should pursue underlies the ongoing debate concerning the appropriate
role for summary judgment in the California civil justice system.
C. The Celotex Bombshell
The Saga of Summary Judgment in California begins with a trilogy
of landmark cases handed down by the Supreme Court in 1986, which
transformed the nature and function of summary judgment in federal
court.2" Prior to the trilogy, the common wisdom was that summary
judgment was a disfavored and rarely granted motion in federal
court,"l as well as in California state courts.' The trilogy, consisting
of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,' Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,24 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,2°5 drastical-
ly increased the discretion of federal judges to dismiss claims on summa-
ry judgment grounds. These three decisions sent strong signals through-
out the federal judiciary that "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an inte-
gral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure
198. See Gregory A. Gordillo, Summary Judgment and Problems in Applying the
Celotex Trilogy Standard, 42 CLEv. ST. L REv. 263, 263 (1994). "In an effort to pro-
vide swift justice while respecting due process, the courts have refined a tool that in
theory serves this purpose superbly sununary judgment" Id. "Unfortunately, swift
justice and due process often create conflicting interests." Id. at 263-64.
199. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text' (discussing the ideological in-
terests of the preservationists and the reformers).
200. See ifra notes 212-68 (discussing effect of trilogy cases on movant and
respondent's burdens).
201. See Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shits at
the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987). Stempel disputes the reality of this percep-
tion, stating that the trilogy made an already pro-defendant rule more pro-defendant.
Stempel, supra note 131, at 160.
202. See Biljac Assocs. v. First Interstate Bank, 267 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824 (Ct App.
1990) ("Summary judgment is a drastic measure which should be used with caution
so that it does not become a substitute for trial.").
203. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
204. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
205. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'"' The
trilogy enhanced the utility of sununary judgment as a tool in the hands
of defendants to dismiss claims, and in the hands of courts to manage
crowded dockets.'
California felt the trilogy's shockwaves strongly. "Shockwaves" refers
to the response of the bench, the bar, the legislature, and organized inter-
est groups in California to the Celotex bombshell,'n and the implica-
tions of that response for California's legislative primacy rulemaking
process.
This Article chronicles the struggle between two opposing forces trig-
gered by the trilogy: those who profess to want the application of Cali-
fornia summary judgment standard to mirror the post-trilogy federal
summary judgment standard, and those who do not Those in support of
the federal approach include the defense bar, Republicans, who won
control of the California Assembly in early 1996, and some judges, includ-
ing the Judicial Council.2 Those in opposition include trial lawyers,
some judges, and the Democrats, who retained control of the California
Senate following the 1996 election.
One casualty of this struggle, as it has played out in practice commnen-
taries, the legislature and the courts, is a clear and precise understanding
206. Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R CIrv. P. 1).
207. See Stempel, supra note 131, at 160-62; Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE U. 73, 93
(1990); William Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and Case Management, 56 ANrrrausT
U. 213, 228 (1987) (-Summary judgment procedure is a means for cutting rapidly to
the core issues of litigation.").
208. The "Celotex bombshell" is a shorthand way to describe the trilogy of cases of
which Celotex was only one. This Article will shortly criticize this practice of loosely
invoking the case name Celotex on the grounds that it has engendered much confu-
sion in the law of summary judgment in California. See infra Parts III.D.2-F.
209. Prior to Celotex, there were calls for a more liberal summary judgment rule.
See Stuart R. Poliak, Liberalizing Summary Adjudication: A Proposal, 36 HASTINGS
U. 419 (1985). In 1985, Judge Pollak, who presided over the Law and Motion De-
partment of the San Francisco Superior Court from August 1982 to July 1984, criti-
cized the Adickes case and proposed relaxing the movant's burden placed on a mov-
ing defendant Id at 429. Pollak proposed allowing a defendant simply to "assert" the
nonexistence of a fact material to the plaintiffs case and support that assertion with
a declaration by the defendant's counsel "stating that diligent inquiry has disclosed no
competent evidence of such fact and that the declarant believes that no such compe-
tent evidence exists." Id. This proposal would have gone further than Celotex by
making it easier for moving defendants to force plaintiffs to undergo the burden of
putting their trial cases together earlier than they ordinarily would.
of each of the cases of the trilogy and the propositions for which each
case stands. Another casualty has been a clear and uniform definition of
the standard for granting summary judgment in California.
Traditionally, the pretrial motion for summary judgment serves to pre-
vent cases from proceeding to trial when the moving party persuades the
court that there is no need for a trial, based upon the apparent lack of
evidence creating a genuine factual dispute needed to justify the com-
mencement of trial."° Rule 56, the federal summary judgment rule, per-
mits the court to grant summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on fie, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."
211
1. The Effect of Celotex on the Movant's Burden
The Celotex decision strengthened the utility of summary judgment as
a defendant's tool to dismiss claims by relaxing the requirements of the
movant's burden. 12 The movant's burden is the burden of the party
moving for summary judgment to produce evidence that demonstrates
the moving party's right to summary judgment by showing that there is
"no genuine issue as to any material fact."2 3 The movant can attempt to
meet this burden by using "paper evidence" in the form of depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions (in the pleadings or in response to
a Rule 36 Request for Admissions)214 and affidavits, if any.216
The consequence of a moving party's failure to meet its burden is deni-
al of the summary judgment motion, even if the responding party fails to
produce any evidence of its own in opposition to the motion. In other
words, the burden does not shift to the opposing party to show the exis-
tence of a genuine issue on the material fact that is the subject of the
motion unless and until the court first finds that the movant's burden has
been satisfied.
In a sense, therefore, the movant's burden is analogous to the dues
that a moving party must pay before it can force the opposing party to
produce evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue as to a mate-
rial fact. Its function is to protect the opposing party who may have a
210. Stempel, supra note 131, at 139-40.
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
212. For an illuminating treatment of the effects of Celotex on the movant's burden,
and of Liberty Lobby and Matvushita on the respondent's burden, see generally
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 207.
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
215. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
[Vol. 24: 455, 1997] Saga of Summary Judgment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
meritorious case from harassment by having to respond to unsupported
motions. In the type of defendant's motion involved in Celotex, the shift-
ing of the burden to the responding plaintiff would force it to assemble
and reveal to the defendant its trial case, often substantially earlier than
it would in the normal course of trial preparation.
The motion that was the subject of the Court's holding in Celotex was
a defensive summary judgment motion in which the "material fact," as to
which the moving defendant contended there was "no genuine issue,"
was an essential element of the plaintiffs case2 .. and therefore at trial,
the plaintiff would have the burden of production to prove up that
fact.2"7 In a defensive summary judgment motion, the moving defendant
contends that the responding plaintiff cannot meet its burden of produc-
tion at trial on an essential element of its case.2"'
In Celotex, the plaintiff, Mrs. Catrett, brought a wrongful death suit
against several manufacturers of asbestos claiming that the proximate
cause of her husband's death was his exposure to asbestos on the
job."' Mrs. Catrett sued several manufacturers of asbestos, including
the Celotex Corporation.' After a year of discovery, Celotex moved
for summary judgment, contending that there was no genuine issue as to
the material fact of causation, i.e., that the decedent had been exposed
to Celotex-manufactured asbestos.22 In support of its movant's burden,
Celotex submitted the plaintiffs factually devoid answer to Celotex's
interrogatory, which asked the plaintiff to identify her causation witness-
es.' In response to this interrogatory, Mrs. Catrett named no witnesses
to her husband's exposure to Celotex-manufactured asbestos.
The trial court granted Celotex's summary judgment motion.' The
court of appeals reversed, agreeing with the plaintiff that Celotex had not
met its movant's burden, based on the court's interpretation of the Su-
preme Court's 1970 opinion in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,' that a
moving defendant must conclusively negate an essential element of the





221. Id. at 319-20.
222. Id, at 320.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
plaintiffs case with affirmative evidence of its own.' The plaintiffs
factually devoid interrogatory answers merely showed that the plaintiff
had not identified any evidence of causation with which to go forward at
trial. Because the court of appeals held that Celotex had not met its
movant's burden, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff and, therefore,
the court did not address whether the plaintiffs response was sufficient
to show the existence of a genuine issue as to causation.'
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the
plaintiffs factually devoid interrogatory answers were sufficient to satisfy
the movant's burden by "'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district
court-that there [was] an absence of evidence [on the material issue of
causation.]"' The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to
determine whether Mrs. Catrett had satisfied her respondent's bur-
den.' For the first time in the history of Rule 56, the Supreme Court,
in this trilogy of decisions, equated summary judgment, a pre-trial mo-
tion, with the directed verdict trial motion,'a which is made after the
plaintiff has had the opportunity to develop its case at trial, including tes-
timony by live witnesses."' Based upon the Supreme Court's holding in
Liberty Lobby' that the standard for granting a summary judgment
motion should mirror' that for granting a directed verdict motion, the
Court in Celotex reasoned that the burden of production on the moving
defendant for sununary judgment should be no greater than the burden
on that defendant would be if it moved for a directed verdict after the
plaintiffs presentation of its case in chief at trial.' 4 Because the latter
motion requires the defendant to do no more than point to evidence that
has already been presented by the plaintiff and show that it is insuffi-
226. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When the defendant satisfies its movant's burden, the
burden on the responding plaintiff to show the existence of a genuine issue (i.e., to
preview its case) is triggered. It was widely perceived that Adickes enabled a plaintiff
to force a defendant to endure the time and expense of a needless trial even though
the plaintiff had no case.
227. Id. at 321-22.
228. Id. at 325.
229. Id. at 328.
230. Id. at 323. The equating of summary judgment and directed verdict motions
was based upon the Supreme Court's opinions in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986), decided during the same term as Celotex. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323.
231. Note that this result has changed under amended Rule 50 which now permits
the opposing party to move for a judgment as a matter of law after the opposing
party has been fully heard with respect to the element which is the focus of the
motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
232. 477 U.S. at 250.
233. Id.
234. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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cient to support a reasonable jury verdict for the plaintiff,' the defen-
dant on summary judgment should be required to do no more. The mov-
ing defendant should not have to submit its own affirmative evidence to
negate conclusively an element of the plaintiffs case, as was thought to
have been the standard under Adickes.' Of course, because summary
judgment is a pretrial motion,' the plaintiff has not yet put on its trial
case. Therefore, the moving defendant still has a burden of production to
demonstrate on paper that the plaintiff would not have sufficient evi-
dence at trial to satisfy its burden of production and withstand a directed
verdict motion.'
The Supreme Court was careful to make clear that it was not eliminat-
ing the movant's burden; the moving defendant still had the initial re-
sponsibility to demonstrate to the court, through discovery materials,
admissions and affidavits, that the plaintiff would not have sufficient
evidence to present at trial to create a case for the jury.3  The Court
failed, however, to provide sufficient guidance to help the district and ap-
pellate courts determine how this redefined movant's burden will work
on a practical level. For example, how does the movant's burden tie into
discovery? May a moving defendant support its motion by simply declar-
ing, or pointing out to the court, that there is nothing in the record to
support the plaintiffs case? Should courts require moving defendants to
235. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
236. Adickes v. S.- Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); see supra note 209 and ac-
companying text.
237. FED. R. Cirv. P. 56.
238. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157.
239. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The Court stated:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial respon-
sibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identi-
fying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any" which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. (quoting FED. R Civ. P. 56(c)).
Therefore, although the Court does not require the moving defendant to submit affir-
mauve evidence, such as affidavits, to support the motion, it does require the movant
to affirmatively demonstrate its right to summary judgment. Id.
conduct some discovery into the plaintiffs case to show affirmatively an
absence of evidence?'
Advocates of the Celotex approach in California have often overlooked
the fact that the plaintiffs case in Celotex was not frivolous or
meritless." As a result of a prior summary judgment motion, the plain-
240. Some commentators have intimated that the movant's burden on summary
judgment under Celotex is simply to point out the absence of evidence for an essen-
tial element of the plaintiffs case, a light burden which involves something less than
affirmatively demonstrating through discovery materials, pleadings, admissions, and
affidavits the absence of a genuine issue. See Childress, supra note 201, at 191 ("You
[the moving defendant] suffice if you point out a failure of genuine dispute, though
of course the best practice is to support your motion as factually as possible with
record materials (e.g., depositions, answers to interrogatories, documents with record
page cites)."); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment- Has There Been a
Material Change in Standards?, 63 NoTRE DAME L REv. 770 (1988).
"[A) party who moves for summary judgment, unless he or she must bear the burden
of proof at trial, should need to do no more than demand that the opposing party
establish that it can meet its burden of production if the case is permitted to go to
trial." Id. at 779; see also Melissa L Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 53, 55 (1988).
Much of the confusion surrounding California summary judgment in the after-
math of Celotex has centered on the movant's burden. The view that the moving
defendant need only point out an absence of evidence in the plaintiffs case has its
advocates in California sunmmary judgment practice and its opponents. After the Court
decided Celotex in 1986, pro-Ceiotex practice commentaries often stated, simplistically
and misleadingly, that "[s]ununary judgment proof now follows the burden of proof at
trial." Briane Nelson Mitchell, Summary Judgment: A Solution to Court Congestion?,
LA. LAW., Dec. 1990, at 29, 32. Such statements have created the impression that
Celotex merely requires the defendant to point out to the court the absence of evi-
dence, with no affirmative burden to assemble a prima facie case for summary judg-
ment. After the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District decided
Union Bank, courts of appeal have split over this issue. See infra notes 415-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the aftermath of the Union Bank decision).
The view that the moving defendant should be able to shift the burden of pro-
duction by merely pointing out the absence of evidence in the plaintiffs case has
been advocated even prior to Celotex. In his January 1985 article, Judge Pollak ac-
knowledged that such a "shift in the burden of (going] forward with evidence to the
opposing party could be used to harass one's adversary" by enabling defendants to
"flush out the opponent's case more quickly and effectively than extended discovery."
Pollak, supra note 209, at 428. However, Judge Pollak's proposed method to deter
bad faith sununary judgment motions was merely to require counsel for the moving
party, "as a condition to shifting the burden of producing evidence, [to] submit a
sworn statement that he or she believes there is no competent evidence of the fact
in question." Id. at 429. Under Judge Pollak's proposal, the declaration of counsel for
the movant need only affirm that "diligent inquiry has disclosed no competent evi-
dence of such [material] fact and that [counsel] believes that no such competent evi-
dence exists." Id. This proposal went beyond Celotex by relieving the moving defen-
dant of the burden of assembling and submitting documentary support to demonstrate
affirmatively the absence of sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the
plaintiffs case.
241. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (Celotex I), 756 F.2d 181, 183-84 (D.C.
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tiff had placed in the record a letter from her husband's supervisor, Mr.
Hoff, which indicated that the decedent had been exposed to Celotex-
manufactured asbestos.2 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion com-
pletely ignored this fact.' Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, while agreeing in principle with the
movant's burden standard announced by the majority, did not believe
that Celotex had done enough to satisfy that standard.' Because
Celotex knew of the contents of Mr. Hoff's letter, and Mrs. Catrett had
earlier indicated her intent to call Mr. Hoff as a trial witness, the dissent
argued that Celotex had the initial burden to depose Mr. Hoff to negate
the possibility that he could offer relevant testimony on causation at trial
sufficient to satisfy Mrs. Catrett's burden of production. 5
California case law interpreted the state's summary judgment stat-
ute' consistently with the Adickes approach to the movant's burden in
defensive summary judgment motions, and held fast to this restrictive
view even after Celotex.2'7 The California approach changed with the
Second Appellate District's controversial Union Bank decision, which
clouded the issue.'
Cir. 1985); see also Ce otex, 477 U.S. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320.
243. See Nelken, supra note 240, at 55.
[TIhe majority misread the record on appeal by ignoring the fact that Celotex
had made not one but two summary judgment motions. Indeed, the plaintiffs
evidence of exposure was already in the record when the defendant's second
motion, the one before the Court, was made. Consequently, in its eagerness
to announce a new standard for the moving party's initial burden, the majori-
ty reached the wrong result on the facts of the case, even under that stan-
dard.
IcL
244. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 334-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 335-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nelken criticizes Celotex on the grounds
that this flawed opinion is the consequence of the Supreme Court's determination to
reinterpret Rule 56 and the choice of a poor vehicle for doing so. Nelken, supra
note 240, at 56. Professor Stempel argues that the Supreme Court, in the trilogy,
circumvented the amendment process prescribed by Congress in the REA and, in es-
sence, amended Rule 56 itself. Stempel, supra note 131, at 162, 167.
246. § 437c.
247. See, e.g., Bilbac Assocs. v. First Interstate Bank, 267 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Ct. App.
1990).
248. Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct.
App. 1995).
California case law also expressed the view that summary judgment
was a disfavored procedural device to be granted sparingly, rooted in
concern for granting plaintiffs their day in court.' Prior to Union
Bank there was a common perception among lawyers that a defendant
could not win summary judgment motions,' even where the plaintiff had
no case to offer at trial, because the burden to negate an essential ele-
ment of the plaintiffs case was too difficult to meet in most situa-
tions. °
2. The Effect of Matsushita and Liberty Lobby on
the Respondent's Burden
By lowering the movant's burden, Celotex made it easier for the mov-
ing party to shift the burden to the responding party to show, through
paper evidence, the existence of a genuine issue in order to defeat the
motion for summary judgment.25 Matsushita" and Liberty Lobby 2m
further strengthened summary judgment as a defensive tool by imposing
a heavier respondent's burden on the nonmoving party to defeat summa-
ry judgment, once that burden shifted.2
Prior to these two decisions, the burden on the plaintiff to defeat a
summary judgment motion and preserve its right to reach the trial stage
was lighter than the burden on the plaintiff to defeat a directed verdict
motion and reach the jury.'s On summary judgment, "most courts con-
fined their role to merely ascertaining whether the record showed a
nonfrivolous fact existence or fact interpretation dispute." ' However,
once the plaintiff presents its case at trial, the trial court has wide lati-
tude to evaluate the persuasiveness of the plaintiffs case to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a rational jury verdict in
the plaintiffs favor. 7 This distinction between summary judgment and
249. See Bijac Assocs., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
250. See D. HERR Er AL, MOTION PRACTICE § 16.1.10 (1985) (asserting that prece-
dents holding that summary judgment should be granted rarely are in error and
courts should grant summary judgment more often).
251. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
252. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
253. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
254. Lawrence W. Pierce, Summary JudgmenL A Favored Means of Resolving Dis-
putes, 53 BROOx L. REv. 279, 286-87 (1987) (arguing that Liberty Lobby, Celotex, and
Matsushita merely enhance the already receptive attitude of the Second Circuit to-
ward the disposition of certain cases through summary judgment motions).
255. Id.
256. Stempel, supra note 131, at 115. See, e.g., Paul E. Hawkinson Co. v. Dennis,
166 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1948) (holding that summary judgment is not proper when
conflicting inferences can be drawn).
257. Stempel, supra note 131, at 108 (asserting that in equating summary judgment
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directed verdict radically changed when the Supreme Court, in Liberty
Lobby, equated summary judgment with a directed verdict by holding
"that the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard
for a directed verdict."2'
The Supreme Court, in Liberty Lobby,' declared:
[The]" "genuine issue" summary judgment standard is "very close" to the "reason-
able jury" directed verdict standard -The primary difference between the two
motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial
and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made
at trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted."'
Therefore, according to Liberty Lobby, summary judgment should be
granted where the plaintiffs evidence would be insufficient to support a
reasonable jury verdict for the plaintiff, ie., to withstand a directed ver-
dict motion.26 More specifically, the Court stated that the plaintiffs evi-
dence would not be sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion
if it were "merely colorable... or [was] not significantly probative."
26
There were two dissenting opinions in Liberty Lobby, one by Justice
Brennan and the other by Justice Rehnquist joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger. Justice Brennan called the majority rule a "brand new procedure,"
and directed verdict, the Court ignored the intent of Rule 56, expanding too greatly
the power of the bench, and removing too many disputes from active, adjudication).
258. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250.
259. In Liberty Lobby, the plaintiffs Willis Carto, a conservative publisher, and Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., which Carto headed, brought a libel suit against Jack Anderson, the
publisher of Investigator, the magazine's president and chief executive officer, and
the magazine itself. Id. at 244-45. The plaintiffs based their libel action upon several
articles about Carto which appeared in Investigator. Id. at 245. The defendants
moved for summary judgment, arguing that, because the plaintiffs were limited-pur-
pose public figures under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 967 (1964), the
plaintiffs were required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defen-
dants had published the articles with actual malice. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 245.
The trial court granted summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs' evidence insufficient
as a matter of law to prove actual malice. Id. at 246. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, finding undisputed facts from which a jury could infer
reckless disregard for the truth and, consequently, actual malice. Id. at 246-47. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the grounds that the lower appellate court
should have applied the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in determining
whether plaintiffs' evidence of actual malice was sufficient to withstand the summary
judgment motion. Id. at 247.
260. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251 (quoting Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983)).
261. Id. at 251-52.
262. Id, at 249-50.
which will "transform what is meant to provide an expedited 'summary'
procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits."2" He found it
impossible "to square the [majority opinion's] direction that the judge 'is
not himself to weigh the evidence' with the direction that the judge also
bear in mind the 'quantum' of proof required and consider whether the
evidence is of sufficient 'caliber or quantity' to meet that 'quantum. '"'
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., an anti-
trust case in which a group of American electronics manufacturers al-
leged that certain Japanese companies had conspired to sell their prod-
ucts below marginal cost, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision,
reversed the court of appeals and upheld the district court's grant of
summary judgment against the plaintiffs.2' The Court based its decision
on its conclusion that the plaintiffs' charge of conspiracy was "implausi-
ble."2
None of the trilogy cases were "no evidence" cases. On the contrary, in
Liberty Lobby and Matsushita, the court of appeals and a significant
minority of the Supreme Court believed that the plaintiffs' cases were
sufficient to warrant a trial.267 In Celotex, the majority opinion over-
looked the record in that Mrs. Catrett had a potential causation witness,
and thus established a factual dispute. The Supreme Court had chosen
the wrong case as a vehicle for redefining the movant's burden in defen-
sive summary judgment motions.2
263. Id. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
265. 475 U.S. 574, 576-78 (1986).
266. Id. at 587, 596. The strongly worded dissent by Justice White, joined by Justic-
es Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, accused the majority of suggesting that a judge
"hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case should go
beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the
weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff," which would be "overturning settled law."
Id. at 600-01 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent also criticized the ma-
jority for "prefer[ring] its own economic theorizing to [plaintiffs expert]" and de-
priving the trier of fact of the opportunity to evaluate the expert's testimony. Id. at
603 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 336 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See supra note 245.
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D. The 1992 and 1993 Amendments to the Summary
Judgment Statute
1. A Textbook Case of Confusing "Patchwork Amendments " '
Criticism over the confused state of summary judgment law in Califor-
nia is a time-honored tradition, as is the call for summary judgment re-
form.' 7 While some commentators have cautioned against too much
legislative tinkering with the summary judgment statute,"7 the legisla-
ture has repeatedly amended the statute in response to scholarly cri-
tiques over summary judgment.272
Since 1933, the legislature has amended the sununary judgment statute
on seventeen occasions.27 As a consequence of legislative tinkering
over the years with section 437c of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, the summary judgment statute has mushroomed in detail and com-
plexity. 7 4 Through "piece-meal amendment by successive legisla-
tures,"276 the text of the statute has grown from roughly 637 words in
the 1971 version, described by one writer as "relatively brief," to approxi-
mately 2466 words contained in the current statute, an almost four-fold
increase.27 By comparison, the text of Rule 56, the federal summary
judgment statute, is relatively terse, containing the same volume of
words as the 1971 version of section 437c, and has been amended only
three times since its original promulgation in 1938.
As a consequence of this succession of piecemeal amendments, the
current summary judgment statute is bewildering in its complexity and
disorganization.7 7 In 1989, a former Shasta County Superior Court
269. Chief Justice Phil Gibson used the phrase "patchwork amendments" in criticiz-
ing code procedure by legislative enactment. Gibson, supra note 59, at 332.
270. See Pollak, supra note 209, at 419 n.2.
271. See generally Leon T. David, The Summary Judgment in California: The Case
for Judicial Reform, 25 HAINGs U. 119, 121 (1973); Ernest J. Zack, California
Summary Judgment: The Need for Legislative Reform, 59 CAL L REV. 439, 473
(1971).
272. Pollak, supra note 209, at 420.
273. See § 437c. This code section was amended in 1937, 1939, 1951, 1953, 1957,
1965, 1971, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, and 1993. Id.
274. Id.
275. See Kleps, supra note 40, at 23. These are the words of Ralph N. KIleps, the
first Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, written in 1942, complaining
about legislative rulemaking.
276. See § 437c.
277. See id.; Pollak, supra note 209, at 419 n.2.
judge characterized California summary judgment procedure as "'clumsy,
mastodonic, and overly complex.'"2" A review of section 437c, set forth
in Appendix A, reveals the degree to which the statute micromanages the
judge in the minutest detail.' The arrangement of the subsections is
disorganized, alternating back and forth between summary judgment and
summary adjudication.' °
More specifically, the drafting defects in the statute have caused par-
ticular confusion in defining the movant and respondent's burden in a
defensive summary judgment motion and the standard to be applied by
the court in deciding whether to grant the motionY The 1992 amend-
ment to section 437c revised subsection (n) to define, for the first time,
what the moving and responding parties must show to satisfy their re-
spective burdens.' The 1993 amendment moved the text of subsection
278. Paul D. Freeman, Summary Judgment: An Illusory Option?, CAL LAw., Dec.
1989, at 63, 65 (quoting Clyde Small, a Redding, California, attorney).
279. For example, section 437c(g) reads:
Upon the denial of a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that there
is a triable issue as to one or more material facts, the court shall, by written
or oral order, specify one or more material facts raised by the motion as to
which the court has determined there exists a triable controversy. This deter-
mination shall specifically refer to the evidence proffered in support of and
in opposition to the motion which indicates that a triable controversy exists.
Upon the grant of a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that there
is no triable issue of material fact, the court shall, by written or oral order,
specify the reasons for its determination. The order shall specifically refer to
the evidence proffered in support of, and if applicable in opposition to, the
motion which indicates that no triable issue exists. The court shall also state
its reasons for any other determination. The court shall record its determina-
tion by court reporter or written order.
§ 437c(g).
280. The distinction between summary judgment and summary adjudication as used
in section 437c is that the grant of sununary judgment results in a final judgment,
which terminates the entire action or lawsuit, whereas an order of summary adjudica-
tion only disposes of one or more, but fewer than all, causes of action within an ac-
ton. § 437c. The subsections of section 437c oscillate between summary judgment
and summary adjudication as follows: Subsections (a) through (e) address summary
judgment; subsection (f) deals with summary adjudication; subsections (g) through (t)
return to summary judgment; subsection (in) swings back to summary adjudication;
and, finally, subsections (n) and (o) apply to both motions. Id.
281. Id.
282. After the 1992 amendment (Assembly Bill 2616), the text of section 437c(n)
read:
(1) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing
that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each
element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause
of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action.
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(n) to subsection (o) where it currently remains.' This amendment al-
so added language to subsection (o) which requires a party responding
to a sunuary judgment motion to rely on specific facts, and not on the
pleadings, to show the existence of a triable issue.' Assembly Bill 498
did not, however, purport to affect the movant's burden, only the
respondent's burden.
By peppering the summary judgment statute with a variety of ambigu-
ous terms, the legislature has compounded the confusion surrounding
the movant's burden, which has taken center stage since Celotex. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 uses a single legal standard-"no genuine
(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing
that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot
be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.
Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action.
§ 437c(n).
283. See § 437c.
284. The current text of section 437c(o), including the 1992 and 1993 amendments,
now reads as follows:
(1) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing
that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each
element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause
of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the
burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of, action or a defense
thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant may not rely upon the mere allega-
tions or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact
exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable
issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing
that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or
more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot
be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.
Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not rely upon the mere allegations or
denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists
but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of
material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
§ 437c(o).
issue as to any material fact"s--to define both the moving and re-
sponding parties' burden of production as well as the burden of persua-
sion governing the trial court's ultimate determination of the motion.s
Instead of adopting the simplified, single-standard approach of the fed-
eral rule, the current text of section 437c takes the reader through a
labyrinth of vague and varying standards including: "no triable issue,"
"has no merit," and "cannot be established." 7
Subsection (a) of the current version of section 437c, as amended in
1992 and 1993, provides, inter alia, that a party may move for summary
judgment "if it is contended that the action has no merit."  Subsection
(c) addresses the applicable standard for granting summary judg-
ment.' It does not employ the phrase "has no merit," but instead pro-
vides that the motion shall be granted "if all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."' Subsection (n) re-
285. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
286. Rule 56's more flexible and simple approach is typical of the procedural goals
of the Federal Rules' "open courts" paradigm described by Stempel. See supra notes
96-106 and accompanying text; see also Childress, supra note 201, at 185 (finding that
"[miost states use a summary judgment rule whose language tracks that of federal
Rule 56").
287. The California Judges Association (CJA) chided the legislature for sowing seeds
of confusion in summary judgment law by dreaming up additional statutory terminolo-
gy rather than simply tracing Rule 56. The Association expressed this view in a
letter sent by the Association to the Chair of the Assembly Judiciary Committee dat-
ed April 26, 1993, opposing Assembly Bill 498:
CJA believes that the Legislature should use the language of the Federal Rule
in further amending California's statute or leave current law intact. Otherwise,
rather than allowing the courts to rely on settled interpretation of the Feder-
al language, the Legislature will be making new law requiring fresh interpreta-
tion in an area where such diversity would not be called for, given that the
author's goal is adherence to the Federal model.
Letter from Constance Dove, Executive Director, Cal. Judges Ass'n, (Apr. 26, 1993)
(on file with author).
288. § 437c(a) (emphasis added). The phrase "has no merit" is a carryover from the
1990 version of section 437c(a). Section 437c(a) also authorizes a party to move for
summary judgment if it is contended that there is "no defense to the action." Id.
(emphasis added). This phrase "no defense to the action" is applicable only to offen-
sive summary judgment motions in which the plaintiff, or cross-complainant, contends
that, on each element of its claim as to which it would have the burden of produc-
tion at trial, there is no genuine issue for trial. I relegate to footnotes that portion of
the text of section 437c that concerns offensive summary judgment motions in order
to focus on the more controversial portion of section 437c that deals with defensive
summary judgment motions.
289. Id.
290. § 437c(c) (emphasis added). The phrase "no triable issue as to any material
fact" is also a carryover from the predecessor section 437c(c). Note that this stan-
dard sounds similar, but not identical to the language "no genuine issue as to any
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turns to the words "has no merit" for the purpose of defining this phrase
as follows: "A cause of action has no merit if... One or more of the
elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established ....
,21 Finally, in subsection (o), the legislature attempts, for the first time
in the history of California summary judgment jurisprudence, to clarify
the summary judgment burden of production borne by a moving plain-
tff9  in an offensive summary judgment motion and the burden of pro-
duction borne by a moving defendant in a defensive summary judgment
motion.'
Rather than defining the burden of the moving defendant as "showing
that there is no triable issue as to a material fact,"' the standard for
granting the motion set forth in subsection (c), subsection (o)(2) pro-
vides that the moving defendant has the burden of "showing that a cause
of action has no merit... [by showing] that one or more elements of
the cause of action... cannot be established."295
2. Sowing the Seeds of Ambiguity: The Statutory Language
"Cannot Be Established"
After the enactment of the 1992 amendment, the meaning of the ambig-
uous phrase "cannot be established" divided commentators.2 ' A major
material fact" in Federal Rule 56.
291. § 437c(n) (emphasis added).
292. § 437c(o)(1).
293. § 437c(o)(2).
294. Federal Rule 56 defines the movant's burden in terms of "show[ing] that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
295. § 437c(o)(2) (emphasis added). Section 437c(o)(1) defines the movant's burden
in offensive summary judgment and summary adjudication motions: "A plaintiff or
cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a
cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling
the party to judgment on that cause of action." § 437c(o)(1) (emphasis added).
296. See Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 206 (Ct App. 1995) ("There
was initial debate [after enactment of the 1992 amendment] as to whether the new
statutory requirement of a showing that an element 'cannot be established' effected
any significant change from the preexisting requirement that the defendant 'conclu-
sively negate' the element"). Compare, e.g., Douglas Hatchimodi, Considering the
Summary View of the Recent Change in Summary Judgment Law, CTLA F., Mar.
1994, at 11, 13, with Kurt L Schmalz, Summary Judgment: A Dress Rehearsal for
TrWa, 16 LA. LAw., Sept 1993, at 23.
Curtis E.A. Kamow, who at publication was a member of the California State
Bar Standing Committee on the Administration of Justice, wrote in reference to sec-
tion 437c as amended in 1992:
controversy erupted between pro-Celotex and anti-Celotex factions over
the legislative intent behind this language, each side reading into "cannot
be established" the meaning that supported its view of the role of sum-
mary judgment.9 7 As a consequence, instead of achieving the
legislature's purpose of clarifying the movant's burden, the insertion of
this language into section 437c(o)(2) has served to generate confusion as
to what a moving defendant must do to satisfy its burden of production
in a defensive summary judgment motion.
The legislature sowed the seeds of this confusion over the movant's
burden through poor drafting choices. Inaccurate references to Celotex in
the legislative history of the 1992 and 1993 amendments fertilized the
ground. Confusion over the movant's burden blossomed in the Union
IT/he statute remains opaque. It still places the burden of showing that a
cause of action has "no merit" on the defendant moving for summary judg-
ment .... While many interpretations of the new language are conceivable,
it probably will have the effect of continuing the imposition on moving de-
fendants to demonstrate a negative, that there is no evidence of an essential
element.
Curtis E.A. Karnow, Archeology of Error: Tracing California's Summary Judgment
Rule, 24 PAC. LJ. 1845, 1883-84 (1993) (emphasis added). Compare id. with ROBERT
I. WEIL & IRA A. BROwN, CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
§ 10.237 (1996) ("The 1992 amendments represent a significant departure from former
law. Legislative history shows it was the legislature's intent to adopt the federal stan-
dards governing burden of proof on summary judgment motions as expressed in
Celotex."). See Michael Paul Thomas, California Has a New Burden of Proof for
Summary Judgment, LA. DAILY J., July 19, 1993, at 7:
We may continue to believe the time has come for California to fully adopt
the federal standard on motions for summary judgment. However, it is not
obvious that the California Legislature intended to do so with the passage of
AB 2616. Judges Wel and Brown clearly believe otherwise. They may be cor-
rect. Their analysis may also become a sef-fulfilling prophecy, since the
Weil & Brown practice guide has been cited by California appellate courts
as a 'eading treatise."
(emphasis added); see also Schmalz, supra. Schmalz predicted that the 1992 amend-
ment made summary judgment "subject to essentially the same liberal standard which
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted for the federal courts in the
CelotexAndersonlMatsushita trilogy." Id. at 23. At the same time, Schmalz conceded
that "(wihether the California judiciary embraces the summary judgment procedure as
the federal courts did in 1986 after CelotexAnderonlMatsushita is subject to specula-
tion." Id.; see Robin Brandes-Gibbs & James B. Morel], Developments on the Burden
of Proof in Summary Judgment, LA. DAILY J., May 3, 1994, at 7 ("California has
adopted the Celotex standard only with respect to the burden of proof for a moving
plaintiff; and the 1992 and 1993 amendments otherwise codify standards for summary
judgment under existing California law.").
297. See irtfra note 309-13 and accompanying text.
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Bank decision.' This Part will first trace, in three phases, the legisla-
tive roots of the phrase "cannot be established."
a. Phase 1
Phase 1 begins with the phrase "has no merit." Prior to the 1990
amendments to section 437c, this phrase appeared only in subsection (a),
which provided: "Any party may move for summary judgment... if it is
contended that the action has no merit." Prior to the 1990 amend-
ments, subsection (f), which sets forth when a party can move for sum-
mary adjudication, contained no parallel provision to indicate what the
movant must contend in order to move for summary adjudication,'
even though the two motions are essentially the same.
301
b. Phase 2
The 1990 amendments to section 437c added the phrase "has no merit"
to subsection (f),' thereby making it parallel to subsection (a). The
legislature, however, took an additional step. In defining when a cause of
action "has no merit" for purposes of a summary adjudication motion
under subsection (f), the legislature added the words "if ... one or more
of the elements of the cause of action... cannot be established." ' In-
terestingly, the legislature chose not to add "cannot be established" to
define "has no merit" for purposes of subsection (a) pertaining to sum-
mary judgment.'
298. Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct
App. 1995).
299. § 437c(a) (emphasis added).
300. § 437c(f).
301. The only difference between summary judgment and summary adjudication is
that "summary judgment terminates the action between the parties and results in an
immediate, appealable judgment," whereas "[s]ummary adjudication orders do not
terminate the action." 3 WEIL & BROWN, supra note 296, § 10:34. "The summary adju-
dication simply eliminates the need to prove or disprove a particular claim or de-
fense when the case comes to trial." Id.
302. S.B. 2594, 1990 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1990).
303. § 437c(o)(2) (emphasis added).
304. This asymmetry was corrected two years later in the 1992 amendment to sec-
tion 437c that purported, for the first time, to address specifically the issue of the
movant's burden A.B. 2616, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).
c. Phase 3
In 1992, the legislature apparently corrected the drafting error made
two years earlier. The 1992 amendments to section 437c deleted the
phrase "cannot be established" from subsection (f) and inserted this
phrase in subsection (n)' 5 to define when a cause of action "has no
merit" in motions for both summary adjudication and summary judg-
ment."
When the words "cannot be established" made their debut in the 1990
amendment to section 437c(f), there was no contention that these words
manifested a legislative intent to change the standard for determining
summary adjudication motions. 7 In 1992, the legislature took this same
phrase and simply expanded its application to include summary judg-
ment as well as summary adjudication in subsection (n)(1), thereby mak-
ing the movant's burden on summary judgment and summary adjudica-
tion consistent.' Therefore, on the face of these amendments, there is
no apparent legislative intent behind the language "cannot be estab-
lished" to change summary judgment standards. If there were such an
intent, the legislature made another poor choice of words to effect that
intent.
The following analysis of the Union Bank opinion challenges the
court's reliance on ambiguous and contradictory legislative history to
interpret "cannot be established" as manifesting a legislative intent to
adopt, or move toward, the Celotex definition of the moving defendant's
burden of production in a motion for summary judgment.
305. Section 437c(n) became the current section 437c(o) as a consequence of the
1993 amendment. A.B. 498, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
306. A.B. 2616, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).
307. See, e.g., Brantley v. Pisaro, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Ct. App. 1996):
ITihe phrase 'cannot be established' was not new to section 437c in 1992. It
first appeared in 1990, and was then placed in subdivision (f), which dealt
only with motions for summary adjudication.... Other than limit the issues
for which summary adjudication was available, the 1990 legislation was not
intended to change existing summary judgment law.
Id. at 435 (citing City of Emoryville v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (Ct. App.
1991)).
One commentator who advocated the Celotex approach proposed accomplishing
the transformation of the movant's burden from the "restrictive approach" to the
liberal federal approach, not by legislative action, but by judicial reinterpretation of
the "cannot be established" language in section 437c(O. William J. Dowling, Is There
Any Hope for the Celotex Rule on Summary Judgment Motions in California?, 26
U.S.F. L REv. 493 (1992). "The very terms of this amendment seem to contemplate
summary judgment for lack of evidence on or inability to substantiate some element
of a pleaded claim." Id. at 510.
308. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
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E. Union Bank- The Confusion Caused by Bad Statutory Law is
Compounded by Bad Case Law
Celotex advocates heralded the Second District Court of Appeal's deci-
sion in Union Bank as ushering in a "new era in summary judgment
practice in California."31 For the first time, a California court ruled
that, like the federal approach under Celotex, a moving defendant did not
have to negate conclusively the plaintiff's case.3 " In Union Bank, the
Second District Court of Appeal interpreted the phrase "cannot be estab-
lished" as manifesting the intention of the legislature that "[n]ow, a mov-
ing defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses to shift
the burden of proof pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (o)(2). "312
Many thought Union Bank had conclusively settled the movant's burden
issue throughout California courts in favor of the Celotex approach.1 3
In fact, Union Bank did not settle the issue, " but rather has com-
pounded the confusion in the current law on the extent of the summary
judgment burden of production on a moving defendant.
In Union Bank, the plaintiffs brought suit against forty co-defendants,
including Union Bank, claiming fraud and conspiracy to defraud."5 Un-
ion Bank moved for summary judgment in reliance on the plaintiffs' fac-
tually devoid answers to interrogatories.316 Reversing the lower court's
denial of the defendant's summary judgment motion, the court of appeal
held that Union Bank met its burden by showing, through the deficient
interrogatory answers, that the plaintiffs lacked evidence to prove Union
Bank had made fraudulent representations or was involved in a conspira-
309. Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653 (Ct.
App. 1995).
310. Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 337 (Ct. App. 1995).
311. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
312. Id. The Union Bank court fashioned a narrow holding, expressly declining to
decide whether the Legislature had "intended to adopt the Celotex Corp. test." Id. at
661. See infru notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Calvin House, Summary Shift, State Defendants Get Benefit of Fed-
eral Standard, LA. DAILY J., Mar. 6, 1995, at 7. "The Union Bank decision should
settle the debate [over whether the Legislature intended] to import the federal stan-
dard [for shifting the burden of production from movant to respondent or whether] a
defendant still had to negate the plaintiffs case with evidence of his or her own."
Id.; see also Evelio M. Grillo, Union Bank v. Superior Court-California's Celotex, 9
CAL LITIGATOR 210, 211 (Fall 1995).
314. See infra notes 415-64 and accompanying text.
315. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.
316. Id. at 655.
cy.317 Conceding the ambiguity of the phrase "cannot be established,"
the court reviewed and relied on the legislative history of both the 1992
and 1993 amendments of section 437c.
318
1. The Court's Use of Legislative History of
Assembly Bill 2616-The 1992 Amendment
a. Report prepared for August 18, 1992, hearing before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
The Union Bank decision places great weight on a committee report
prepared for an August 18, 1992, hearing before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary.319 The Union Bank decision notes that the version of As-
sembly Bill 2616 that first passed the State Assembly did not contain the
language establishing the burden on a moving defendant that would later
appear in section 437c(n)(2). ° As an amendment to Assembly Bill
2616, this language was first proposed after the Assembly passed the
amendment and while it was pending before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary."l The August 18, 1992, report to the Senate Judiciary
Committee (August 18 Report) contains the first reference to the "cannot
be established" language at issue in Union Bank.'
The court quoted that portion of the report which describes the man-
ner in which the "new" subdivision (n) would distribute the burdens of
proof in a summary judgment motion:
317. Id. at 665.
318. Id. at 659. "Because there is some ambiguity as to the effect of the language
'one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established . . .' in the
1992 amendment which was later reenacted as section 437c, subdivision (o)(2), resort
to contemporaneous legislative history materials such as committee reports is appro-
priate." Id.
319. See infvua notes 323-26 and accompanying text
320. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659. The version of Assembly Bill 2616 that
first passed the Assembly contained "technical" changes designed to correct, in patch-
work fashion, "deficiencies and oversights resulting from the 1990 bill in this area."
REPORT TO ASSEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal.
1992). The report notes that the 1990 amendments to section 437c "were intended to
streamline the summary judgment procedure," but "due to drafting errors the legisla-
tion inadvertently repealed a number of provisions that gave summary adjudication
orders legal effect." Id. at AP-4.
321. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659-60. The fact that the significant changes
to the movant's burden were added to Assembly Bill 2616 after it had passed the
Assembly demonstrates that these changes were not part of a coherent, deliberate
plan to overhaul summary judgment practice; rather, the idea seems to have come as
an afterthought.
322. Id.
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It would provide that a plaintiff has met his burden of showing there is no de-
fense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of
action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists in that cause of action.
A similar rule is proposed for defendants. A defendant would be deemed to have
met his burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows
that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that
there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant meets that
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact re-
mains in the cause of action.m
The court omitted from its quotation the next paragraph of the August 18
Report, simply describing that paragraph as a "discuss[ion of] the
plaintiffs burden under the proposed amendment." 4 The omitted para-
graph states:
This provision is sponsored by the author's staff, who asserts that the current
state rule has been criticized by a number of legal commentators. Case law cur-
rently requires a plaintiff seeking to obtain a sununary judgment motion to show
both that it has proved up on the cause of action and negated any applicable affir-
mative defenses. In comparison, a defendant can obtain a sununary judgment if it
negates the existence of a material element of the plaintiff's cause of action or
proves up its affirmative defense.se
The court's opinion then quotes in full the concluding paragraph of the
report
The sponsor points to the federal rules as providing a more equitable standard.
Under Federal Rule 56, a party moving for sununary judgment is not required to
support the motion with affidavits or other similar materials to negate an
opponent's claim. (See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.
Ct. 2548, 91 L Ed. 2d 265.) This bill would follow the federal example and require
each party seeking a summary judgment to prove up its own case without having
to negate claims of the opposition.re
The court did not at that point in its opinion draw any conclusions as
to the meaning of the foregoing excerpts from the August 18 Report,
choosing instead to withhold all commentary until completing its review
of the legislative history of both Assembly Bill 2616 and Assembly Bill
498."2 Only at that point did the court deduce the meaning of "cannot
323. Id at 660 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
324. Id.
325. IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CAUFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 8 (1992) (emphasis added).
326. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660 (citation omitted) (quoting IRWIN NOWICK
& STATE BAR OF CAUFORNiA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM. ON JUDIcIARY, A.B. 2616,
Reg. Sess. 9 (1992)).
327. See id. at 657-63 (discussing the legislative history of Assembly Bill 2616 and
be established" from the combined legislative history of both bills
"[tiaken together."=
Nevertheless, the court mistakenly thought it had found some support
for its holding that a moving defendant need not negate an element of
the plaintiffs case in the August 18 Report's reference to Celotex. The
court quoted the report, which stated: "This bill would follow the federal
example and require each party seeking summary judgment to prove up
its own case without having to negate claims of the opposition.'"'
When one reads the entire section of the August 18 Report dealing
with subsection (n)' ° and other parts of the legislative history ignored
by the court, it is apparent that the legislative intent was only to relax
the burden of a moving plaintiff in an offensive summary judgment mo-
tion so that it matches the burden of a moving defendant in a defensive
summary judgment motion. The intent was not to relax the moving
defendant's burden to conform to Celotex.331
The August 18 Report clearly reflects the Senate Judiciary Committee's
awareness that the bill's author's sole concern was to correct an inequity
that existed with respect to the burden of a moving plaintiff, not a mov-
ing defendant.' In effect, California case law required a moving plain-
tiff to satisfy two burdens, while requiring a moving defendant to meet
only one.' Not only did the plaintiff bear the burden to prove up con-
clusively the elements of its own cause of action, but also it bore a bur-
den to address any affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant and to
negate them.334 By contrast, the moving defendant had only the burden
of negating the existence of a material element of the plaintiffs cause of
action. 5 The clear intent of subdivision (n) was to treat these two bur-
dens more equitably by relieving the moving plaintiff of the burden of
negating affirmative defenses, not to relax the moving defendant's burden
to negate an essential element of the plaintiffs cause of action. This
equalizing of the moving plaintiffs and moving defendant's burdens is
Assembly Bill 498).
328. Id. at 663.
329. Id. at 660 (quoting IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL
SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess 10 (1992).
330. § 437c(n).
331. See iftra notes 346-64 and accompanying text
332. See IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM.
ON JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 9-10 (1992).
333. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
334. Id
335. See IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM.
ON JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 9-10 (1992).
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what the bill's author meant when he inappropriately pointed to "the
federal rules as providing a more equitable standard." m
A report to the Assembly Subcommittee on Administration of Justice,
dated May 5, 1992, confirms the foregoing interpretation of Assembly Bill
2616.' This report, which was not mentioned in Union Bank, stated
that the California Trial Lawyers Association and the bill's author be-
lieved that "the allocation of the burden of proof on summary judgments"
needed to be further examined as the bill proceeded through the legisla-
ture.' More specifically, the report recognized that "[t]he state rule for
plaintiffs of all kinds in obtaining a summary judgment... is much more
onerous than exists in the federal courts or in other states."'
It is not surprising that the California Trial Lawyers Association would
seek to make it easier for plaintiffs to win summary judgment motions.
They would, however, vigorously and vocally oppose any effort to relax
the moving defendant's summary judgment burden.' The August 18
Report confirms that "none [of the changes to the summary judgment
law proposed by A.B. 2616] appear to be controversial. " " The report
continues: "The proposal has been extensively circulated without any
group voicing any opposition." 2
Another mistake by the Union Bank court was to rely on the inappro-
priate references in the August 18 Report to Rule 56 and Celotex as sup-
port for the court's interpretation of subdivision (n)(2).' These refer-
ences derive from the bill's sponsor, Assembly Member Steve Peace.'
The record is clear that Peace believed a "modified form" of the Celotex
rule supports the intent behind Assembly Bill 2616 to relax the burden of
a moving plaintiff.' Celotex's holding that a moving defendant "is not
336. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660 (emphasis added).




340. The influence of the Trial Lawyers Association on the Democrat-controlled Sen-
ate was instrumental in the demise of Assembly Bill 3113 in the Senate Judiciary
Conunittee in August 1996. The express purpose of that bill was to conform the mov-
ing defendant's burden to Celotex. See infra notes 465-506 and accompanying text.
341. IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 9 (1992).
342. Id.
343. Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 660-61
(Ct. App. 1995).
344. Id. at 663 n.9.
345. Assembly Member Peace explicitly expressed this view in his September 8,
required to support the [summary judgment] motion with affidavits...
to negate an opponent's claim"'" does appear on the surface to provide
support for the elimination in Assembly Bill 2616 of the requirement that
a moving plaintiff negate any affirmative defenses. Closer analysis re-
veals, however, that Celotex does not apply to the moving plaintiffs bur-
den in an offensive summary judgment motion.M7
Celotex's holding that a moving defendant is not required to negate or
disprove an element of the plaintiffs case makes sense only in the con-
text of a defensive summary judgment motion.' By definition, in a de-
fensive summary judgment motion the movant will not bear the burden
of production at trial on the material fact that is the focus of the mo-
tion.' Ce/otex's rationale is that a defendant who will not have the bur-
den at trial to negate a plaintiffs case in order to prevail on a directed
verdict motion should not have that burden as a moving party on sum-
mary judgment.' Because Liberty Lobby held that the standard for
summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict,3 the
Court in Celotex reasoned that the moving defendant need only show
that the plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support a rational jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff.-
This rationale has no application to the burden of a moving plaintiff
who has made an offensive summary judgment motion. Under federal
summary judgment law, the moving plaintiff must conclusively establish
every element of its claim because it has the burden of production on
each element of its claim if the case proceeds to trial.' Celotex did
nothing to change that requirement.' 5 It would appear at first, however,
that Celotex does support the elimination of the additional burden that
1993, letter inserted in the Assembly Daily Journal: "AB .2616 adopted in a modified
form the rule of [Celotex] and overrode pre-existing California law by providing that
a plaintiff may obtain a summary judgment if it proves up the allegations of its com-
plaint." CArUORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY DAELY JouRNAL, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEM-
BLY OF 1993-1994 (1993).
346. IRwIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL. SENATE COMM. ON
JuDIciARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 9 (1992) (emphasis added).
347. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
348. See id. at 324 (noting that "[ijn cases like the instant ones where the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a sum-
mary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file") (internal quotations
omitted).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 323-24.
351. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
352. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325.
353. FED. R. Crv. P. 56; see also Celotex, 447 U.S. at 324.
354. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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California case law placed on the moving plaintiff to negate any affirma-
tive defenses as to which the defendant would bear the burden of pro-
duction at trial.'
The problem with this logic is that Assembly Bill 2616 did not relax
the moving plaintiffs burden to negate affirmative defenses; rather, it
eliminated that burden.' Celotex did not purport to reassign burdens,
and it certainly did not eliminate the summary judgment burden on a
moving defendant'l Instead, Celotex established that a moving defen-
dant still has an initial burden, but that it can satisfy that burden by
showing an absence of evidence to support the plaintiffs case." Hypo-
thetically, had Assembly Bill 2616 continued to assign to the moving
plaintiff the additional burden of addressing affirmative defenses, but
provided that the plaintiff could meet that burden merely by showing
that the defendant's evidence is insufficient to prevail at trial on its affir-
mative defenses, it could then be argued with some plausibility that
Ceotex supports that result. Assembly Bill 2616, however, did not merely
relax this additional burden; in fact, it completely eliminated the burden
because it was an inequitable second burden that had been assigned to
plaintiffs only in California.'
Furthermore, the statement in the August 18 Report that the "bill
would follow the federal example and require each party seeking a sum-
mary judgment to prove up its own case"' also makes no sense. In a
defensive summary judgment motion, it is the plaintiff, not the moving
defendant, who has a case to prove up."I Therefore, under Celotex, the
defendant need only show that the plaintiff has no case.' By contrast,
in an offensive motion, the moving plaintiff does have a case to prove up
on its motion and at trial.' Thus, the sentence in the August 18 Report
355. Id.
356. IRWIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM. ON
JuDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 8 (1992).
357. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
358. Id. at 325.
359. See REPORT TO ASSEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess.
7-8 (1992).
360. IRWIN NOWiCK & STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 9 (1992).
361. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25.
362. Id. at 325.
363. Id. at 324.
is more consistent with the negation approach that requires the moving
defendant to disprove affirmatively a material element of the plaintiffs
case. W
4
b. Report prepared by the Assembly Committee of the
Floor Coordinator
The second piece of Assembly Bill 2616 legislative history relied upon
in Union Bank was a report prepared by the Assembly Committee of the
Floor Coordinator after Assembly Bill 2616 returned to the Assembly for
concurrence in the Senate amendments.'s The opinion quotes the fol-
lowing statements from the report, which the court characterized as
"ambiguous[]":
[Assembly Bill 2616] [c]larifies the burden of proof on summary adjudication and
summary judgment motions to codify state law as to the defendant's burden of
proof and changes the plaintiffs burden of proof in accordance with the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Cetotex Corp. v. Catrett by:
a) Providing that a plaintiff has shown that its motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication shall be granted if the plaintiff proves up his or her
cause(s) of action. Once the plaintiff has met the initial burden, the defendant has
met that burden, [sic] the defendant has the burden to show that there is a triable
issue of fact
b) Providing that a defendant has shown that its motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication shall be granted if the defendant or cross defendant ne-
gates an element of the paintiff's cause(s) of action or proves up its affirmative
defense(s). Once the defendant has met the initial burden, the plaintiff has the
burden to show that there is a triable issue of fact'
The report is not ambiguous. The text of the report is consistent with
the sense of the August 18 Report to the Senate Judiciary Committee
that Assembly Bill 2616 did not purport to change the burden on the
moving defendant.6 7 The statement that Assembly Bill 2616 codifies
state law as to the defendant's burden of proof means that the bill re-
tains the existing case law requirement that the defendant negate an
element of the plaintiffs cause of action.s Subparagraph (b) expressly
364. See Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653,
661 n.8 (Ct App. 1995).
365. Id. at 660-61 (citing Concurrence in Senate Amendments, A.B. 2616 (Peace)-as
amended, Aug. 25, 1992).
366. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
367. IRwIN NOWICK & STATE BAR OF CALFORNIA, REPORT TO CAL. SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, A.B. 2616, Reg. Sess. 8-9 (1992).
368. See Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 n.9 (describing letter inserted into the
Assembly Daily Journal by Assembly Member Steve Peace, the author of Assembly
Bill 2616, which stated that "A.B. 2616 merely codified the already existing burden of
proof for defendants without change"). The Union Bank court did not rely on
Peace's letter, but instead upon the following holding by the California Supreme
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uses the very words of this case law rule: "negate[] an element of the
plaintiffs cause[] of action."' The court itself was understandably criti-
cal of this report because it was inconsistent with Union Bank's holding.
The opinion characterized the quoted language as "shrouded in some
uncertainty" and noted the flaw in the reference to Celotex as shaping
the plaintiffs burden of proof.370
2. The Court's Use of Legislative History of
Assembly Bill 498-The 1993 Amendment
The court relied heavily on certain parts of the legislative history be-
hind Assembly Bill 498, stating: "Whatever uncertainty may have existed
after the 1992 legislation was approved by the Governor as to the contin-
ued viability of [the Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools rule requiring a moving
defendant 'to negate the matters which the resisting party would have to
prove at trial'], the purpose of Assembly Bill No. 498 is unmistak-
able."37" ' Assembly Bill 498 did not change the movant's summary judg-
ment burden; rather, the 1993 amendment affected the respondent's bur-
den by adding the following language to section 437c(o)(1) and (2):
[The responding party] may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to
that cause of action or a defense thereto."
The court's opinion stressed three components of Assembly Bill 498's
legislative history: a resolution of the State Bar Conference of Delegates,
accompanied by excerpts from the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e);'" a report prepared for a Senate Judicia-
Court:
"In construing a statute, we do not consider the motives or understandings of
individual legislators who cast their votes in favor of it. Nor do we carve an
exception to this principle simply because the legislator whose motives are
proffered actually authored the bill in controversy; no guarantee can issue
that those who supported his proposal shared his view of its compass."
California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist, 621 P.2d 856, 860
(Cal. 1981) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371,
1374 (Cal. 1976)).
369. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 663.
372. § 437c(o)(1), (2).
373. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661-65; see also infra notes 376-90 and ac-
companying text.
ry Committee hearing held on June 29, 1993;3'4 and a report prepared
by the Office of Senate Floor Analyses.375
a. Resolution of the State Bar Conference of Delegates
The Union Bank court noted that both the Assembly and the Senate
Judiciary Committees had before them a resolution of the State Bar Con-
ference of Delegates.' The specially underlined portion of this resolu-
tion, which appeared in the legislative history but was omitted from the
court's opinion, states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
section, an opposing party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a triable is-
sue. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be granted.-
Based upon this resolution, the court made the unqualified statement
that the State Bar resolution intended to overrule Barnes v. Blue Haven
Pools.3" Barnes, a 1969 Second District Court of Appeal decision, held
that a moving defendant, in a defensive summary judgment motion, must
conclusively negate an essential element of a plaintiffs case." With re-
spect to the movant's burden, the Barnes court stated:
There is nothing in the statute which lessens the burden of the moving party sim-
ply because at the trial the resisting party would have the burden of proof on the
issue on which the summary judgment is sought to be predicated. In such a case,
on the motion for summary judgment, the moving party must generally negative
the matters which the resisting party would have to prove at the trial."
374. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 661-65; see also infr notes 391-401 and ac-
companying text.
375. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661-65; see also infra notes 402-04 and ac-
companying text.
376. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662 (citing letter from Theresa D. Taylor, Leg-
islative Counsel of the State Bar of California, to Assembly Member Jan Goldsmith,
January 7, 1993, contained in SENATE COMMrrEE ON JUDICIARY FILE FOR A.B. No. 498,
Reg. Sess. SP 9 (1993).
377. Resolution 5-5-90, Sponsored by State Bar Conference of Delegates, under cover
letter from Theresa D. Taylor, Legislative Counsel of the State Bar of California, to
Assembly Member Jan Goldsmith, January 7, 1993, contained in SENATE COMMITrEE
ON JUDICIARY FILE FOR A.B. No. 498, Reg. Sess. SP 9 (1993).
378. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662.
379. Id.; Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (Ct. App. 1969).
380. Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (emphasis added). In Barnes, the plaintiff brought
a personal injury suit against Blue Haven Pools, alleging that he was injured as a
result of the defendant's negligent design and construction of a private swimming
pool. Id. The defendant brought a defensive summary judgment motion to dismiss the
negligence claim and supported its motion with plaintiffs factually devoid interrogato-
ry answers. Id. The superior court granted the motion, but was reversed on appeal
because the "defendant's presentation at the motion for summary judgment [did not]
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The Barnes court held that the defendant had not met its stringent
movant's burden and, therefore, the plaintiff had no burden to re-
spond. 1
The full text of the State Bar resolution does not support the Union
Bank court's blanket assertion that the resolution's express purpose was
to overrule Barnes.' The resolution's Statement of Reasons, cited by
Union Bank, states: "The proposed amendment is derived from the last
two sentences of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and would over-
rule cases such as Barns [sic] v. Blue Haven Pools." ' The last two
sentences of Rule 56(e) pertain to the respondent's burden, not the
movant's burden, which was Barnes's focus.' 8 Rule 56(e) provides that
when the moving party has met its burden to show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact, so that the burden shifts to the respond-
ing party to show the existence of a genuine issue, the respondent "may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's
pleading, but the adverse party's response .... must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."'
It is apparent that the purpose of the resolution cited in Union Bank
was to increase the respondent's burden, assuming that the movant's
burden had shifted, by abrogating the case law rule that allowed the
respondent to oppose a sunmmary judgment motion with its pleadings
instead of evidence.38 There are three confirming facts of the
resolution's purpose: first, the resolution's underlined language refers
solely to the respondent's burden; second, the reference in the Statement
of Reasons to the last two sentences of Rule 56(e) solely addressed the
respondent's burden; and third, the fact that the resolution was submit-
ted in connection with Assembly Bill 498, the terms of which solely ad-
dress the respondent's burden. If the Conference of Delegates had want-
ed the legislature to abrogate Barnes's holding regarding the movant's
burden, one would expect the State Bar would have submitted a resolu-
tion to that effect a year earlier in connection with Assembly Bill 2616,
when the issue of the movant's burden was on the table.
demonstrably show[] a carefully constructed pool, free of defects." Id.
381. Id.
382. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
384. See FED. R Cirv. P. 56(e); Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
385. FED. R Crv. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
386. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
What emerges from a reading of the resolution and its Statement of
Reasons is that the movant and respondent's burdens confused the Con-
ference of Delegates. The resolution's reference to Barnes is misplaced
because Barnes does not hold that a respondent may oppose a properly
supported summary judgment motion with its pleadings.3 Barnes nev-
er reached that issue; rather, it held that the movant's burden did not
shift, because the moving defendant did not meet its burden to negate
the plaintiffs case.'
Once again, the inappropriate citing of decisions by the proponents of
procedural amendments, Celotex in connection with Assembly Bill
261638 and Barnes in connection with Assembly Bill 498,me has gener-
ated confusion infiltrating summary judgment legislative history and sum-
mary judgment case law.
b. Report prepared for Hearing of Senate Judiciary Committee held
on June 29, 1993
The Union Bank decision also purported to find support for its hold-
ing that Assembly Bill 2616 legislatively overruled Barnes in a report
prepared for a June 29, 1993, hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee
on Assembly Bill 498."' The court stressed the report's reference to
Rule 56(e) and its extensive discussion of the rule's Advisory Committee
notes.' 2 Again, these references to Rule 56(e) had no relevance to the
movant's burden. They were, however, intended to justify Assembly Bill
498's proposed modification of the respondent's burden then under con-
sideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee.'s
387. Barnes, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
388. Id. The confused nature of the resolution's reference to Barnes is further evi-
denced by the resolution's additional statement that "[tlhe problem with Barns [sic]
v. Blue Haven Pools is well summarized by the Notes of the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules." Resolution 5-5-90, sponsored by State Bar Conference of Dele-
gates, under cover letter from Theresa D. Taylor, Legislative Counsel of the State Bar
of California, to Assembly Member Jan Goldsmith, Jan. 7, 1993, contained in SENATE
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY FILE FOR A.B. No. 498, Reg. Sess. SP 11 (1993). The Adviso-
ry Conunittee addressed neither the Barnes decision by name nor the issue of the
movant's burden. See id. The text of the Advisory Committee Notes that was quoted
extensively in the resolution's Statement of Reasons addressed only the respondent's
burden and the justification for overruling a line of Third Circuit cases that allowed
the responding party to rely on the allegations of its pleadings to oppose a summary
judgment motion. See supra note 376 and accompanying text
389. See supra notes 319-70 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 371-88 and accompanying text.
391. Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 662
(Ct. App. 1995).
392. Id. at 662-63.
393. Id.; see supra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
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The court also found the following statement in the report significant:
In addition to these similarities, California has taken other steps to move our sum-
mary judgment law closer to federal law. A.B. 2616 (Peace) adopted other provi-
sions of Rule 56, requiring each party seeking a summary judgment to prove up its
own case without having to negate claims of the opposition.3"
The court implied that this statement confirmed its view that the legisla-
ture intended, by its enactment of Assembly Bill 2616, to abrogate
Barnes's requirement that the moving defendant negate the plaintiffs
case.' This implication is incorrect.' The portion of the statement
stating that "AB 2616... requir[ed] each party seeking a summary judg-
ment to prove up its own case without having to negate claims of the
opposition"' is, at best, an ambiguous description of the legislative in-
tent underlying the enactment of Assembly Bill 2616 the previous year.
This description probably derived from the same statement that appeared
in the August 18 Report that the court cited earlier in its opinion.'s As
demonstrated above, this language is consistent with the legislative intent
to relax only the moving plaintiffs summary judgment burden, not that
of the moving defendant.'
Furthermore, the part of the statement that describes Assembly Bill 2616
as a step which moves California summary judgment law "closer to fed-
eral law"' is based upon the mistaken belief of Assembly Bill 2616's
author that Celotex supports easing the moving plaintiffs burden in an
offensive motion."°
394. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
395. Id.
396. The court ignored the following statement of "existing law" reminiscent of
Barnes, contained in a report on Assembly Bill 498 to the Assembly Committee on
the Judiciary "Once a defendant . . . has met his or her burden by disproving one
or more elements of the cause of action ... the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to
show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action." STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA REPORT ON A.B. 498 BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
Reg. Sess. 1 (1993) (emphasis added).
397. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (quoting Hearing on A.B. 498 Before the
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 1993-1994) [hereinafter Hearing on
A.B. 498]).
398. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 319-64 and accompanying text
400. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (quoting Hearing on A.B. 498, supra note
397).
401. See supra notes 343-59 and accompanying text.
c. Report prepared by the Office of Senate Foor Analyses
The last item of legislative history referred to in the Union Bank deci-
sion is a report prepared by the Office of Senate Floor Analyses on As-
sembly Bill 498.' The court found support for its holding in that
report's opinion, which stated that "[t]he purpose of this bill is to clarify
the law relating to summary judgment and summary adjudication and to
bring it closer to the federal law relating to these same procedures. " 4'
The remainder of the report clarifies that the only aspect of federal sum-
mary judgment law referred to is Rule 56(e), which "require[s] a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment... [to] set forth specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of
action or defense instead of relying merely on the allegations in its
pleadings."
40
3. The Legislative History of the 1992 and 1993 Amendments to
Section 437c Does Not Support Union Bank's Holding
The Union Bank opinion concluded:
Taken together, the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c legislatively over-
ruled this division's holding in Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools insofar as it prohibited
a summary judgment motion from being granted when a moving defendant merely
relies on a plaintiffs factually devoid interrogatory answers. Whatever uncertainty
may have existed after the 1992 legislation was approved by the Governor as to
the continued viability of Barnes, the purpose of Assembly Bill No. 498 is unmis-
takable."
The foregoing analysis of the legislative history reveals that critical
links needed to connect legislative history with the court's conclusion
are missing." Acknowledging that some uncertainty existed after the
enactment of Assembly Bill 2616, the court relied heavily on the legisla-
tive history of Assembly Bill 498 to support its holding.47 The opinion
made the unsupported statement that the "object in view" and "the prob-
lem the Legislature was addressing" when it considered Assembly Bill
498 was "that the burden shifting characteristics of rule 56 as interpreted
in [Celotex] were to be applied to California summary judgment motions
402. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
403. Id. (quoting STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF OFFICE OF SEN. FLOOR ANALY-
SES ON, A.B. 498, Reg. Sess. 2 (1993)).
404. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT OF OFFICE OF SEN. FLOOR ANALYSES ON A.B.
498, Reg. Sess. 1 (1993) (Digest section) (emphasis added).
405. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (citations omitted).
406. See id. at 653-66.
407. See supra notes 371404 and accompanying text.
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when a defendant relied on a plaintiffs factually inadequate discovery
answers to seek summary judgment."'
The legislative history of Assembly Bill 498 plainly shows that the "ob-
ject in view" was to stiffen the respondent's burden by adopting the sub-
stance of the last two sentences of Rule 56(e).4' The legislature
achieved this objective when it enacted Assembly Bill 498 to add the
extra requirement that "[the responding party] may not rely upon the
mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of
material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth ... specific facts."
410
To support its holding, the Union Bank court picked up on references
in the legislative history to Celotex and Barnes. Some of these references
are inappropriate, such as the statement in the August 18 Report that
implied that Celotex supported the proposed revision of the moving
plaintiffs burden."" Other references are vague or overbroad, such as
the June 29, 1993, Report to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Assem-
bly Bill 498, which stated in reference to Assembly Bill 2616: "California
has taken other steps to move our summary judgment law closer to fed-
eral law."
412
Although the issue in both Celotex and Union Bank concerned the
burden on a moving defendant in the context of a defensive summary
judgment motion,413 statements in the legislative history of Assembly
Bill 2616 and Assembly Bill 498 referring to Celotex or to Rule 56 are
made in the context of this issue. The references to federal summary
judgment law were made to justify either relaxing the burden of a mov-
ing plaintiff in an offensive summary judgment motion or increasing the
burden on a responding plaintiff to set forth specific facts to show the
existence of a genuine issue. The 1992 and 1993 amendments did, indeed,
make it easier to win summary judgment motions in California. To this
extent, these amendments are consistent with the liberal summary judg-
ment spirit of Celotex and the other two trilogy cases. But the legislative
history relied upon in Union Bank does not indicate that the legislature
intended to overrule Barnes or in any other way incorporate into Cal-
408. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663.
409. See supm notes 382-88 and accompanying text.
410. § 437c(o)(1) & (2).
411. See supra notes 343-59 and accompanying text.
412. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT ON A.B. 498 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM.
ON JUDICIARY, Reg. Sess. 4 (1993).
413. See supra notes 217-18 (Celotex) and 315-18 (Union Bank) and accompanying
text.
ifornia summary judgment law Celotex's approach to the burden on a
moving defendant in a defensive motion.414
4. The Aftermath of Union Bank
Union Bank has not settled the issue of what initial showing a moving
defendant must make on a defensive motion for summary judgment. It
succeeded in unsettling the settled case law rule that requires the defen-
dant to disprove affirmatively elements of the plaintiffs case. Union
Bank has not been reviewed by the California Supreme Court.415 Its im-
414. Assembly Member Peace, the author of Assembly Bill 2616, confirmed in a
letter inserted into the Assembly Daily Journal on September 8, 1993, that.
(T]he suggestion that post AB 2616 a defendant can now meet its burden of
proof simply by pointing out that the nonmoving party has no evidence, as is
allegedly the case under Celotex, is simply not true. AB 2616 merely codified
the already existing burden of proof for defendants without change ....
... AB 498 makes crystal clear that the intent behind AB 2616 was to
provide that a plaintiff may obtain a summary judgment if it proves upon the
allegations of its complaint. I trust that this puts to rest any questions as to
the intent behind AB 2616 as to summary judgments.
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY DAILY JOURNAL, REPORT To THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF
1993-94, at 4190 (1993).
The Union Bank court stated that it could not rely on Assembly Member
Peace's letter, and, even if. the court could consider it, "when weighed against the
other evidence of legislative intent [the letter] is insufficient to support the conclusion
that [Barnes] is still a valid statement of California law insofar as it prohibits a de-
fendant from securing a summary judgment based upon a plaintiff's factually incom-
plete discovery responses." Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 653, 664 (Ct. App. 1995).
It should also be noted that Assembly Bill 498, like Assembly Bill 2616, was
supported by the California Trial Lawyers Association. It is difficult to believe that
the trial lawyers would have supported Assembly Bill 498 if they suspected that this
bill, or anything said about it as it proceeded through the legislature, could be in-
terpreted as providing support for overruling Barnes. REPoir ON A.B. 498 BEFORE THE
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICLARY, Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1993).
415. The California Supreme Court added to the confusion over the movant's bur-
den in Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center, 884 P.2d 142 (Cal.
1994), which was decided one month before Union Bank. The Flowers court stated
that "the defendant must conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiffs
case and demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that
requires the process of a trial." Id. at 146 (emphasis added). This language could be
read as rejecting Union Bank's interpretation of the 1992 and 1993 amendments. See
id. However, commentators have recognized that "the summary judgment in Flowers
predated the 1992 amendments to CCP section 437c," and that the supreme court
may not have been interpreting these amendments. See WEIL & BROWN, supra note
296, § 10:241.5. The supreme court should have mentioned this fact in order to quali-
fy its statement when addressing the movant's burden. Flowers, like Union Bank,
provides another example of the role courts have played in compounding the confu-
sion regarding California summary judgment law.
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pact in other appellate districts is not yet clear.
For example, there is reason to doubt whether the superior courts in
Orange County follow Union Bank. Jane Morell and Robin Brandes-
Gibbs, who serve on the staff of the Legal Research Department of the
Orange County Superior Courts, stated before the Union Bank decision
that the 1992 and 1993 amendments "did not change the existing burden
of proof on a moving party defendant."41 Morell, who is the Legal Re-
search Department's summary judgment specialist, still holds this view
after Union Bank.417 The unsuccessful legislative attempt in 1996 to en-
act Assembly Bill 3113 provides additional evidence of the uncertain
status of Union Bank. This proposed amendment to the summary judg-
ment law would have clearly adopted the Celotex approach to defining
the moving defendant's burden. The sponsors of this proposed amend-
ment did not believe that Union Bank's interpretation of the phrase "can-
not be established" in section 437(o)(2) resolved the issue."8
416. Brandes-Gibbs & Morell, supra note 296, at 7. Specifically, Gibbs and Morell
argue that the phrase "'cannot be established' denotes impossibility" and that the
legislature's use of "cannot be established," borrowed from the 1990 amendment to
section 437c(f) to define the moving defendant's burden in the 1992 amendment,
shows that "the legislature is presumed to have intended to reaffirm edsting case
law." Id
417. Telephone Interview with Jamie Morell, Staff Member, Legal Research Depart-
ment of the Orange County Superior Courts (Feb. 14, 1996).
Language reminiscent of the traditional negation standard still crops up in case
law. For example, in Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415 (Ct.
App. 1996), the Second District Court of Appeal applied the following summary judg-
ment standard-
To secure summary judgment, a moving defendant may prove an affirmative
defense, disprove at least one essential element of the plaintif's cause of ac-
tion ... or show that an element of the cause of action cannot be estab-
lshed .... The defendant must show that under no possible hypothesis
within the reasonable purview of the allegations of the complaint is there a
material question of fact which requires examination by trial
Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The court cited several
pre-Union Bank cases in support of its standard but omitted Union Bank itself The
court cited Union Bank later in the opinion during its discussion of the appellate
scope of review. Id. at 418.
418. Assembly Bill 3113's author stated in a Background Information Request sub-
mitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee that
[a]s it currently reads, CCP 437c(o)(1) and (2) imply the moving party has
the burden of negating the claim or defense of any nonmoving party bearing
the burden of proof. Celotex has clarified that is not the law under Federal
Rule 56....
In those jurisdictions that claim to follow Union Bank as persuasive
authority, it is unclear what Union Bank means, just as it is unclear
what Celotex means in defining what, at a minimum, a moving defendant
must do to show an absence of evidence by the plaintiff. If it is true, as
the First District Court of Appeal stated, that Union Bank has taken the
lead in moving California summary judgment "toward the federal direc-
tion,""9 there is a sharp difference of opinion over how far along this
road Union Bank actually travels.420
Cases and commentary after Union Bank reflect substantial confusion
over how much of an affirmative burden, if any, the moving defendant
must shoulder on a summary judgment motion before the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to prove up its prima facie case.42 ' Does the statutory
language "cannot be established"4" boil down to an illusory burden that
simply allows the moving defendant to "point[] out to the court" an "ab-
sence of evidence" on the plaintiffs side?" Or does the statutory
phrase connote a requirement that the defendant must make a more af-
firmative showing? If so, how affirmative must that showing be, in terms
of the amount of discovery a defendant must engage in, to show that a
plaintiff "cannot establish" an essential element of its case? Will the
To conform to the Federal standard, CCP 437(o)(1) and (2) are delet-
ed ....
BACKGROUND INFORMATION REQUEST, SENATE JUDICIARY CoMMITTEE, MEASURE: AB 3113;
AUTHOR: GoLDsMrTH (on file with author). Goldsmith was also the author of Assembly
Bill 498, which formed part of the legislative history that was heavily relied upon by
the Union Bank court.
The Bill Analysis submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee underscores the
confusion surrounding the effect of the 1992 and 1993 amendments on a movant's
burden:
Since the 1992 and 1993 amendments, there has been much commentary on
whether it was the legislature's intent to adopt the federal standards govern-
ing burden of proof on summary judgment motions. This bill appears to con-
fuse matters further by just entirely wiping out the burden of production
language with no statement of purpose to guide the judicial branch in future
litigation.
A.B. 3113 Bill Analysis Submitted to Senate Judiciary Comm., Hearing Date Aug.
7, 1996, at 7.
419. Hunter v. Pacific Mechanical Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 338 (Ct. App. 1995).
420. One practitioner refers to Union Bank's "far reaching holdings," while ac-
knowledging that "[tlhe court, however, purported to limit its holding only to the is-
sues raised by the Union Bank's summary judgment motion." Grilo, supra note 313,
at 217.
421. See infra notes 425-64 and accompanying text.
422. § 437c(o)(2).
423. The Celotax opinion states that "the burden on the moving party may be dis-
charged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs "factually devoid interrogatory answers" do the trick for the
moving defendant? Will something less suffice, such as the plaintiffs
"factually vague deposition testimony?" Must the defendant track down
and negate every potential source of evidence that might blossom into
evidence for the plaintiff at trial?'
Weil and Brown's influential treatise on California civil practice has
made broad pronouncements regarding Union Bank's impact on the
defendant's burden as the moving party.' They incorrectly cite Union
Bank as case authority for their assertions that section 437c "captures
the essence" of and is "virtually the same" as Federal Rule 56.426 The
portions of the legislative history quoted in Union Bank upon which
these sweeping statements are based include Assembly Bill 498 and Rule
56(e), both of which require the responding party to set forth specific
facts to oppose a summary judgment motion.' The actual passage in
the report prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee on Assembly Bill
498 relating to "capturing the essence" of Rule 56, quoted by the Union
Bank court, reads: "AB 498 captures the essence of Rule 56(e) by requir-
ing the opposing party to set forth specific facts in opposing a mo-
tion."42 This kind of imprecise reference to Union Bank, like the im-
424. While each justice on the Celotex Court rejected the Adickes requirement that
the moving defendant must provide affirmative evidence disproving the plaintiffs case,
three justices disagreed with the majority as to exactly "what is required of a moving
party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot
prove its case." Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, dissented and argued that under the new stan-
dard announced by the majority, Celotex had not met the movant's burden to show
an absence of evidence in the record to support the plaintiffs claim. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned that Celotex failed to meet its burden because
Celotex knew of the existence in the record of a potential witness for the plaintiff
and did not depose that witness to negate the possibility of his providing relevant
testimony to support the plaintiffs case. Id at 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice White, in a concurring opinion, dearly stated that "it is the defendant's
task [as moving party on summary judgment] to negate, if he can, the claimed basis
for the suit" Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring). Justice White also suggested that, to-
ward that end, it is the defendant's burden, not the plaintiffs, to conduct discovery.
Id. (White, J., concurring). This standard comes fairly close to the rejected Adickes
approach that required the moving defendant to "negate" the plaintiffs claim with
affirmative evidence. Thus, the Celotex Court was split over what a moving defendant
must do to satisfy its burden.
425. WEIL & BROWN, supra note 296, § 10:240.
426. Id. § 10:243.
427. Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 662-63
(Ct. App. 1995).
428. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). In contrast to Weil and Brown's assertion that
precise reference to Celotex,41 contributes to the confusion regarding
the appropriate standard for determining the movant's burden.
The Union Bank decision carefully avoided any sweeping pronounce-
ments regarding the effect of Celotex on summary judgment in California
and took particular care to craft its holding very narrowly.' The
Union Bank court cautioned:
We recognize that there may be other aspects of the legislatively intended
changes resulting from the 1992 and 1993 amendments to section 437c. However,
the only issue raised by this petition relates to whether Barnes v. Blue Haven
Pools required that the summary judgment motion at issue be denied. Our opinion
can only be read to apply to the specific issue before the court. We are not ad-
dressing other issues concerning the manner rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may apply to California summary judgment motions or the further
applicability of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett to section 437c as amended in 1992 and
1993.3'
The actual holding of Union Bank-that the 1992 and 1993 amend-
ments to section 437c overruled Barnes to the extent that Barnes barred
a summary judgment motion from being granted when the moving defen-
dant relies only on a plaintiffs factually devoid interrogatory answers-is
very narrow.' Union Bank nowhere refers to Celotex's broad language
that "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'
The Sixth Appellate District has taken a cautious approach in citing
Union Bank, emphasizing the narrowness of that decision's holding and
confining its persuasive value to instances when the moving defendant
relies on the plaintiffs factually devoid interrogatory answers.' In
Hagen v. Hickenbottom, the court of appeal expressed concern over the
misuse of Union Bank by those who proclaim that Union Bank brought
California summary judgment all the way to a full-blown, broad construc-
tion of Celotex.' While acknowledging that "[tihere is evidence that
"the substance of [437c(o) and Rule 561 is virtually the same," WElL & BROWN, supra
note 296, § 10:243, Union Bank's actual quotation from the report to the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, which specifically referred to the opposing party's burden, reads:
"'he language adopted by this bill is not Rule 56(e) verbatim, but reflects the spe-
cific requirements of California law. However, technically different the substance of
each is virtually the same.'" Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (quoting STATE BAR
OF CAUFORNIA, REPORT ON AB. 498 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, Reg.
Sess. 3 (1994)).
429. See supra notes 346-64 and accompanying text
430. Union Bank, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.
431. Id. (citations omitted).
432. Id. at 663.
433. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
434. Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 206-08 (Ct App. 1995).
435. Id.
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the 1992 and 1993 amendments were in some respects influenced by the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Celotex," the Hagen
court recognized that a group of commentators overemphasized the influ-
ence of Celotex on the amendments.'
[T]hose who support the view that the amendments have substantially lessened a
moving defendant's burden sometimes point to Celotex's statement that, under the
federal summary judgment rule, where at trial the nonmoving party would have
the burden of proving the element in issue "the burden on the moving party may
be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there
is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'
Rejecting the view that "a moving defendant may shift the burden
simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its
case," the Hagen court held that the words "cannot be established" re-
quire a defendant to make an "affirmative showing" in support of its
motion.' In an apparent rejection of the broad standard articulated in
Celotex, Hagen adopted the following movant's burden standard, a
movant's burden "with teeth," that provides responding plaintiffs with
some protection against unsupported motions:
Such a showing connotes something significantly more than simply "pointing out
to the... court" that "there is an absence of evidence": Before the burden of
producing even a prima facie case should be shifted to the plaintiff in advance of
trial, a defendant who cannot negate an element of the plaintiffs case should be
required to produce direct or circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff not only
does not have but cannot reasonably expect to obtain a prima facie case."'
In Hagen, the plaintiffs brought an action to set aside a trust on the
theory that the defendant exercised undue influence over the dece-
dent."' The moving defendant did not rely on any of the plaintiffs fac-
tually devoid interrogatory answers but, rather, upon the plaintiffs "fac-
tually vague" deposition testimony."2 In his successful motion for sum-
mary judgment, the defendant relied upon the plaintiffs' deposition tes-
timony that indicated the plaintiffs did not have any personal knowledge
of undue influence by defendant."' While acknowledging that the re-
436. Id. at 206 (citation omitted).
437. Id. The Hagen court specifically listed Weil and Brown's view as being too
expansive. Id.
438. Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
439. Id. at 207.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 198-202.
443. Id.
cord suggested that the plaintiffs' "prospects of ultimately proving undue
influence [were] slight,"'4 the court nevertheless held that the defen-
dant failed to meet its burden to show the plaintiffs could not establish
undue influence, because they "almost certainly would not have been
present" had such undue influence occurred.' Therefore, the burden
did not shift to the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case."6 The court of
appeal thus drew a line between cases that are simply weak and those
that "cannot be established." 7
In support of its holding, the Hagen court cited Vila v. McFerren,"
an opinion decided five months after Union Bank by the same appellate
district that decided Union Bank. The court in Villa held that a
defendant's moving papers-comprised only of the plaintiffs factually
vague deposition responses-failed to meet the burden of proof neces-
sary to shift the burden to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact. 9
The Villa court devoted a full four pages to make the point that the cur-
rent summary judgment statute, incorporating the 1992 and 1993
amendments, still places on the moving party the burden of proving its
right to summary judgment and, if that burden is not met, the motion
must be denied "even though the opposing party has not responded suffi-
ciently or at all."" Reaffirming the continued vitality of the movant's
burden under Union Bank and Celotex, the Villa court quoted a portion
of the Celotex opinion:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsi-
bility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ad-
missions on fie, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demon-
444. Id. at 208.
445. Id.
446. Id. The court questioned why the defendant "did not employ discovery tac-
tics-such as legitimately founded state-all-facts interrogatories-more likely in these
circumstances to lead to a well-founded conclusion that the [plaintiffsj could not es-
tablish their case." Id. at 208-09.
447. Id. at 208.
448. 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (Ct. App. 1995).
449. Id. at 729. The plaintiff in Villa brought an action for civil conspiracy and
acknowledged at his deposition that he was personally unaware of any significant
communication between the alleged co-conspirators. Id. at 720. As in Hagen, the
court ruled that the plaintiff's deposition testimony was insufficient to shift the bur-
den to the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in opposition to the defendant's
summary judgment motion, concluding that such communication would not have been
made in the plaintiffs presence. Id. The Villa court noted that "[t]here are a myriad
of litigation scenarios where, in a case like the present one, a moving party can shift
the burden of proof on a conspiracy issue," such as the defendant's filing a declara-
tion denying the alleged communications, or filing plaintiffs factually devoid interroga-
tory answers. Id. at 729.
450. Id. at 725.
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strate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."'
However, the Court did not cite the portion of the Celotex opinion that
stated that the movant's burden may be discharged simply by "pointing
out to the district court... that there is an absence of evidence to sup-
port the nonmoving party's case."' Thus, the Second and Sixth Appel-
late Districts appear to agree that the movant's burden under the current
summary judgment statute continues to provide the opposing plaintiff
with real protection against unsupported summary judgment motions,
and that Union Bank does not stand for Celotex's proposition that a
moving defendant may discharge its burden by "pointing out" to the
court an "absence of evidence."'
The First Appellate District, on the other hand, is in sharp conflict
with the Second and Sixth Appellate Districts. In Hunter v. Pacific Me-
chanical Corp.,' the First District Court of Appeal held that a defen-
dant could "show" that the element of causation "'cannot be established'
by pointing to an absence of evidence to support this element."4 The
evidence to which the defendant pointed was the plaintiffs "factually
vague discovery responses" that the court held sufficient to shift the
burden to the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of causation.'
The plaintiff Hunter, a bricklayer at various construction sites, sued
defendant PMC, a contractor, claiming that he sustained asbestos-related
injuries through exposure to asbestos as a result of working in close
proximity to PMC employees. 7 In affirming summary judgment for
PMC, the court held that PMC's reliance on Hunter's deposition testimo-
ny that he was personally unaware of PMC's activities at any of the job
sites at which he worked was sufficient to shift the burden to Hunter,
who was unable to meet that burden.4" The court of appeal held that
Hunter's lack of personal knowledge satisfied PMC's burden to point out
the absence of proof by Hunter for causation.459
The Sixth District Court of Appeal in Hagen "respectfully questioned"
451. Id. at 727 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
452. Ce/otex, 477 U.S. at 325.
453. Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197 (Ct. App. 1995); Vi/a, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 727.
454. 44 CaL Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1995).
455. Id. at 338 (quoting § 437c(o)(2)).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 336.
458. Id. at 339.
459. Id.
the Hunter court's conclusion "that 'factually vague' deposition respons-
es by the plaintiff himself sufficed, in the circumstances of that case, to
shift the burden to the plaintiff."4" Noting its alignment with the Sec-
ond Appellate District on the issue, the Hagen court stated that Villa
"reached a result consistent with our perception of the effect of the 1992
amendments to the summary judgment statute."4' Five months after its
decision in Hagen, the Sixth District Court of Appeal once again attacked
Hunter, going further than it did in Hagen. In Addy v. Bliss &
Glennon,4" the Sixth District panel stated that "the [Hunter] court...
may be understood to suggest that a moving defendant may shift the
burden simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot
prove its case," a proposition with which it vigorously disagreed in
Hagen. 4
460. Hagen v. Hickenbottom, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 208 (Ct. App. 1995).
461. Id. The same panel that decided Hunter appears to have generated confusion
within the first district by its decision only two months later in Vann v. Travelers
Cos., 46 Cal Rptr. 2d 617 (Ct. App. 1995). According to practice commentary, "the
same panel ignored and contradicted Hunter, Union Bank and the Section 437c
amendments." Richard A- Eggerth & Elizabeth A. McIntyre, Lonely Hunter, LA. DAILY
J., Mar. 14, 1996, at 7. In Vann, a landlord sued a tenant for dumping toxic waste on
the leased premises. Vann, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618. Vann's liability insurance carrier
declined to defend him based on a pollution exclusion clause in his policy that ex-
cluded from coverage any pollution-related liability. Id. This clause, however, con-
tained an exception for the "sudden and accidental" discharge of pollutants. Id at
619. In Vann's suit against Travelers for declaratory relief, Travelers moved for sum-
mary judgment, pointing to an absence of evidence of a "sudden and accidental" dis-
charge. Id. Reversing the trial court's order of summary judgment in Travelers' favor,
the court of appeal stated: "Given Travelers' burden to negate coverage as a matter
of law, the facts that it has marshalled in this regard are surprisingly weak" Id. at
621 (emphasis added).
The commentary expressed surprise that the court had refused to consider the
impact of Hunter, Union Bank, and the 1992 amendment to section 437c on the
issue of whether Travelers met its burden as the moving party. Eggerth & McIntyre,
supra, at 7. It should be pointed out, however, that the authors of this commentary
are specialists in liability defense and coverage litigation. Id. Complicating the sum-
mary judgment issue in Vann were questions concerning special burdens imposed by
substantive insurance law on insurance companies in duty to defend cases. Id.
462. 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (CL App. 1996).
463. Id. at 647. The sixth district in Addy went out of its way to explain that
a moving defendant may not shift the burden to the plaintiff to put on a
prima facie case simply by pointing out to the court the absence of essential
evidence to support plaintiffs case, and that a defendant must make an affir-
mative showing in support of his or her motion.
Id. at 645 (dictum). In an opinion that omitted any reference to Union Bank, the
court went on to hold that the defendant in Addy "did not merely 'point to' Addy's
lack of evidence to support her claim but rather submitted evidence itself demon-
strating that Addy could not support her claim" and that such evidence satisfied the
required "affirmative showing." Id. at 649 & n.l. This statement reflects the intensity
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The recent failed attempt by advocates of the liberal Celotex approach
to enact yet another amendment to section 437c, the avowed purpose of
which was "to conform California's summary judgment standard to the
federal summary judgment standard," indicates that Union Bank has not
settled the issue of the movant's burden.'
F. Assembly Bill 3113: The Failed Attempt to "Enact Celotex"
(or, Rather, a Very Rough Approximation Thereof)
On March 5, 1996, Republican Governor Pete Wilson proposed Assem-
bly Bill 3113, an amendment to section 437c, as part of his civil justice
reform package.' The avowed purpose of the :bill was "to conform
California's summary judgment standard to the federal summary judg-
ment standard."" The bill had many supporters, including the Asso-
ciation for California Tort Reform, California Manufacturers Association,
California Defense Counsel, the California Employment Council, the
Consulting Engineers & Land Surveyors of California, and the California
Judicial Council. 7 The Consumer Attorneys of California, a trial law-
yers professional association, and the Committee on the Administration
of the court's concern that vague references to Celotex in the legislative history of
the 1992 and 1993 amendments are being misused to dilute the movant's burden
beyond the holding in Celotex itself.
464. Analysis of A.B. 3113 Bill Submitted to Comm. on Senate Judiciary, Aug. 7,
1996, Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal 1995-1996); see also Hearings on A.B. 3113 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, August 7, 1996, Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 1995-1996) [hereinafter Hear-
ings on A.B. 3113].
465. Wilson Announces Civil Law Reforms, UPI, Mar. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File. Along with Assembly Bill 3113, the package included the
following bills: Assembly Bill 3259, which would modify joint and several liability
among tort defendants; Senate Bill 1429, which would encourage early resolution of
civil disputes by referring parties to early mediation in all cases; Assembly Bill 3364,
which prohibits attorneys' contingent fee charges from exceeding 1596 of the settle-
ment amount; and Assembly Bill 3381, which directs cases involving damage claims
of less than $50,000 from superior court into municipal court by raising the jurisdic-
tional limit of municipal courts from $25,000 to $50,000. Id. The three latter proposals
are consistent with the "restrictive access" paradigm goals of discouraging formal liti-
gation and steering cases involving low damages to less formal dispute resolution
fora. Id.
466. See Hearings on A.B. 3113, supra note 464, at 4.
467. The Judicial Council withdrew its support when the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee amended Assembly Bill 3113 to delete provisions that established the movant's
burden.
of Justice of the State Bar opposed the bill.'
Assembly Bill 3113 passed the Republican-controlled assembly before
it was defeated by the Democrat-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee
in August 1996. Although it was never enacted, Assembly Bill 3113 never-
theless merits inclusion in the summary judgment saga for two reasons.
First, a Republican-controlled senate' would have enacted the law.
Second, Assembly Bill 3113 was the first overt attempt by judicial "re-
formers" to legislate Celotex into California summary judgment law. As-
sembly Bill 3113 is consistent with the Quayle Report's civil justice re-
form agenda and is, therefore, a prime example of politically charged
procedure.47 The Assembly Bill 3113 episode provides insight into how
politically charged procedure plays out in the California legislature and
reveals implications for the legislative primacy rulemaking process.
Assembly Bill 3113 would have made bad summary judgment law for
several reasons. First, the proposed bill was the latest in a series of poor-
ly drafted patchwork amendments to the summary judgment statute.471
Second, the proposed bill overshot its self-proclaimed objective of enact-
ing Celotex into state procedural law.4" Finally, the proposed bill vio-
lated key tenets of good procedure.4"
1. More "Patchwork" Amendments
Assembly Bill 3113 continued the tradition of codifying legislative pro-
cedural law by embroidering upon a crazy quilt of badly drafted, overly
amended text. Given the bill's stated purpose of conforming California
summary judgment law to the federal standard,474 Assembly Bill 3113
presented an ideal opportunity to truly reform California's summary judg-
ment law by overhauling and simplifying the summary judgment statute.
Many states have adopted the federal rules in their entirety, or close
approximations thereof.475 The bill's authors attempted to insert the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the comparatively simple federal
standard into an overly amended and complex "code" statute.
468. See Hearings on A.B. 3113, supra note 464, at 4-5.
469. The 1994 elections left the Democrats with a "paper-thin" majority in the State
Senate of 21 out of 40 seats. Republican prospects for taking control of the Senate
in 1996 were good, owing to retirements, term limits, and reapportionment. See CAlJ-
FORNIA POLmCAL ALMANAC 150 (Stephen Green ed., 4th ed. 1995-1996).
470. see supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
471. See ifura notes 476-89 and accompanying text.
472. See infra notes 490-95 and accompanying text.
473. See infra notes 496-506 and accompanying text.
474. See supra note 466 and accompanying text
475. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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a. Assembly Bill 3113 as passed by the Assembly
Two key textual changes proposed in Assembly Bill 3113 would con-
form section 437c to the federal Celotex standard of summary judgment.
First, the phrase "no genuine issue" replaced the phrase "no triable issue"
so as to conform California terminology to Rule 56.47' Had the bill
passed, the first sentence of subsection (c) would have read: "The mo-
tion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact... ."4' The
second change in the proposed bill would have defined "no genuine issue
as to any material fact" to be where "no reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party on the matter that is the subject of the
motion for summary judgment."4M This language comes not from Rule
56, but from Celotex's holding that equated the standard for granting
summary judgment with the standard for granting a directed verdict
motion at trial.T
The authors of Assembly Bill 3113 could have avoided ambiguity in the
bill had they pruned away the old statutory phrases "has no merit" and
"cannot be established" and replaced them with the new terminology "no
genuine issue." True to the "code" tradition, however, the bill not only re-
tained the antiquated and ambiguous statutory terms, but added a new
one for good measure.' Subsection (o)(2) of the bill provided that "[a]
defendant... has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of ac-
tion has no merit if there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to
476. The first draft of Assembly Bill 3113, however, contained a glitch. Subsection
(c) properly referred to "no genuine issue," but the author forgot to change subse-
quent references to "no triable issue" in subsections (g) and (o)(1) to "no genuine
issue."
477. A.B. 3113 as Amended in Assembly, May 15, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
478. Id.
479. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
480. The bill's definition of the moving defendant's burden, contained in subsection
(o)(2), does not frame that burden in terms of requiring a showing that there is "no
genuine issue," which would have been logical in light of subsection (c). This is the
approach of Rule 56, which consistently and exclusively employs the standard "no
genuine issue" to define the movant's burden and the ultimate burden of persuasion
to be used by the court in determining the motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving
party not only has the initial burden to come forward with materials sufficient to
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, but also bears the ul-
timate burden of persuading the court that, on all the documents submitted by both
movant and respondent, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.- Id.
support one or more elements of the cause of action."41 The words
"sufficient substantiality" were to replace "cannot be established" be-
cause despite Union Bank's holding, the language "cannot be estab-
lished" still smacked of the restrictive "negation" approach. However, the
new statutory formulation "sufficient substantiality" would have added
yet another layer of ambiguity to the definition of the movant's bur-
den.' Had the authors resisted the typical' "code" tendency to throw
nothing out, these drafting problems could have been avoided simply by
replacing all references to "has no merit" with "no genuine issue" to
define the standard for the moving defendant's burden as well as the
overall standard governing the court's determination of summary judg-
ment and summary adjudication motions.
The original draft of Assembly Bill 3113 had two additional major de-
fects. First, although the proposed amendment to subsection (o)(2) pur-
ported to define the moving defendant's burden on summary judgment, it
failed to articulate what the movant must do to show that the plaintiffs
481. A.B. 3113 as Amended in Assembly, May 15, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (em-
phasis added). The phrase "sufficient substantiality" is derived from California case
law that defines the level of sufficiency required of plaintiffs trial evidence to avoid
a nonsuit. Under this case law rule, a motion for nonsuit, the equivalent of a federal
motion for a directed verdict, now called "motion for judgment as a matter of law"
under amended Rule 50, may be granted
only when, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving to plaintiffs evidence
all the value to which it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate infer-
ence which may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination
that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.
Dameshghi v. Texaco Refining & Mktg,, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 528 (Ct. App. 1992)
(emphasis added), overruled by Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 259 (Cal. 1995).
The purpose of Assembly Bill 3113 was to enact into California summary judg-
ment law the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Liberty Lobby and Celotex that the
"standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The use of the phrase "sufficient sub-
stantiality" to define the moving defendant's burden under the proposed amendment
to section 437c(o) intended to add to the movant's burden a sufficiency of the evi-
dence nonsuit standard with which California courts were already familiar. A.B. 3113
as Amended in Assembly, May 15, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996). However, this phrase
adds another layer of terminology over and above "no genuine issue" with little bene-
fit. Also, the amendment to section 437c does not spell out what, if anything, a de-
fendant must do to show the insufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence. See id.
482. However, A-B. 3113 would not have entirely eliminated the phrase "camot be
established" from section 437c. The bill still used this phrase in subsection (n), ("A
cause of action has no merit if ... [olne or more of the elements of the cause of
action cannot be separately established"), which continued to apply to summary adju-
dication motions to define the phrase "has no merit" in subsection (f). § 437c(n)(1).
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case lacks "sufficient substantiality."' The text merely provides that a
defendant meets "his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has
no merit if there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality."' This lan-
guage can be interpreted as allowing the moving defendant merely to
assert or "point out" to the court that the plaintiffs case lacks sufficient
substantiality, instead of requiring the defendant to demonstrate affirna-
tively through appropriate materials that this is so.
Second, the proposed text deleted the burden-shifting language con-
tained in section 437c(o)(2), which clarifies that the respondent's burden
to show the existence of a triable issue does not shift to the plaintiff
unless and until the court finds that the defendant has, as a threshold
matter, met its movant's burden.' Without burden-shifting language,
one could reasonably interpret the text to mean that the plaintiffs bur-
den to "set forth the specific facts showing that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact exists" is quite independent of the defendant's burden and is
borne by a plaintiff whether or not a defendant has met its burden. The
effective elimination of the movant's burden as the trigger that shifts the
burden to the plaintiff could have allowed defendants to force plaintiffs
483. A.B. 3113 as Amended in Assembly, May, 15, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
484. Id. To fill this void, a court would have had to interpret this passage from
subsection (o)(2) in light of subsection (b), which provides that "ItIhe motion shall
be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, [and]
depositions" in order to conclude that the moving defendant must do more than
merely point out to the court the insufficiency of the plaintiffs case. Id.
After Assembly Bill 3113 passed the Assembly, the bill's author amended subsec-
tion (b) to change "shall" to "may." A.B. 3113 as Amended in Assembly, June 13,
1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996). Had this version of Assembly Bill 3113 become law, this
change could have been construed to permit, rather than to require, the moving party
to support its motion with appropriate documentation. Id.
485. AB. 3113, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (Legislative Counsel's Digest (Feb.
22, 1996)) (on file with author). The original draft of Assembly Bill 3113 would have
affected the current text of section 437c(o)(2) as follows:
A defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of ac-
tion has no merit if there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to sup-
port one or more elements of the cause of action .... Onee Lhc 1zfen
dant . .. has met that Iburden, the btrda. sh-ift to the plini~ff. . . te show
that a tital af onez or mrer materkal faets exists as to th" eause-ef
aetien .... The plaintiff ... may not rely upon the mere allegations or
denials of its pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists
but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to that cause of action ....
Id.
to respond to unsupported summary judgment motions.4 Had this pro-
vision become law, it would have tipped the balance of summary judg-
ment procedure even more heavily in favor of defendants than does
Celotex. Celotex did not establish such a bizarre structure.487
Counsel to the Assembly Judiciary Committee brought this omission to
the attention of the Governor's Legal Advisor, who agreed to an amend-
ment that restored the deleted burden-shifting language as follows: "Once
the defendant. . has met [his or her movant's burden of showing that a
cause of action has no merit], the burden shifts to the plaintiff.... to
show that a genuine issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action."4 Assembly Bill 3113 passed the Assembly as amend-
ed.'e
b. Assembly Bill 3113 as amended (again) in the Senate Judiciary
Committee: The movant's burden entirely deleted
Once Assembly Bill 3113 passed the Assembly, a funny thing happened
on the way to the Senate Judiciary Committee. While the bill was pend-
ing before that committee, the bill's author, Assembly Member Gold-
smith, amended it to delete all language in subsections (o)(1) and (2)
referring to the movant's burden of production.4" The only language
486. Id.
487. Celotex confirmed the continued existence of a significant movant's burden.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see supra notes 212-50. Many au-
thors as well as Justice Brennan in his Celotex dissent have underscored the impor-
tance of a significant movant's burden to prevent defendants from harassing plaintiffs
whom they know have some evidence to carry their burden of production at trial, by
making unsupported demands for plaintiffs to preview their evidence far in advance
of trial. See Friedenthal, supra note 240, at 776; see also Nelken, supra note 240, at
75.
Referring to the omission in the original draft of Assembly Bill 3113 of burden-
shifting language, the bill analysis for the Assembly Judiciary Committee diplomatical-
ly states: "In addition, an amendment should be taken to make it clear that it' a de-
fendant meets its burden of proof then the burden still shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. The author appears to have unin-
tentionaUy deleted that language." Analysis of A.B. 3113 Submitted to Assembly
Comm. on Judiciary, May 8, 1996, Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 1995-1996) (emphasis added).
488. A.B. 3113 as Amended in Assembly, May 15, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
There is reason to believe that the bill's author reluctantly agreed to the amendment.
After Assembly Bill 3113 passed the Assembly. with the burden-shifting language in-
tact, and while it was pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill was
again amended to delete entirely the burden-shifting language in subsection (o). See
A.B. 3113 as Amended in Senate, June 13, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995-1996).
489. Analysis of A.B. 3113 Submitted to Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Aug. 7, 1996,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995-1996).
490. The author also amended section 437c(b) to change the provision that the
motion "shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to inter-
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that remained in the text of subsection (o) after the deletion was the
definition of the respondent's burden:
For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication the
nonmoving party may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a genuine issue of fact exists but, instead, shall set forth
the specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the
cause of action or defense at issue in the motion.91
The author of the bill, Assembly Member Goldsmith, gave the follow-
ing explanation to the Senate Judiciary Committee for the deletion:
As it currently reads, CCP 437c(o)(1) and (2) imply the moving party has the
burden of negating the claim or defense of any nonmoving party bearing the bur-
den of proof. Celotex has clarified that is not the law under Federal Rule 56.
To conform to the Federal standard, CCP 437 (o)(1) and (2) are deleted, retain-
ing one sentence providing the allegations of a pleading alone cannot create a
genuine issue of material fact, and further clarifying that the moving party does
not have the burden of negating the claim or defense of any nonmoving party
bearing the burden of proof.
4 2
In response to the deletion of the movant's burden, the Civil and Small
Claims Advisory Committee of the Judicial Council recommended that
the Judicial Council formally oppose the bill." The bill analysis submit-
rogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken"
from a mandatory requirement to merely permissive. See A.B. 3113, 1995-1996 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1996) (Legislative Counsel's Digest) (on file with author). The purpose of
this amendment was to enact Celotex's holding that, in defensive summary judgment
motions, moving defendants are not required to submit affirmative evidence like affi-
davits to support the motion. BACKGROUND INFORMATION REQUEST, SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, MEASURE: A.B. 3113, AUTHOR: GOLDSMITH (on file with author). Through
unartful drafting, however, the switch from "shall" to "may," covering all documentary
support for the motion-not just affidavits-could be interpreted as making the sub-
mission of any supporting documentation optional. See Analysis of A.B. 3113 Sub-
mitted to Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Aug. 7, 1996, Reg. Ses. 6 (Cal 1995-1996)
("This bill not only allows the permissive use of affidavits, but also everything else
which includes declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, etc. This is clearly
not in conformance with the Celotex case."); see supra note 239 and accompanying
text (discussing the Supreme Court's requirement in Celotex that the moving party
identify "those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact") (quoting FED. R. CIrv. P. 56(c)).
491. A.B. 3113 as Amended in Assembly, June 13, 1996, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
492. BACKGROUND INFORMATION REQUEST, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMrrEE, MEASURE: A.B.
3113, AUTHOR: GOLDSMITH (on file with author).
493. The recommendation of the Civil and Small Claims Advisory Committee would
have been transmitted to the Policy Coordination and Liaison Committee for a vote
on whether the Judicial Council should send a formal letter in opposition to the
ted to the Senate Judiciary Committee made the following comment
about the deletion:
Despite where the confusion lies, this bill completely eliminates all language deal-
ing with the burden of production leaving courts to interpret the disarray. If the
authoros [sic] intent is to clarify the nonmoving party's burden of production, this
bill would appear not to meet its purpose."
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted down Assembly Bill 3113 be-
cause it was a partisan attempt to enact part of the Governor's civil jus-
tice reform agenda. It was doomed from the outset to flounder in the
Democrat-controlled Senate after sailing through the Republican Assem-
bly. One lesson for the legislative primacy rulemaking model is that parti-
san procedure can become a casualty of legislative gridlock. The tortu-
ous progress of Assembly Bill 3113 through the legislature also revwals a
rulemaking process that is not characterized by "considered delibera-
tion."4'
2. Assembly Bill 3113 is also "Bad" Summary Judgment Law on the
Merits
Even if Assembly Bill 3113 accurately captured the essence of Celotex's
holding, the bill is "bad" procedure on its merits. Celotex and the rest of
the trilogy have been strongly criticized for tilting the playing field in
favor of repeat-player defendants.496 Assembly Bill 3113 also fits
Senate Judiciary Committee. Telephone Interview with Carrie Cornwell, Legislative
Policy Analyst, California Judicial Council (Aug. 20, 1996). Before the Policy Coordi-
nation and Liaison Committee could vote on the recommendation, Assembly Bil 3113
had been rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee, making the matter moot. Id.
494. Analysis of A.B. 3113 Submitted to Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Aug. 7, 1996,
Reg. Sess. 13 (Cal. 1995-1996).
495. See supra note 176 (discussing the testimony of Judge Robert F. Peckham
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and criticizing the adverse impact of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 on the federal rulemaldng process).
496. See Stempel, supra note 131, at 161-62. Stempel writes:
By making summary judgment easier to obtain, the Court implicitly bestowed
a political favor (and greater judicial power) on litigants who can make most
use of the motion. Defendants use the motion more than plaintiffs. Defen-
dants are disproportionately comprised of society's 'haves': banks, insurance
companies, railroads, business organizations, governments, and government
agencies.
Since rules of procedure are, insofar as possible, supposed to be neutral in
their impact on litigants, a change in any procedural rule should be justified
by evidence that the rule needs to be changed to correct an unfair imbalance
or that a current neutral balance is unwise. No such case was made prior to
the Liberty Lobby holding.
Id.
Jack B. Weinstein, a federal district court judge, referring to the trilogy; com-
mented that "[t]he counter-revolution already has established a beachhead in our
highest court. Professor Coffee overstates it, but makes a point with some merit
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squarely within the "restrictive access" paradigm. 497 This bill would
have denied access to less favored claims and politically and economical-
ly powerless plaintiffs.' Viewed in this way, Assembly Bill 3113 would
have undermined the goal of party-neutrality.4 99 It also would have
transformed the function of summary judgment from a pretrial device to
screen out cases that are not trial-worthy to a trial itself. a "mini-trial" on
paper evidence.' This transformation is part of the "currently trendy
drive toward efficiency" at the expense of accuracy."1
Assembly Bill 3113's proponents argued that the bill would have
"ma[d]e it easier for litigants to dispose of frivolous claims before trial
and would reduce litigation costs."' The "reformed" summary judg-
ment procedure, however, would have gone beyond merely eliminating
cases "in which the claimant has 'no case at all'" to give the judge un-
precedented power to "dismiss claims in which the claimant's case ap-
when he writes: 'a series of recent Supreme Court decisions seem to have the one
common denominator that the plaintiffs attorney always loses.'" Weinstein, supra
note 116, at 1919 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractu-
at Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L REV.
919, 920 n.2 (1988)); see also Gordillo, supra note 198, at 277.
497. See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text. Assembly Bill 3113 was part of
Governor Wilson's "civil justice reform" package designed to speed up disposition of
cases and cut litigation costs. See supra notes 465-68 and accompanying text. The
Governor's press release echoed the themes of the Quayle Report, including the ad-
verse impact of escalating litigation costs on the competitiveness of California busi-
nesses. Also included in the civil justice reform package was a proposal to raise the
municipal court jurisdictional limit from $25,000 to $50,000. This proposal would have
forced cases with more substantial damage claims into municipal court with its expe-
dited procedures. Governor Wilson's civil justice reform package also proposed early
mediation for all cases. See supra note '465. Press Release, Governor Unveils New
Tort Reform Proposals, 1, 2 (Mar. 5, 1996).
498. Professor Stempel states that the Supreme Court's "message" to lower federal
courts in Liberty Lobby and Matsushita was "to trim weak or otherwise disfavored
cases from the trial docket," and he predicts "[t]he observed and coming change in
summary judgment jurisprudence bodes ill for certain classes of litigants, persons
interested in the accuracy of judicial decision making, and the system as a whole."
Stempel, supra note 131, at 159; see also Weinstein, supra note 116, at 1907 (observ-
ing that free access to courts is the "controversy that surrounds us today").
499. See Stempel, supra note 131, at 159.
500. Childress, supra note 201, at 184.
501. See Stempel, supra note 131, at 193 (noting the "currently trendy drive toward
efficiency"); see also id. at 172-81 (analyzing the increased potential for erroneous
dismissals under the trilogy's sununary judgment standards).
502. Analysis of A.B. 3113 Submitted to Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, May 8,
1996, Reg. Sess. 2 (1995-1996).
pears weak in the eyes of the judge." ' The trilogy permits the court to
assess the persuasiveness of the plaintiffs case, rather than determine
the existence of a factual dispute to warrant trial, and does so prema-
turely based on paper evidence before the case can develop with live
witnesses testifying before a jury.' Assembly Bill 3113's use of the
phrase "no evidence of sufficient substantiality" to define when a cause
of action "has no merit" highlights the foregoing point.' This phrase
would have been an invitation to courts to weigh the evidence. Tradition-
al summary judgment law prohibited courts from weighing the evi-
dence.m
503. Stempel, supra note 131, at 140 (quoting Charles E. Clark, The Summary
Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REv. 567, 578 (1952)). For a "post-trilogy review of lower
court decisions," see Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 207, at 88-89. Issacharoff
and Loewenstein asserL
A post-trilogy review of lower court decisions reveals a widespread and dra-
matic recasting of sununary judgment doctrine by the lower courts. This is
clearly evident in the revision of the movant's burden in light of Celotex and
in the eased standards for the grant of summary judgment evident in Ander-
son and Matsushita. Courts have shown a new willingness to resolve issues
of intent or motive at the summary judgment stage and, in the extreme ver-
sion, to grant summary judgment where "taken as a whole, [plaintiffs' evi-
dence does not] exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of
certainty. ... "
There is evidence in the post-trilogy case law that summary judgment has
moved beyond its originally intended role as a guarantor of the existence of
material issues to be resolved at trial and has been transformed into a mech-
anism to assess plaintiffs likelihood of prevailing at trial.
Id. (quoting Bovillion v. Eli Lilly & Co., 677 F. Supp. 467, 471 (W.D. La 1988); Norris
v. Bell Helicopter Teltron, 495 So. 2d 976, 982 (La. Ct. App. 1986)); see also
Carrington, supra note 44, at 2093; Gordillo, supra note 198, at 280.
504. Stempel, supra note 131, at 140; see also Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra
note 207, at 87.
505. See supra note 481 and accompanying text.
506. Stempel, supra note 131, at 166.
[Before the trilogy], the judge had to wait until at least mid-trial before her
excursion into what many regarded as jury territory could begin. By deciding,
before full development of the record at trial, that the nonmovant's side of a
disputed factual story is not sufficiently probative to support a verdict by a
reasonable jury, the judge can more easily eliminate not only claims that she
finds unpersuasive in the instant case but also legal rights with which she is
unsympathetic.
Id. For an example of a recent federal case in which the district court used summa-
ry judgment to dismiss a case that the court found unpersuasive, see Visser v. Pack-
er Eng'g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc). In Visser, the plaintiff
claimed his employer terminated him because of age discrimination in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Id. at 660. The district court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon its evaluation of the plaintiffs
case on intent as insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. Id. Summary judg-
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SAGA FOR
CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATVE PRIMACY RULEMAKING PROCESS:
BAD PROCESS PRODUCES BAD PROCEDURE
A. General Observations
This Article reveals two major points. First, California's summary judg-
ment law needs to be reformed, if not completely overhauled. Second,
and more fundamentally, the very process for drafting the rules of civil
procedure in California also needs reform.
California's summary judgment saga reveals how a procedural issue
with powerful political resonance, which has vocal support and opposi-
tion by interest groups both ideological and pecuniary, fares in the
rough-and-tumble reality of the legislative primacy rulemaking process.
Summary judgment reform is an item on the agendas of several interest
groups. At the federal level, it has been on the agenda of "reformers"
who oppose the "open access" paradigm and seek to speed up the dispo-
sition of cases by restricting access to the formal litigation system.' In
ment was upheld on appeal over the dissent of three judges. Id. at 660-64. The three
dissenting judges believed that the plaintiffs affidavits showed that he had enough
evidence to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination and meet his burden
of production at trial. Id. at 662-64 (Flaum, J., dissenting). Like the plaintiffs in
Celotex, Liberty Lobby, and Matsushita, Visser had a case, but one that a majority of
the court of appeals judges found unpersuasive. Visser is an example of the "new
willingness to resolve issues of intent or motive at the summary judgment stage." See
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 207, at 88-89.
507. Judge Weinstein includes in his list of "change after change in procedure [that]
has been designed to reduce access to the courts on the ground of abuse: Summary
judgment-usually against plaintiffs-[which] has been expanded." Weinstein, supra
note 133, at 831-32; see also Stempel, supra note 131, at 193 (implying that the Su-
preme Court's expansion of summary judgment in the trilogy is part of the "currently
trendy drive toward efficiency").
The "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America" included among its recommen-
dations "mandatory summary judgment" and a requirement that the courts of appeals
give trial judges greater discretion in determining whether a "genuine issue of materi-
al fact exists." President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Re-
form in America (1991), reprinted at 60 U. CIN. L REv. 979, 990, 998 (1992).
The Sourcebook of American State Legislation of the American Legislative Ex-
change Council, a conservative think-tank, also contains recommendations for expand-
ing summary judgment. AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, I SOURCEBOOK OF AMER-
ICAN STATE LEGISLATION pt.fL 86-87 (1995). Assembly Bill 3113 was offered by Gover-
nor Wilson as part of a package of "civil justice reform" proposals. See supra note
465.
California, some form of expanded summary judgment has also been part
of the reform agenda of the "anti-access movement,"' which has had a
major impact on California's judicial reform.' Thus, as a matter of ide-
ology, many in the judiciary and in academia support some form of more
potent summary judgment procedure to clear court dockets by avoiding
"unnecessary" trials. This belief in summary judgment as a docket man-
agement device explains the initial support given by the Judicial Council
to the version of Assembly Bill 3113 that passed the Assembly.510
Summary judgment, however, is also on the political or substantive
agenda of groups with a partisan or pecuniary ax to grind. Republicans,
conservatives, manufacturers and other business interests, defense law-
yers, and tort reform advocates routinely support proposals making it
easier for defendants to win summary judgment motions.51" ' These same
proposals are on the legislative hit list of the American Trial Lawyers
Association."2 Summary judgment is a prime example of highly politi-
cized procedure. As such, it has become a partisan issue in California
with special interest groups squaring off against each other in the legisla-
ture, the courts, and practice commentaries."3
Those who support a more vigorous summary judgment for pecuniary
or partisan advantage1 4 and those "reformers" who support it on ideo-
logical grounds. 5 do not necessarily agree on what form the reform
should take. For example, the Judicial Council withdrew its initial sup-
508. Weinstein, supra note 133, at 1907.
509. Professor Scheiber has observed that California has not been immune from the
reform movement characterized by Professor Stempel as the restrictive access para-
dignm:
The movement for enhanced judicial control over litigation has enjoyed ex-
traordinary success. In the federal courts and in many states, including Cali-
fornia, the trial of facts and the process of judgement in open court has
been robustly challenged as the central element of litigation by a model of
adjudication that incorporates mandated negotiation as an integral part, for
many types of cases the central part, of the process leading to disposition.
Scheiber, supra note 33, at 2107.
510. In addition to the ideological interest of improving the judicial system, support
by some judges for a strengthened summary judgment procedure may also be moti-
vated by the self-interest of achieving a more manageable workload.
511. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
513. See Mullenix, supra note 82, at 795. "It should not be surprising that partisan
politics informs legislative rulemaking, but more curious is the incursion of such
partisan tactics into the inner workings of judicial rulemaking." Id. at 851.
514. See id. at 851.
515. See Stempel, supra note 131, at 190-91. "Unlike the reformers who sought to
merge law and equity, establish discovery, and supplant code pleading with notice
pleading, the summary judgment revolutionaries prevailed without firing a legitimately
debated 'shot' in a conflict conducted under proper Enabling Act procedure." Id.
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port for Assembly Bill 3113 when the Senate Judiciary Committee deleted
the statutory provisions requiring a movant's burden."'
California's summary judgment saga teaches several lessons about the
legislative primacy rulemaldng process. Whatever the merits of a more
liberal summary judgment procedure, when the legislature serves as the
decision-making arena for the formulation of court procedure, any delib-
erative, careful, informed consideration of the merits suffers severely.
The absence from the deliberative process of persons with expertise in
procedure, and the presence of political logrolling, in the rules formula-
tion process, creates procedural rulemaking chaos. The resulting statuto-
ry product is a patchwork of poorly drafted provisions, which neglects
the public interest in a coherent, fair, and efficient judicial system and in
simple, flexible, and well-drafted procedural rules.
B. The Saga's Particular Lessons
1. The "Code" Tradition of Legislative Rulemaking Leads to Overly
Detailed and Amended Statutory Procedure
California's summary judgment statute is poorly drafted, overly de-
tailed, laden with ambiguous terms, and confusing. These statutory de-
fects are the result of the enactment, over the years, of layer upon layer
of patchwork amendments and is typical of the "code" tradition of legis-
lative rulemaking.517 One consequence is bad case, law, typified by Un-
ion Bank, as courts try to make sense out of confusing statutes"' or,
worse, use badly drawn statutes as an opportunity to grind a jurispru-
dential ax. Rather than attempting to engraft Celotex onto the existing
summary judgment statute, the legislature should have started over, com-
pletely overhauling and simplifying the statute. 19 The best candidate for
overhauling not only the summary judgment law, but the entire civil pro-
516. See supra note 493 and accompanying text.
517. See Jeffrey J. Coordohn, A Brief History of the California Legislative Counsel
Bureau and the Growing Precedential Value of its Digests and Opinions, 25 PAC.
U. 211, 216 (1994) (describing the California Legislature's practice of "churn[ing] out
ill-conceived and poorly drafted statutes while simultaneously calling for corrections
under the guise of 'revision and reform'").
518. In commenting upon the code system's adverse impact on procedural case law
in California, Chief Justice Gibson observed in 1957 that "[u]nder the code system we
constantly resort to judicial construction to make statutes workable and to fit them
into situations which were not clearly contemplated by their draftsmen." Gibson, su-
pra note 70, at 730.
519. See supra note 287 (describing the California Judges Association's support for
this assertion).
cedure code, is the Judicial Council."0
2. The Legislative Primacy Process is "Uninformed" About Procedure
Most legislators lack sufficient litigation experience to understand
complex procedural issues. Few, if any, of the members of the Assembly
Judiciary Committee that voted in favor of Assembly Bill 3113 had exten-
sive experience with civil litigation. At the time the Assembly Judiciary
Committee voted Assembly Bill 3113 onto the floor of the Assembly, only
four of the committee's fifteen members were lawyers, and this group's
shared litigation experience is not extensive."2 There were more "law-
yer" members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that rejected Assembly
Bill 3113, but like the assembly members who accepted it, the hands-on
civil litigation experience shared by these attorneys was thin.'s It is dif-
ficult to believe that most of these judiciary committee members who
played such a key role in formulating summary judgment law could un-
derstand the intricacies of the movant and respondent's burdens and
their relation to Celotex.
Prolonged service on a legislative judiciary committee might mitigate
the committee members' lack of practical litigation experience. However,
of the Assembly Judiciary Committee's fifteen members as it existed in
the spring of 1996, seven members had served only two years, two had
served three years, five had served four years and only one had served
six years.' Term limits, which will prevent legislators from sitting on a
520. See ifra notes 550-59.
521. Committee Chair Bill Morrow, a Republican, was a United States Marine Corps
officer, judge advocate, and chief trial counsel at Camp Pendleton. CALIFORNIA PoLIrI-
CAL ALMANAC, supra note 469, at 266-68. Democrat Debra Bowen's practice specializes
in environmental issues. Id. at 198-99. Republican Howard Kaloogian's practice centers
on probate, trusts, and taxes. Id. at 231-32. Jan Goldsmith was a professional media-
tor and arbitrator (1981-1992), an adjunct instructor in negotiation and mediation at
University of San Diego Law School (1987-1989), and served as judge pro tern. Id.
Three out of the four lawyer-members, including Democrat Debra Bowen, voted in
favor of releasing Assembly Bill 3113 to the Assembly floor. A.B. 3113, Votes-Roll Call
in Assembly Committee on Judiciary (on file with author). Kaloogian is listed as "ab-
sent, abstaining or not voting." Id.
522. Senator Charles Calderon, a Democrat, was a former city attorney prosecutor.
Id. at 116-18. Senator Ray Haynes, a Republican, is free counsel for Western Center
of Law and Religious Freedom. Id. at 291. Senator William Lockyer, a Democrat, is
not listed in Martindale-Hubbell nor is there any reference to his practice in the Cali-
fornia Political Almanac. See id. at 149-50. However, that book describes Democrat
Senator Nicholas Petris as "a vocal champion of the state's influential trial lawyers,
standing against all efforts to tighten the state's 'deep pockets' tort liability laws,
efforts he sees as victimizing consumers." Id. at 164-65. Senator Byron Sher, a Demo-
crat, is a Stanford law professor. Id. at 279-81.
523. See id.
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judiciary committee long enough to develop a familiarity with procedural
issues, will exacerbate this lack of rulemaking wisdom.
Also missing from the legislative rulemaking process are well-re-
searched empirical studies of proposed rules to determine whether there
were problems with the statute, what those problems were, and whether
each proposed rule change would provide a solution. The natural source
of such data would have been the Judicial Council, which has a well-
developed research staff in the Administrative Office of the Courts.'
However, when the legislature tosses proposed amendments to the Coun-
cil for appraisal, the Council generally does not have sufficient time to
develop an in-depth workup.s This lack of sufficient response time
provides some explanation as to why the Judicial Council did not pro-
vide the Assembly Judiciary Committee with any studies. The Council
sent only a brief letter in support of the version of Assembly Bill 3113
that ultimately passed the Assembly, with no real analysis of the pros
and cons of the proposed amendment.s
Legal scholars and practitioners did little to inform the debate over the
1992 and 1993 amendments and Assembly Bill 3113. The local literature
made no attempt to give perspective and context to the summary judg-
ment issue by importing into the California summary judgment debate
524. See Stolz & Gunn, supm note 34, at 886 n.63 and 890-91; Scheiber, supra note
33, at 2081, 2083-84. This staff produces such studies when the Judicial Council con-
siders one of its own proposals to change a rule of court. Telephone Interview with
Carrie Cornwell, Legislative Policy Analyst, California Judicial Council (July 25, 1996).
525. Telephone Interview with Carrie Cornwell, Legislative Policy Analyst, California
Judicial Council (July 25, 1996).
526. Letter from Carrie Cornwell, Legislative Policy Analyst, California Judicial Coun-
cil to Assembly Member Morrow, Assembly Judiciary Committee (April 8, 1996) (on
file with author). After noting that Assembly Bill 3113 "adopts in state statute the
federal standard for granting summary judgment," the Judicial Council's letter makes
the following observations:
Summary judgment at the federal level forces parties to prove their cases
earlier because the defendant shifts the burden to the plaintiff after showing
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
The council, therefore, believes that this bill by strengthening summary judg-
ment in state courts will promote early settlement and eliminate those cases
with no merit.
Id.
It is, of course, arguable that even had the committee members been presented
with a thorough and well-researched study, most members would not have had the
requisite familiarity with procedure generally, and of summary judgment in particu-
lar-nor the time or inclination-to digest its contents.
the scholarly dialogue in law reviews across the nation regarding the wis-
dom of the Supreme Court's expansion of summary judgment. There has
been no examination of the post-trilogy federal case law to determine
how deep the new version of summary judgment cuts. There has been no
exploration of the place for summary judgment in the larger adjudicatory
system through an honest assessment of the competing visions or para-
digms of adjudicatory procedure vying for dominance. California legal
academicians have a unique contribution to offer to the development of
California procedure by providing depth and perspective to the dialogue
over procedural issues, and some coherence to a judicial system buffeted
by change. The legislative primacy rulemaking model does not encourage
this scholarly contribution. In contrast to the legislative primacy model,
the Federal Advisory Committee actively invites scholarly input into rules
formulation. The membership of the Federal Advisory Committee in-
cludes academicians, and the reporter for each committee is usually a
law professor.'
California's legislative rulemaking process relies heavily upon the work
of the counsel assigned to each judiciary committee to synthesize the
arguments in support of and in opposition to a bill, to scrutinize text for
drafting defects, and to analyze the impact of the proposed amendment
on existing law.' Careful scrutiny by counsel to the Assembly Judicia-
ry Committee of the draft of Assembly Bill 3113, as originally proposed
by the Governor's office, disclosed the omission in the text of a provision
for shifting the movant's burden to the respondent, as well as the failure
to change all references from "triable issue" to "genuine issue."' The
assigned counsel bases his analysis of the merits largely on the partisan
input of supporters and opponents of that bill, and whatever independent
research he can perform.' No matter how competent counsel happens
to be, the work of one lawyer, whose job is dependent upon the goodwill
of the party in power, is no substitute for careful, collective, and neutral
deliberation.
3. The Legislative Primacy Process is "Political"
Sununary judgment has become an intensely political issue. Once the
legislature raised the red flag of Celotex as the avowed purpose of As-
527. See Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Proce-
dure, 22 TEx. TECH. L REv. 323, 329 (1991). Perhaps part of the explanation for the
dearth of scholarly input into the summary judgment dialogue lies in the low level of
scholarly interest in California procedural issues.
528. Telephone Interview with Cliff Zall, Counsel, Assembly Judiciary Conunittee
(July 25, 1996) [hereinaer Telephone Interview with Cliff Zall].
529. See supra notes 476, 487.
530. See Telephone Interview with Cliff Zall, supra note 528.
[Vol. 24: 455, 1997] Saga of Summary Judgment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sembly Bill 3113, support for and opposition to the bill became a highly
partisan matter. The vote in the Assembly Judiciary Committee and on
the assembly floor broke almost completely along party lines."1 In the
Judiciary Committee, all but one of the committee members who voted
to release Assembly Bill 3113 to the assembly floor were Republicans.'
All but one of the Democrats on the committee either abstained or were
absent from the hearing at which the vote was taken.' On the assem-
bly floor, Republican legislators accounted for forty of the forty-one
votes that passed Assembly Bill 3 1 13 .' Democrats accounted for all
thirty-two votes opposing the bill.'a
From the partisan nature of the vote on Assembly Bill 3113, as well as
the lack of informed, neutral-sourced input on this technical procedural
matter, it seems fair to infer that the political affiliation of the legislators
determined their vote more than did a careful, informed decision on the
merits.'a
Legislative rulemaking is a non-neutral process that is likely to produce
non-neutral rules of procedure. Legislators are directly subject to special
interest group and party leadership pressure. 7 Assembly Bill 3113
531. See A.B. 3113, Votes-Roll Call on Assembly Floor, AB. 3113, Votes-Roll Call in
Assembly Judiciary Committee (on file with author).
532. See A.B. 3113, Votes-Roll Call in Assembly Judiciary Committee (on file with
author). Debra Bowen, a Democrat from the 53rd Assembly District, was the only
Democrat on the committee to vote in favor of Assembly Bill 3113. See id. Bill
Kaloogian, a Republican, was either absent or abstained. I&
533. See id.
534. See A.B. 3113, Votes-Roll Call on Assembly Floor (on file with author).
535. See id. It is interesting to note that Assembly Member Debra Bowen, the Dem-
ocratic .Vice-Chair of the Assembly Judiciary Committee who provided the lone Demo-
cratic vote in favor of releasing Assembly Bill 3113 to the Assembly floor, was either
absent, abstained, or did not vote on the bill when it actually reached the Assembly
floor. See id. Only one Democrat and one Republican crossed party lines; Cortese, a
Democrat, voted in favor of A.B. 3113 while Setencich, a Republican voted against.
See id.
536. The fact that a fortified summary judgment is part of the "civil justice agenda"
of Governor Wilson, the Quayle Report, and the package of "model" legislation pro-
posals distributed to state legislators nationwide by the conservative American Legis-
lative Exchange Council suggests that harried conservative legislators vote the entire
agenda. See supra notes 107-32 and accompanying text.
537. See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Con-
temporaneous Crisis, 27 STAN. L REV. 673 (1975). Professor Friedenthal notes:
The legislative process seems particularly unsuited both to wholesale reform
of court procedures and to technical adjustment of specific regulations....
[L]egislators, even when sensitive to the need for reform, are often influenced
seems to have suffered from the "shoot from the hip" and "draft first and
ask questions later" propensities of legislators.' The result was a piece
of poorly drafted, ill-considered procedural legislation.
Furthermore, due to the heightened partisan interest in summary judg-
ment and the split control of the legislature between Democrats and
Republicans,' resolution of the current confusion in summary judg-
ment law will be held hostage to legislative gridlock The legislative
rulemaking process does not foster forthright and candid assessment of
procedural bills that are perceived to have significant political implica-
tions. Commentators have criticized reformers for packaging substantive
proposals, aimed at advancing the financial interests of repeat players, as
civil justice reform measures that benefit everyone.5 "
The Saga of Summary Judgment also illustrates how poorly drafted
procedural statutes produced by the legislative primacy process can
invite flawed case law as courts attempt to interpret these statutes."
The Union Bank episode illustrates how reformers were able to leverage
ambiguities in the summary judgment statute and confused legislative
history to achieve in the court of appeal a transformation of summary
judgment procedure unachievable in the legislature due to the powerful
opposition of the trial lawyers' lobby.
Reformers set the stage for Union Bank by advancing their views on
summary judgment in law reviews and practice commentaries. For exam-
ple, Judge Pollak pressed for a Celotex-type approach to California sum-
mary judgment before the Supreme Court decided Celotex.5" Addition-
ally, the campaign in the commentaries for a stronger summary judgment
procedure gathered momentum following the trilogy.' A few writers
suggested that the courts could do the job, rather than the legisla-
ture.
4 4
by special interest lobbyists, including members of various elements of the
bar itself. Such lobbyists may pressure legislators to alter crucial parts of a
proposed reform bill, thereby limiting or destroying its overall effectiveness.
Id. at 673.
538. See Stempel, supra note 55, at 742-43.
539. See supra note 8 (noting that the Democrats regained control of the Assembly
in the November 1996 election, but only by a "paper thin" majority).
540. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 65-67 (discussing the comments of Chief Justice Phil Gibson)
& 518.
542. Pollak, supra note 209, at 419.
543. See, e.g., Dowling, supra note 307, at 493; Curtis Karnow, Follow the Federal
Lead on Summary Judgment, CAL. LAw., Dec. 1989, at 33; Mitchell, supra note 240,
at 29.
544. Dowling, supra note 307, at 510 ("The necessary evolution can occur through
judicial action without additional legislative reform."); Mitchell, supra note 240, at 29-
30 ("The California courts can and should interpret Code of Civil Procedure Section
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As early as 1989, the most influential of these commentators, Wel and
Brown, urged that California follow the federal lead in summary judg-
ment.' After the enactment of the 1992 amendment to section 437c,
but before any case law interpretation of that amendment, Weil and
Brown stated that "[tjhe 1992 amendments represent a significant depar-
ture from former law" and that the legislature intended "to adopt the
federal standards governing burden of proof on summary judgment mo-
tions as expressed in [Ce/otex]." w One commentator predicted that
Wel and Brown's interpretation of the 1992 amendment "may also be-
come a self-fulfilling prophecy, because the Wel and Brown practice
guide has been cited by California appellate courts as a 'leading trea-
tise.'" 7 Wel and Brown read Union Bank expansively,' despite the
court's deliberately narrow holding."M 9
437c in a way to accomplish [the same purposes as Celotex].").
Mitchell, supra note 240, at 32 ("If the California courts are interested in resolv-
ing court congestion and reducing the backlog of cases waiting for trial, they should
be willing to take a more realistic approach to summary judgment") Karnow, supra
note 296, at 1885-86. ("Those pining for a change in California's summary judgment
law have suggested amendments to the statute. But problems in the law heretofore
are the byproduct of judges, not legislators; and judges have the power to change the
law.") Id,
545. ROBEirr . WEIL & IRA A. BRowN, CAL PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PRoCEDURE BE-
FORE TRIMAL § 10:115.4 (1989).
There is much to be said for the federal rule. The California rule places no
burden on the opposing party until the moving party negates the opposing
party's claim or defense (at which point, the opposing party can avoid sum-
mary judgment simply by showing a single triable issue of fact . . ). The
federal rule enables the moving party to force the other side to "reveal its
hand." If the opposition has no evidence on an essential element of its case,
or its evidence consists of inadmissible hearsay or opinions, this will be dis-
closed early on rather than having to wait until the time of trial!
Id. § 10:227.
546. WEIL & BROWN, supra note 296, § 10.237.
547. Thomas, supra note 296, at 7. It should be noted that the Union Bank deci-
sion did not cite Weil and Brown to support its interpretation of the 1992 and 1993
amendments. See Union Bank v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
653 (Ct App. 1995).
548. See supra notes 425-28 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.
C. The Judicial Council, Supported by a Standing Advisory
Committee, Should Promulgate All Rules of Civil Procedure
Vesting the Judicial Council with complete rulemaking power would be
a substantial improvement over legislative rulemaking; it would not, of
course, be a panacea for all the ills plaguing the rulemaking process. This
Article proposes that the Judicial Council serve a rulemaking function
similar to the Judicial Conference of the United States. A standing advi-
sory committee on the civil rules, operating within the Judicial Council,
would do the work of drafting proposed rules for ultimate approval and
promulgation by the Council, subject to legislative veto. The advisory
committee would consist of a balanced cross-section of the bench, bar,
and academia' Additionally, this Article proposes that the member-
ship of the Judicial Council itself be diversified to include procedural
scholars in addition to the existing membership drawn from the bench
and bar.
The Judicial Council, of course, is not immune from the political forc-
es that buffet the rulemaking process in the legislature." Even the fed-
eral judiciary, with appointed, life-tenured judges, is not immune from
the political influence of the presidents who appoint those judges. 2 In
California, the election of judges, who occupy most of the seats on the
Judicial Council, increases the vulnerability of rulemaking in the Council
to political influence.
However, federal experience demonstrates that despite the recent
onslaught of lobbyists, the neutral perspective of the advisory committee
process remains intact.' The Advisory Committee's adherence to the
550. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules consists of two circuit court judges,
three district court judges, one United States magistrate, one state court justice, one
Justice Department attorney, two practitioners, and two law professors. See Mullenix,
supra note 82, at 797 n.2. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988, as originally draft-
ed, proposed that the Advisory Committees "consist of a balanced cross section of
the bench and bar, and trial and appellate judges," but this provision was eliminated
from the final legislation. Id. at 832.
551. The impact of the politicization of procedure on federal rulemaking has not
been confined to Congress. Since the 1988 amendments to the REA opened up the
Advisory Committee's rulemaking process to wider public participation, special inter-
est groups have actively lobbied the Advisory Committee. For a summary of the spe-
cific ways in which the Judicial Improvements Act of 1988 has made the Advisory
Committee's rulemaking process more public, see id. at 832.
552. See supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Quayle Report).
553. Marcus, supra note 44, at 816. Marcus explains:
[R]eformers can be moved by more than the self-interest of the loudest or
best-financed supplicant, and this is the orientation the Advisory Committee
has assumed. Despite the controversy surrounding some of the recent propos-
als, there is no significant indication that the proposals themselves reflect the
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goal of neutrality amidst the political tempest provides good reason to
expect that the Judicial Council will approach its expanded rulemaking
duties with the same good-faith objective of drafting procedurally neutral
rules.
It should be noted that the Advisory Committee has been the subject
of some criticism recently,' but one need not throw the baby out with
the bathwater.' There is certainly room to improve the process, and
commentators have floated a variety of proposals motivated by the com-
mon desire to preserve the key role of the judiciary in federal
importuning, as such, of those who might be affected.
Id.
The increased accessibility of the Advisory Committee to interest group lobbying
has not aroused concern that the committee will lose its neutral perspective. To the
contrary, Professor Mullenix is concerned that, as procedure becomes politicized, the
Advisory Committee will abdicate more rulemaking authority to Congress to avoid
tangling with political issues. Mullenix, supra note 82, at 837. Ultimately, Professor
Mullenix fears that "the Advisory Committee will become insignificant in the
rulemaling process" as interest groups move on to Congress for satisfaction. Id.
554. Scholarly commentary has criticized the Advisory Committee for acting intu-
itively and precipitously, without sufficient deliberation based upon empirical data. See
Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L REV. 1393, 1443
(1994) (discussing criticism by Supreme Court Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter on
the Advisory Committee's attempts to amend federal civil discovery); Gerald F. Hess,
Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court, An Empirical Comparative Study, 75
MARQ. L REV. 313, 314 nn.3-4 (1992) (discussing empirical studies on the controversy
surrounding Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee). In this regard, the problems sur-
rounding the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 and the addition of mandatory disclosure to
conventional discovery under Rule 26 have drawn the most criticisr. See Burbank,
supra note 183, at 844-48 (discussing the implications of the 1983 amendments to
Rule 11 and the 1993 amendments to Rule 26); Mullenix, supra note 82, at 837 (com-
menting on the impact of the Advisory Committee's newly proposed informal discov-
ery rules and procedures); Stempel, supra note 55, at 740 n.278 ("The adoption and
subsequent modification of Rule 11 reveals a shoot-from-the-hip rulemaking process in
which insiders quietly but quickly decided to 'do something' about a perceived prob-
lem with frivolous litigation."); Walker, supra note 82, at 489 (proposing a shift in the
process of committee rulemaking from deductive to inductive reasoning based upon
empirical data in order "to preserve judicial expertise as a starting point for
rulemaldng"). But see Marcus, supra note 44, at 824 ("Far from stirring up trouble to
justify its existence, the Advisory Committee appears in many ways a stable and cau-
tious institution in the present climate of multifaceted and aggressive procedural re-
form in civil litigation.").
555. See Marcus, supra note 44, at 761 n.1; (citing STEPHEN B. BuRBANK, RULE 11 IN
TRANSITION 71 (1989) ("The answer lies not in throwing the baby out with the
bathwater.")).
nilemaldng.' Whatever may be the defects in the advisory committee
process, few suggest abandoning the field to Congress. 7 The Judicial
Council has already proven its rulemaking competence in areas specifi-
cally delegated by the legislature.' The nucleus of a standing advisory
committee has been in place for many years.' Any necessary expan-
sion of the current staff of experts to support an expanded rulemaking
function should. be adequately funded by the legislature.
D. Conclusion
California summary judgment law is in a state of confusion. This prob-
lem has been created by a legislative rulemaking process, which also
blocks the way to a solution. Summary judgment procedure requires a
complete overhaul from the ground up. Such a thorough reassessment of
summary judgment requires honest, forthright debate, from a public-in-
terest perspective, about the goals of California's judicial system and the
role of summary judgment in that system. It requires informed decision
making based on empirical research and careful deliberation involving
the bench and bar.
Such reassessment is unlikely to come from the legislature. The legisla-
tive primacy rulemaking process does not promote clear thinking about
summary judgment or about the future direction of California's civil jus-
tice system. Summary judgment procedure is currently trapped in politi-
cal gridlock in the legislature.' The Judicial Council has retreated into
its administrative role of court manager and the bar is factionalized be-
tween the trial and defense bars each pressing their own professional
interests. Meanwhile, the public interest in a fair and efficient judicial
system is caught in the cross fire.
California's judicial system, like that of the federal courts, is at a wa-
tershed somewhat akin to the historic shift in procedural paradigms that
occurred during the 1930s and resulted in the epic reforms of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. As in the 1930s, the nation, and California,"
are undergoing a period of soul-searching in which fundamental assump-
556. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 55, at 740 ("The Enabling Act, which was
opened more to the public in 1988, should be opened further and amended in other
ways."); Walker, supra note 82, at 489 ("I propose that the analogy of modern admin-
istrative law be employed to suggest adoption of a synoptic model of rulemaking for
use by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules."); Burbank, supra note 183, at 842
("We need a moratorium on procedural law reform, whether by court rule or by
statute, until such time as we know what we are doing.").
557. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
559. See supra notes 70, 77 and accompanying text.
560. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
561. See generally Scheiber, supra note 33, at 2057-67 (documenting the social and
political content of change in the California courts).
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tions-political, social, and economic-are being questioned. This re-
thinking of fundamentals includes the goals and further direction of the
adjudicatory system.
This point in time offers California an historic opportunity to reexam-
ine candidly what its citizens expect from their civil justice system. If the
legislature is really interested in judicial reform and in streamlining the
civil justice system, let it release the complete rulemaking power-and,
with it, the code tradition of patchwork, piecemeal amendments-to the
Judicial Council. The Judicial Council can serve the same function today
that the Advisory Committee performed in the late 1930s of streamlining
and simplifying the code of civil procedure through a process of careful
and well-informed study that seeks "to arrive at a shared conception of
the 'common good'"' according to a coherent vision of a reformed ju-
dicial system.
562. Stempel, supra note 55, at 751.
Appendix A'
§ 437c. Grounds for and effect of summary judgment; procedure on
motion
(a) Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or pro-
ceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no
defense to the action or proceeding. The motion may be made at any-
time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the ac-
tion or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or
at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or
without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct. Notice of the
motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the
action at least 28 days before the time appointed for hearing. However,
if the notice is served by mail, the required 28-day period of notice shall
be increased by five days if the place of address is within the State of
California, 10 days if the place of address is outside the State of Califor-
nia but within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is
outside the United States, and if the notice is served by facsimile trans-
mission, Express Mail, or another method of delivery providing for over-
night delivery, the required 28-day period of notice shall be increased by
two court days. The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before
the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The
filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must
otherwise file a responsive pleading.
(b) The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admis-
sions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judi-
cial notice shall or may be taken. The supporting papers shall include a
separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts
which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material
facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.
The failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may
in the court's discretion constitute a sufficient ground for denial of the
motion.
Any opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not less than 14
days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court
for good cause orders otherwise. The opposition, where appropriate,
shall consist of affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interroga-
563. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 437c (West Supp. 1996).
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tories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be
taken.
The opposition papers shall include a separate statement which re-
sponds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be
undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees
that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plain-
ly and concisely any other material facts which the opposing party con-
tends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party
to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evi-
dence. Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement
may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court's discretion, for granting
the motion.
Any reply to the opposition shall be served and filed by the moving
party not less than five days preceding the noticed or continued date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.
Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed
waived.
Sections 1005 and 1013, extending the time within which a right may
be exercised or an act may be done, do not apply to this section.
Any incorporation by reference of matter in the court's file shall set
forth with specificity the exact matter to which reference is being made
and shall not incorporate the entire file.
(c) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the pa-
pers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In determining whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as
to any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth
in the papers, except that to which objections have been made and sus-
tained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court
based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contra-
dicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to
any material fact.
(d) Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made
by any person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evi-
dence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testi-
fy to the matters stated in the affidavits or declarations. Any objections
based on the failure to comply with the requirements of this subdivision
shall be made at the hearing or shall be deemed waived.
(e) If a party is otherwise entitled to a summary judgment pursuant to
this section, summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credi-
bility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses furnishing affidavits
or declarations in support of the summary judgment, except that summa-
ry judgment may be denied in the discretion of the court, where the only
proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is
an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole wit-
ness to that fact; or where a material fact is an individual's state of mind,
or lack thereof, and that fact is sought to be established solely by the
individual's affirmation thereof.
(f)(1) A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more
causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one
or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party
contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affir-
mative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative de-
fense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a
claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that
one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plain-
tiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted
only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative de-
fense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.
(2) A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an
alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all
procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. However, a
party may not move for summary judgment based on issues asserted in a
prior motion for summary adjudication and denied by the court, unless
that party establishes to the satisfaction of the court, newly discovered
facts or circumstances or a change of law supporting the issues reassert-
ed in the summary judgment motion.
(g) Upon the denial of a motion for summary judgment, on the ground
that there is a triable issue as to one or more material facts, the court
shall, by written or oral order, specify one or more material facts raised
by the motion as to which the court has determined there exists a triable
controversy. This determination shall specifically refer to the evidence
proffered in support of and in opposition to the motion which indicates
that a triable controversy exists. Upon the grant of a motion for summa-
ry judgment, on the ground that there is no triable issue of material fact,
the court shall, by written or oral order, specify the reasons for its deter-
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mination. The order shall specifically refer to the evidence proffered in
support of, and if applicable in opposition to, the motion which indicates
that no triable issue exists. The court shall also state its reasons for any
other determination. The court shall record its determination by court
reporter or written order.
(h) If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a mo-
tion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both that facts
essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated,
then be presented, the court shall deny the motion, or order a continu-
ance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may
make any other order as may be just.
(i) If the court determines at any time that any of the affidavits are
presented in bad faith or solely for purposes of delay, the court shall
order the party presenting the affidavits to pay the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits
caused the other party to incur. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursu-
ant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party's papers, or
on the court's own noticed motion, and after an opportunity to be heard.
(j) Except where a separate judgment may properly be awarded in the
action, no final judgment shall be entered on a motion for summary judg-
ment prior to the termination of the action, but the final judgment shall,
in addition to any matters determined in the action, award judgment as
established by the summary proceeding herein provided for.
(k) In actions which arise out of an injury to the person or to proper-
ty, when a motion for summary judgment was granted on the basis that
the defendant was without fault, no other defendant during trial, over
plaintiffs objection, may attempt to attribute fault to or comment on the
absence or involvement of the defendant who was granted the motion.
(1) A summary judgment entered under this section is an appealable
judgment as in other cases. Upon entry of any order pursuant to this
section except the entry of summary judgement, a party may, within 20
days after service upon him or her of a written notice of entry of the
order, petition an appropriate reviewing court for a peremptory writ. If
the notice is served by mail, the initial period within which to file the
petition shall be increased by five days if the place of address is within
the State of California, 10 days if the place of address is outside the State
of California but within the United States, and 20 days if the place of
address is outside the United States. If the notice is served by facsimile
transmission, Express Mail, or another method of delivery providing for
overnight delivery, the initial period within which to file the petition shall
be increased by two court days. The superior court may, for good cause,
and prior to the expiration of the initial period, extend the time for one
additional period not to exceed 10 days.
(m)(1) If a motion for summary adjudication is granted, at the trial of
the action, the cause or causes of action within the action, affirmative
defense or defenses, claim for damages, or issue or issues of duty as to
the motion which has been granted shall be deemed to be established
and the action shall proceed as to the cause or causes of action, affirma-
tive defense or defenses, claim for damages, or issue or issues of duty
remaining.
(2) In the trial of the action, the fact that a motion for summary adju-
dication is granted as to one or more causes of action, affirmative de-
fenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty within the action shall not
operate to bar any cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damag-
es, or issue of duty as to which summary adjudication was either not
sought or denied.
(3) In the trial of an action, neither a party, nor a witness, nor the
court shall comment upon the grant or denial of a motion for summary
adjudication to a jury.
(n) A cause of action has no merit if either of the following exists:
(1) One or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be sepa-
rately established, even if that element is separately pleaded.
(2) A defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of
action.
(o) For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary
adjudication:
(1) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of show-
ing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved
each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on
that cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met
that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant
may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to
show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set
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forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists
as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.
(2) A defendant or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of show-
ing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one
or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded,
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause
of action. Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of ac-
tion or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or cross-complainant may not
rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a
triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specif-
ic facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.
(p) Nothing in this section shall be construed to extend the period for
trial provided by Section 1170.5.
(q) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to actions brought pursu-
ant to Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1159) of Title 3 of Part 3.
(r) For the purposes of this section, a change in law shall not include a
later enacted statute without retroactive application.

